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PREFACE 
Aeronautics is changing in many significant respects. The 
implications of this are so far-reaching as to call into question the 
future position of the United States in world aviation. 
The magnitude of this question, with its possible consequences for 
the nation's economy and security, led the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) to seek an independent evaluation from the 
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Research 
Council's Assembly of Engineering. Specifically, the ASEB was asked 
to assess the nature and implications of the current state of U. S. 
aviation in a world setting and their significance for NASA's role in 
the nation's aeronautical future. 
The ASEB responded by convening a ~lOrkshop July 27 through 
August 2, 1980, at the National Academy of Sciences' Uoods Hole Study 
Center. The workshop \v<lS structured into four panels covering mili-
tary aviation, transport airc raft, general aviation, and rotorcraft. 
In addition, an overview panel was formed to consider NASA's role in 
research as well as its relationships with other elements of the 
aeronautics community. 
The central task of the workshop was to examine the relationship 
of NASA's aeronautical research capabilities to the state of U.S. avia-
tion and to make recommendations about NASA's future roles in 
aeronautics\ 
NASA and its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics (NACA), traditionally have maintained a cooperative 
relationship with the aeronautical industry, with other government 
agencies concerned with aircraft operations and regulations, and with 
the academic community engaged in aerospace research. This 
triumvirate was taken into account in planning the workshop and 
selecting the participants. Thus, representatives from each part of 
the aeronautical communi ty ,,,ere invited, and information on NASA's 
relationship with each was the subject of special presentations prior 
to the working sessions. Representation from industry \vas predominant 
because industry's relationship with NASA is considered to lIe a key 
element in examining the present and future roles of tIASA. 
The members of the workshop panels represente~, in total expertise 
and experience, all of the important sectors of aeronautics: military 
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aircraft and missiles; commercial air transports; general aviation; 
rotorcraft; university and private research; airline operations; and 
government regulatory agencies. In addition, the participants also 
included representatives of other industries--notably, automotive, 
electronics, and steeL Including the speakers and other nonpanel 
members, close to 80 individuals participated. 
The participants were asked to address the issue of NASA's role in 
the context of a wider discussion concerning: the status and dimen-
sions of U.S. aeronautics; the key aeronautical problems and opportuni-
ties that are likely to ~e amenahle to research and technology develop-
ment; the historical evolution and accomplishments of NASA in aeronaut-
ical research and technology development; and possible alternatives to 
NASA. Each of these subjects is discussed thoroughly in separate 
panel reports. 
The report of the workshop consists of seven volumes: 
I Summary 
II Report of the Panel on Military Aviation 
III Report of the Panel on Transport Aircraft 
IV Report of the Panel on General Aviation 
V Report of the Panel on Rotorcraft 
VI Report of the Overview Panel on Aeronautical Research 
VII Background Papers--The Outlook for Aeronautics and Relevant 
Areas 
In order to help focus the discussion, NASA officials developed and 
provided a concise set of definitions of eight possible roles for NASA: 
National Facilities and Expertise; Research; Generic Technology Evolu-
tion; Vehicle Class Technology Evolution; Technology Demonstration; 
Technology Validation; Prototype Development; and, Operatiol1s Feasi-
bility. Because some of these roles differ, depending on the aeronau-
tical discipline involved, the roles are assessed within six principal 
aeronautical disciplines: aerodynamics, structures and materials, pro-
pulsion, electronics and avionics, vehicle operations, and human 
engineering. Definitions of these roles and disciplines are contained 
in Section IV of Volume I. The matching of the roles and discjplines 
is treated in Volumes II-VI and summarized in Section II of Volume I. 
:'he ~-lorkshop participants \-lere extensively briefed by officials 
from NASA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), by leaders fro'll the aviation manufacturing anc1 
operating industries, and by a member of Congress. 
Each panel separately considered the nat'onal benefits produce~l 
within the dimensions of its sector and the relative state of the 
sector's world position; each considered the evolution of NASA's role, 
as \-lell as a rationale for NASA's aeronautical support of its sector; 
and, finally, each panel produced sector-oriented conclusions and 
vi 
recommendations for NASA's roles for the future. Al though there are 
obvious overlaps, the similari ties and differences in each of the 
panels' findings are preserved in the separate reports of the sector-
oriented panels, Volumes II-V. 
This document, Volume' VII, contains the Background Papers that 
\-lere presented to a plenary session of the workshop on the first and 
second days. 
Each paper is the \lTork of an individual who accepts full responsi-
bility for its contents. Each speaker was invited to deliver his 
paper because of his recognized competence in the subject. None of 
the papers published in this volume has been critically reviewed in 
accordance with the procedures approved by a Report Review Committee 
of the National Research Council, which. operates on behalf of the 
National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and 
the Institute of Medicine. 
The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board is grateful to the 
speakers, all of whom gave so willingly and generously of their time 
and expertise to bring to the workshop participants a wealth of 
knowledge and insight on issues likely to affect on the future course 
of aeronautics in the United States. 
vii 
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BACKGROUND AND QUESTIONS ON NASA'S ROLE IN AERONAUTICS 
Dr. Robert A. Frosch 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Art Buchwald enunciated what is known around t-lashington as 
Buchwald's theorem when he said that the way to succeed in l-lashington 
is to fail. Having observed the Washington scene for a while, he 
concluded that it was precisely those portions of the government that 
failed in solving problems that received the greatest attention. 
Therefore, those problems must be terribly important and they must 
have more money in next year's budget to try again to solve those 
problems. I suppose my corollary to Buchwald's theorem is that the 
way to fail in Washington is to succeed. In some sense, that is an 
introductory statement to this workshop. 
For over 60 years we have had a research and development operation 
within the U.S. government that has maintained a close working 
relationship with private industry. We have succeeded jointly in the 
sense that, over a period of time, the U.S. aeronautical community 
founded, constructed, and came into domination of a world aeronautical 
industry. That, I think, is strong evidence of success. In some 
sense, that very success has led, in the past several years, to a 
questioning of the basis and procedure upon which that success was 
based. We have gone through a period in which the very nature of the 
NASA program in aeronautics, the relationship with industry, and the 
fact that there was a funded program have been questioned both during 
the budget process and a number of policy formulation processes. We 
are continually being asked in very blunt terms, "Why does the U.S. 
government do research and development that subsidizes a wealthy 
industry?" I am putting it in its sharpest and strongest terms. This 
is a question we are asked frequently. 
I would say that the Congress is a bit schizophrenic on this 
point. Some subcommittees and committees and members are strongly in 
favor of even more aeronautical research and development. Some take 
the view that I have just described. 
So, we are precipitated by the outside-of-NASA climate into 
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examining this whole question of what the policy of NASA, industry, 
and the academic world ought to be in regard to each other in the 
future. Of course, it is not wholly a bad thing to go back and 
reexamine the basis upon which we are working and the policies and the 
boundary lines between various kinds of work. 
The specific charter for what we are doing is a legislative 
charter. It is the Space Act of 1958, which, like most organic acts, 
is specific but vague. In order to decide what you have to do, you 
must do a good deal of interpreting. It is clear that NASA is charged 
with doing research and development to ensure u.s. leadership in space 
and aeronautics. However, since nobody knows precisa1y what 
leadership in either of these subjects means, it gives us a good piece 
of rhetoric but doesn't carry us very much farther. It is clear that 
we principally have a civil responsibility, but we also have a 
responsibility for working with and supporting, as well as being 
supported by, the military side of the aeronautics and space business. 
Beyond that, there is relatively little guidance other than that 
it is a research and development charter. 
All parties seem clear on the fact that we should not be in the 
business of designing or building commercial aircraft or building 
prototypes. All parties seem clear that we should be in the business 
of basic research in aeronautics. Nearly everything else is in some 
sense in contention. So, one way to put a class of questons to this 
group is to say, "\-lhere are the boundary lines, or in what areas 
between pure aeronautical research and the actual construction of 
prototypes or final flying machines should the NASA program resi:le? 
How should it span that set of possible areas? What is the 
relationship of the government-owned facilities to the academic 
facilities? How shall those relationships be preserved? What is it 
that NASA should be trying to do as its specifie role in the whole 
business of civil aeronautics and in its relationship with military 
aeronautics?" 
This is not an academic exercise for us in any sense of the word. 
It becomes very real in the course of the next month or two as we try 
to decide what the fiscal 1982 budget for NASA in aeroriautics ought to 
be, and what activities it should include, and what activities it 
should exclude. I don't, by that remark, mean to say that this is a 
prebudget exercise for the 1982 budget, but I do want to put both an 
immediate and a long-range policy realism on it because every year we 
have an opportunity, in the course of developing the rationale for the 
budget, to decide what the rationale is for future operations and 
future budgets. 
Having established a general framework, I would like to say that 
your willingness to come and spend a week working on this problem is 
our strongest indication that the industry and the academic world are 
interested in what we jo and think there is some importance to it. I 
want to thank you for taking the trouble and effort in coming together 
to help us try to rethink what the NASA role is in aeronautics, which 
is the general charge for the week. Thank you. 
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NASA'S ROLES AND CONCERNS 
Alan M. Lovelace 
Deputy Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
I would like to share some views and perceptions on where we are 
domestically, where we are in the military, civil aeronautics activity 
as viewed from NASA, where we are on the international scene, and 
finally a few remarks on the legislative environment around us. Then, 
finally, at the risk of some repetition, pose some of the questions 
that are on our minds. 
The current U.S. aeronautical research and development environment 
seems to have in it a number of positive and some negative factors, as· 
viewed in the time frame of this meeting. Surely, advances in 
computer technology have dramatically shortened the time required for 
design and design optimization. It is such that we can now evaluate 
quickly and economically large numbers of design options featuring new 
technological advances and pick the best combinations, then move into 
equally efficient computerized detailed design and production 
processes. These are clearly advances in our business, many of which 
are of relatively recent origin. This improved analytical capability 
enables us to reduce the number of design variations so that 
experimental testing can be limited to the key problem areas 
identified. New materials and fabrication processes have made it 
possible to take advantage of many attractive aerodynamic and 
structural concepts that were not practically possible as recently as 
10 years ago. 
There is no question in my mind that our U.S. industry still leads 
the world in its ability to apply new technology to attractive designs 
and the matching of those designs to the market needs. They are able 
to convert these designs quickly and efficiently into top-quality. 
highly reliable products, and to back up these sales with first-rate 
product support. Clearly, one area of management technology that we 
still, I think, lead in in the United States is the management of 
large, complex systems. The alacrity of the U.S. industry decision 
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process in arriving at optimizations that match the market 
requirements represents a substantial advantage. 
There are some negatives, however, that should be pointed out. If 
" one looks at our U.S. aeronautical in1ustry vis-a-vis particularly the 
Europeans, it is fair to say that after World War II we had 
essentially led in all areas and that that lead is rapidly shrinking 
today. The cost and complexity of developing new aeronautical systems 
have virtually skyrocketed. There have been increases in the severity 
of environmental and safety requirements imposed upon iesigns which 
have, in turn, led to a:iditional development cost burdens and have 
created additional needs for proven technology. The development cost 
and risk questions that face our industry, coupled with warranty 
requirements, questions of product liability, and customer 
conservatism, make it extremely difficult, if not in some cases 
impossible, to incorporate unproven, new technology no matter how 
attractive the technical benefits may appear. This has been coupled, 
in many cases, with a need for coproduc tion agreements and 
international understandings in orier for our industry to compete 
effectively in foreign markets. It has also led to concerns regarding 
such questions as technology transf~r from the United States to many 
of our foreign commercial competitors. 
Let me make a few remarks regarding the civil-military 
aeronautical requirements. I think it is certainly true that the 
military business bolsters most of our commercial manufacturers in 
terms of core staffs, facilities, financial stability, and independent 
research and development support and contributes substantially to the 
overall know-how that resides in our industries as well as in our 
universities. Basic technologies and even hardware are si uilar in 
many areas and apparently in many areas are nearly identical. 
Nevertheless, the military requirements are often more iemanding and 
provide effective driVers for technological advancement. The military 
aircraft tanker and the utility aircraft can provi:ie, in some cases, 
additional markets for modified commercial products. 
It would seem in the near term that the bu:igets for military 
research and development may see some growth. The question of course 
remains as to where those investments will be ma:ie. The requirements 
in terms of operational forces are very large and even though many of 
the budgets of the Department of Defense (DOD) iepartments in 
aeronautics will grow, there remains the question of growth in the 
research and development portions of those budgets. 
On the negative side, the military programs face the same 
obstacles to incorporation of new 'technology as the civil systems in 
terms of cost and inability to accept the risk of finding themselves 
dependent on unproven aerospace or aeronautical advances. As a 
consequence, they must focus as best they can on their military 
requirements T,oTith generally near-term and proven technology. Long 
lead times and budget pressures have, in many areas, almost eliminated 
experimental aircraft from many of the military programs. ~his 
concern has in the past iriven NASA and the DOD to engage in 
experimental aircraft development where it was required by the nature 
of the technologies in question. 
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The civil aircraft requirements, even where missions are superfi-
cially similar to the military, are often' very different and require 
different technological development and emphasis. For example, civil 
usage entails vastly greater numbers of annual and total flight hours 
on their systems, whereas in the military case the economy and mission 
performance are important, but primary emphasis must be placed on the 
performance aspects and then on the economies of performance for those 
systems. Military priorities, of necessity, must favor their combat 
missions and, thus, developments of transport types in recent years 
have been extremely rare in the research and development programs of 
the military and have not, in the recent past, presented the opportu-
nity for try-out of commercially applicable new technologies. . 
Let me turn to the international situation. Our' allies have 
become much stronger in the past 10 years and have the technical 
know-how, the production capability, and the desire to participate as 
full partners in mutual defense, including development and production 
of military aeronautical systems. They have experienced great 
economic growth, which has not only provided the' ability to support 
their military systems, but has also created civil transportation 
demands and corresponding domestic commercial markets for their 
aircraft industries. The Europeans have achieved these gains in part 
by pooling resources and by developing partnerships in technology, 
development, and production. They have worked cooperatively with many 
American companies on major production programs, sharing investments, 
strengthening access to markets, and, in' some instances, even 
providing production economies. 
A somewhat newer and growing factor to be considered from the 
international scene is the matter of utilizing aeronautical technology 
and development as a trading stock. Many nations are emerging today 
that want to achieve a level of technological independence,. not the 
least of which is China. They are looking not just to the United 
States, but to many other countries to help piggy-back their growth. 
Some countries are catching up with the state of aeronautical research 
and development in the United States. All of these factors have 
tended to make them very formidable competitors in the world market. 
In most instances strong government support is provided in various 
forms ranging from the support of research and development· !lown to 
what must be concluded as being direct subsidy of their industries and 
of their research establishments. In some countries'-aeronautical 
industry employment is maintained simply as a national policy and the 
consequences of that, I think, are clear to. e~ch-=-: of us.- In other 
areas,strong ties are ma-:i.ntained with· emergingo-~nations._ including 
former colonies, and some of these Third World countries may in- fact 
represent significant future markets. The technology 'edge th-at we 
speak of is meaningful, I believe, only when that technology is 
applied to a product. If obstacles to technological application or 
innovation in the United States are real and cannot be overcome, then 
technology cannot be used effectively by the U.S. industry to offset 
nontechnical advantages of their foreign competitors. 
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Let me just remind you of some of the legislative activities that 
impinge upon the deliberations of this group. The final returns on 
deregulation are not all in, but it seems so far to have stimulated 
competition, putting a premium on cost reduction and creating 
additional markets for new classes of aircraft such as the computer 
aircraft market. Deregulation has also permitted the airlines, in 
some cases, to abandon unprofitable operations. 
I think it is debatable whether noise regulations will stimulate 
demand for a new aircraft, but clearly they are a factor to be 
calculated into the overall domestic situation. New technological 
needs associated with deregulation, increased cost competition, and 
meeting noise rules will add more cost and risk to new developments; 
in fact, they may eliminate channels for some of the resale of used 
aircraft that formerly helped in proviHng partial financing for new 
equipment. 
Tax incentives, the relaxation of antitrust laws to permit U. S. 
domestic consortiums, and other steps are being discussed as possible 
measures that may help industry defray development costs and apply new 
technology to counter foreign competition. It is not yet possible to 
assess the effectiveness or the final outcome of these measures. 
Gi ven that there is a role that NASA should play, I think there 
are a number of questions that are clearly before all of us. Should 
we be just the custodian of a collection of national facilities? I am 
referring to the wind tunnels and simulators and some of the very 
expensive capabilities in which bhe United States chose to invest and 
which reside for the most part under the custody of NASA. Should we 
limit that role to the conduct and support of only the very basic 
research and technology in the aero-related sciences and, in effect, 
step back from the interface with the more applied, risk-reduction 
activities that must go on in the DOD. Should we limit that activity 
to those technologies that are specific and generic to the civil 
requirements as viewed for the near future? If it is not an 
artificial question--and for me in some areas it becomes difficult to 
distinguish because of the generic nature of the technologies between 
military and civilian--should we, in fact, include such similar basic 
technologies as they are of interest to the DOD? 
Should we include the applied technology programs? How far should 
a NASA program go toward risk reduction and meeting the needs of the 
various industries, both general aviation and commercial and military 
aviation in the United States? Or, should we in fact draw the NASA 
wagons in a much tighter circle around the much more basic and applied 
programs that I think have, in many peoples' minds, characterized the 
NACA aeronautics program? Should there be cost-sharing with industry 
and/or cost-sharing with other departments in the federal government, 
such as the DOD or the FAA? In cost-sharing there is a collateral 
question: should there be cost recoupment? This is an issue that has 
been debated and about which I sense there is not a consensus yet 
between industry and government circles regarding what role the 
... government should play vis-a-vis the industry in risk reduction and 
recoupment of the cost for those investments? 
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Finall y, I '~ouli ':lring up <Jne other quest ion, that i.s, the role of 
NASA in l~ro,auticll rese'lrch :Ini i~velopllent in the inter'1'itional 
scene. How lIuch and 'Ilhat kinds of cooperation shouB 'MSA engage in 
'Nith ot~'!r countries !tni with ::>tner institutions in those countri:;!s? 
Since that can be viewel as '1 iouble-ei 5ei sword, there are much 
larger P':1 1 icy issues that are not the pr')vi.n~e either of NASA or of 
this conference relative to national foreign policy. There is, how-
ever, :1 set of issues that clearly falls within the purview of this 
group. Given that there is going to be a 5reater and probably more 
comple~ i.nterrelationship between the institutions in the United 
States an:i those that exist in the other advancing and advanced na-
tions, what ShOlll,j ~lASA's role be at that interface? 
7 
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THE LEGISLATIVE OUTLOOK 
Thomas R. Harkin 
Chaiman, Subcommittee on 
Transportation, Aviation and Communication 
U.S. House of Representatives 
I am sorry that I can spend only a few moments here. I would like 
to be here the rest of the week, compared to what is going on in 
Washington. I 10 want to thank Guy Stever for inviting me here 
today. It is certainly an honor to be with such a distinguished group 
of aeronautical leaders. 
When Guy called me I said, "Well, what do you think I ought to 
talk about?" He said, "Well, talk about the legislative en:! of 
it--just tell them what is on your .nind." So let me turn to a few 
comments on the legislative outlook of aeronautics or how Congress 
perceives NASA's role. 
I guess the first point I woul:! like to make here is that most 
members of Congress :ion't perceive the role that NASA (and before 
then, NACA) played in aeronautics. It may surprise you but it doesn't 
surprise me. Hembers of Congress are elected from the public at 
large. Very few members of the general public understand that nature 
of NASA's role. To most people the t-lord "NASA" means only one thing. 
It is the space agency that landed men on the moon. NASA means 
Apollo, Saturn rockets, and moon rocks. They are usually unaware of 
NASA's other role and its long history of involvement with aviation. 
They only know about the more spectacular achievements in space. 
That is the first point I would like to make--the first "A" in 
NASA is a well-kept secret from the general public. Now, I understand 
that there are some representatives here today from the auto 
industry. So, for their benefit as well as to further illustrate my 
point, I ~ill tell you that explaining NASA's role in aeronautics has 
been a source of considerable frustration for me over the past 18 
months. 
As many of you know, I am very interested in expanding the federal 
efforts in automotive research and technology development. Other 
members of the Science and Technology Committee and I as well as some 
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senators, f~lt that the NASA approach to bringing forth ne,,;r 
aeronautical technology could serve as a goo:! model for this effort. 
I found, however, that most people, including many of my colleagues, 
:lid not understand NASA's role in aeronautics. They didn't understand 
the partnership nature of ~ASA' s relationship wi th inJustry. They 
:!idn't realize that NASA tries hard to seek industry advice on 
research neejs and priorities, and they :iidn't appreciate the iegree 
to which aeronautical research projects are contracted with industry. 
Rather, the typical reaction was that buil:ling automobiles was not 
like building a spaceship to go to the moon. They were afraid that a 
car built by NASA wou1:! run fine on the moon but that it {.J'ouldn' t be 
able to take you to the corner grocery store or to work ani back. 
Of course, airplanes, unlike spacecraft, aren't bui.lt this way. 
But few people understand this distinction. It is very difficult and 
frustrating to explain it to them. 
The second point I would make concerns the necessity for NASA to 
be a leader in the techni.cal community. To their great credit this 
agency has long employed what I believe is the key to successful 
transfer of their technology to useful products. Unlike '!Iany other 
government agencies, NASA has a very good track record of what science 
people call commercialization. One neei only look to the skies to see 
the practical results of yesterday's NASA-sponsored research. 
The reason for this, it seems to me, is the close cooperation that 
NASA and the aviation industry have enjoyed. We see this in the 
operation of advisory groups. We see it in the substantial percentage 
of research work that is performed on a contract basis by the very 
companies that must eventually commercialize the results. Above all, 
we see this close re1ationsip in the overall attitude of the industry 
and government people involved. 
As an aside, I believe that this could well serve as a model for a 
much needed change on our whole industry-government relationship in 
the United States. But, there is a hidden danger in all this 
harmony. This is the one that concerns us in the legislative area. 
NASA has a broader constituency than just the aviation industry. 
In a very real way, the whole country iepends on aeronautic progress: 
for balance of trade, for improved transportation, for safety and 
economy, and for national security. So, NASA must constantly look to 
the future. NASA's leaders must look beyond the sometimes short-range 
interests of their industry partners. They must strike a fine balance 
between research that nobody wants and that will not lead anywhere on 
the one extreme, and research that can be jone very easily by industry 
on the other extreme. It is a difficult task. I know that Bob 
Frosch, A1 Lovelace, Walt Olstad, and their associates spend a lot of 
time thinking about it. I just heard Bob talking about it when I came 
in the door. Generally speaking, I believe that NASA does a good job 
in this area. 
Certainly NASA's record 
other agency in Washington 
~everthe1ess, it is a policy 
keep fixed in their view an:! 
monitor closely. 
puts it head and shoulders above every 
that is trying to advance technology. 
concept that NASA management must always 
it is one that we in Congress intend to 
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I would ~ention one area that e~emplifies this need for technical 
leadership, this need for perceiving future requirements and making 
sure that we are working t01ay on the technology needed in the 
future. That area is advanced supersonic cruise and maneuver 
technology. I believe that NASA has an obligation to look beyond the 
concerns and limitations of today to be ieveloping this technology for 
the future. 
For example, it is highly likely that energy may not be our number 
one concern 15 years from now. It could instea:i be our supply of 
fresh water. 
As a nation we are currently spending billions of dollars on 
energy alternatives. I firmly believe that within 10 to 15 years we 
may be able to say that we have gotten through the energy crunch and 
our preoccupation with fuel efficiency may diminish--not completely go 
away, but may diminish--as one of the major things to think about. 
Another trend that I believe will develop is the emergence of 
world centers of commerce areas that are located many thousands of 
miles from the United States. It has to do with population, natural 
resources, and labor. I am thinking about such places as Brazil, with 
its huge land area and abundant resources; Australia, with its vast 
open spaces and natural resources; and even South Africa. 
If this should happen, as I believe it will, the worH will need 
high-speed transportation. If energy recedes, as I said, as the 
all-consuming concern, such transportation will become highly 
feasible. While no one is prepared to say that a market for 
supersonic travel is at hand today, I believe it is coming. Yes, to 
use a phrase that we use out in the ~idwest where I am from, we are 
not plant ing enough technological seeds today to ensure a good crop 
when that time comes. So, I believe NASA may be shirking its 
responsibility for technical leadership in this area. 
The present effort is, by all accounts, inadequate to provide the 
data base that will be needed. Most experts seem to agree that more 
is needed. 
The Congress, for its part, appears ready to approve a reasonable 
program aime:i at technology validation. TIle recent report of the 
Office of Technology Assessment supported this:iirection. As you 
probably know there was a House vote very recently--within the last 
month, I believe--on the present supersonic cruise and variable cycle 
engine activities. I believe this result shows a very strong 
underpinning of support in spite of all the emotionalism that seems to 
surround this issue of supersonic transports. 
So now, I believe, the responsibility rests with NASA. NASA must 
become an advocate. No one else can do it effectively. 
Now, to keep my comments in balance, I should say that there are 
other areas where NASA is exhibiting excellent vision, being on the 
cutting edge of this new technology. Their work on advanced 
turboprops is, I believe, a case in point. I am sure we can find many 
who would say that propellers will never again be acceptable for 
transport aircraft use. I believe they are wrong. Yet, NASA has 
persisted, confident that the energy advantages will ultimately prove 
those people wrong. I don't know how it will turn out, but I am 
11 
pleased to see that NASA is on the cutting edge of this technology. 
Let me turn to another policy matter that could affect the future 
role of NASA in aeronautics--that is the extent of involvement in 
research that has traditionally fallen in the gray area between NASA 
and the FAA. In my subcommittee work I have had to deal with both. 
I am sure it is obvious to everyone here that even the most 
spectacular of NASA's energy efficiency gains can be quickly nullified 
by air traffic delays. So, if only as a matter of self-defense, NASA 
should be more assertive in applying their collective systems 
expertise to problems of capacity in the air system. 
But, there is another, even better reason. Langhorne Bond 
testified recently before my subcommittee that he was seriously 
consi:lering limitations on air traffic growth. I feel this would be 
most unfortunate, especially when we have the full scientific 
capability of NASA available to help the FAA solve its problems, and I 
say that with tongue in cheek. 
Therefore, I would strongly urge that NASA expand both its 
independent programs and its cooperation with the FAA in this vital 
area. I am not trying to throw rocks at the FAA, but I believe that 
in the recent past it has moved more toward the area of regulation and 
away from the area of innovation, where NASA is the strongest. This 
is where NASA could fill in the big gap in that gray area. 
Finally, I would like to touch on a very fundamental issue, 
namely, where on the scale from basic research to product development 
should NASA's effort in aeronautics be concentrated? An easy answer 
would be on the whole spectrum. But, with limited resources and 
limited money we may have to concentrate. I know that you plan to 
consider this question in depth throughout the week and that is good. 
It is a question that needs reexamination. 
My thoughts are basically this: conditions in the world are 
constantly changing and nothing is static. For example, I recently 
ran across some interesting projections from a respected financial 
analyst. They showed Boeing's market share dropping from 77 percent 
in 1978 to 64 percent in 1990, McDonnell-Douglas dropping from 15 to 8 
percent, and Airbus going from 5 to 20 percent of the llarket. If 
these figures are correct, we may well be in for a proverbial, 
agonizing reappraisal of government's role in aviation. It is 
certainly clear that "business as usual" won't meet this kind of 
competition. Are we going to go in aviation the way of the automobile 
in international trade? 
As a part of this reappraisal, this agonizing reappraisal,' it 
would be logical to begin with what you are about this week, 
rethinking NASA's role in aeronautics. Before you do, I would suggest 
that your first task be to define some terms. What is meant by 
technology validation? What is meant by technology readiness? How 
far do you go before it is reajy? How far do you go before it is 
validated? If you can all agree on that, it will be a big 
contribution. 
Again, my own general feeling about NASA's role is that the agency 
has retreated too far back to basic research and away from the actual 
validation, away from actual, for example, flight testing with 
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experimental aircraft. Twenty-five years ago Dryien had a whole 
stable of these strange-looking flying machines. Today it is a ghost 
town by comparison. 
We seem to have for30tten that basic research, while absolutely 
necessary, is not sufficient. I recognize that we must continually 
restock the technology shelves, and while I strongly support the R&D 
base programs, I also believe there is no substitute for actually 
making it work. It is an important question. I jon't have the 
answer, but I can tell you that within Congress, if you are talking 
about money, most congressmen are willing to spend money for something 
tangible, something that they can put their hands on. You know that 
as well as I do. Guy Stever knows that from the old NSF. When you 
talk basic rese:lrch, when you talk about things that may never have 
any payoff, it is a struggle year in and year out. But, when you can 
see tangible results, things that they· can put their hands on, then 
you have ~ore support. So, I just throw that out for your 
consideration this week when you talk about the proper role of NASA 
between the area of basic research and this area of commercialization 
and where they ought to be putting their emphasis. 
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Thank you, Dr. Stever. It is certainly a great pleasure for ~e to 
participate in this workshop on the role of NASA in aeronautics. I 
have been asked to discuss the financial a~:i economic outlook for the 
aviation industry as part of the background for your discussions this 
week. 
Before looking at the future, let us review the present status of 
the aviation industry. We are, unfortunately, in the mi.id1e of what 
probably will be the worst year in history for the U. S. airlines in 
terms of earnings. 
Although not as hard hit as the U.S. carriers, most airlines 
throughout the world are anticipating a substantially lower level of 
earnings for 1980. 
Although the depressed U.S. economy and the slowing ~own of 
economic activity worldwide are the major contributors to these 
events, the changed regulatory environment has also been a factor. 
Clearly, the passage of the Airline Deregulation Ac t in October 1978 
has had and will have an important impact on the U.S. domestic 
carriers, while the philosophical underpinnings have already been 
widely felt on international routes. Any assessment of both domestic 
and worldwide industry must take into account the short- and long-term 
impacts of this significant legislation. 
Although dedicated to the concept of less government regulation of 
industry, many of us in the financial community were concerned about 
the impact of legislation that encouraged more competition and lower 
fares in a future environment of steady cost increases, continuing 
fluctuation of traffic levels with the economic cycle, and an 
inability to realize the dramatic productivity gains through improved 
technology that were achieved in the past. We are still concerned, 
and recent events seem to in~icate that our skepticism was well 
founded. 
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While 1978 domestic traffic was up 16 percent, the combination of 
higher costs and lower yields (due to the heavy use of discount fares) 
caused breal<-even load f'1ctors to rise ~lmost as fast ~s passenger 
load factors. There is no question that the proliferation of discount 
fares contri~uted to some of the traffic growth, but there are many in 
the injustry who believe that traffic in 1978 wouH have been robust 
without the jiscount fares and that, in fact, their bottom lines would 
have been better with less traffic growth and a higher yield. 
Although the iniustry fared well in 1978, it is apparent that some 
of the seeds sown at that time have brought about the problems we are 
facing today. For the calendar year 1979, the u.s. trunks earned $256 
million, down 76 percent from 1978. The fourth quarter was 
particularly devastating, with a loss of ~107 million compared with 
earnings of $66 million for the previous year. 
Clearly, 1979 was an unusual year for the industry and one we hope 
will not be repeated. The total increase in fuel prices from 40 cents 
per gallon in the first quarter to approximately 74 cents at the end 
of the year was staggering. Also, the United Airlines strike and the 
grounding of the DC-lO impacted performance. However, the high 
break-even load factors stimulated by the new regulatory environment 
heightened the industry's vulnerability to the dramatic escalation in 
the price of fuel. 
As you are all aware, the results of the first quarter of 1980 
show a further deterioration with a domestic trunk loss of $235 
million compare1 with a $37 million profit in the first quarter of 
1979. Particularly disturbing is the continued escalation of fuel 
costs for the U.S. carriers; at 93 cents per gallon at the end of the 
first quarter compared with 74 cents at year end. Total losses for 
the last quarter of 1979 an1 the first quarter of 1980 were the' 
highest in airline history, and it appe~rs that the domestic trunks 
may experience a significant operat ing loss for the full year 1980, 
the first such loss since 1961. 
Losses for the second quarter may exceed $140 million. Traffic in 
the first half of the year was down 2.8 percent. Most carriers had 
hoped that there would be a substantial improvement in traffic in the 
third quarter that would wipe out or substantially reduce the losses 
of the first half of the year. However, the severity of the recession 
is having a devastating imp~ct, with the prospect of far less traffic 
than normal for the third quarter and a very poor fourth quarter. 
For the full year traffic may drop 5 to 10 percent, which would be 
the first year-to-year decline in two deca:ies. During the 1974-1975 
recession, traffic growth was less than 1 percent, but at least it was 
positive. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that under the new 
regulatory environment we have excess capacity, and although it is nO\-l 
possible to raise fares to cover increased costs, part icularly fuel 
costs, many carriers are hesitant because of the negative impact on 
traffic. Also, overcapacity on routes with high traffic density~ such 
as the transcontinental routes, has create:i an unstable competitive 
environment that makes price increases difficult to implement since 
all carriers will not follow. 
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In consequence, ~e h~ve very soft traffic, inadequate yields, and 
increasing costs, which is the for:nula for substantial losses and 
which the U.S. carriers are now experiencing and probably will 
experience for the balance of the year. 
The regional carriers h3ve fared somewhat better than the domestic 
trunks under the new regulatory environment. They have been able to 
drop some unprofitable routes that have been turned over to commuter 
carriers and enter some trunk markets, successfully utilizing traffic 
fed from their regional systems. 
In addition, since a significant percentage of their traffic is 
business oriented and the trunks have not been interested in competin3 
on the regional's relatively short route segments, their yield has 
been higher and less susceptible to the prolifer:ltion of discount 
fares. 
However, even though some of these carriers have done fairly well 
individually, the regionals as a group report a moderate loss for the 
first half of 1980. 
Perhaps the most sweeping impact of the present aviation policy of 
the Carter .. Hministration is on the international carriers serving the 
United States. Even though foreign carriers are not directly affected 
by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, by means of bilateral 
negot iations, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) is seeking to impose 
its philosophy of more competition and lower fares on the rest of the 
world. This has had the effect already of substantially diluting the 
yields of many international routes. On most routes throughout the 
world the International Air Transport Association has been able to 
agree on fuel-related fare increasas. However, on routes to the U.S. 
many of these increases, until recently, were rejected by the CAB, 
resulting in a far greater lag in adjusting fares to cover increases 
in the cost of fuel on international routes serving the U.S. than on 
domestic routes. 
This has been particularly devastating for U. S. flag carriers. 
Even though the international carriers serving the U. S. have more 
upward flexibility under the recent legislation relating to foreign 
routes, the policy of encouraging more competition and additional-
capacity on international routes serving the United States will 
continue to have a depressing impact on yields. 
The present policy of the CAB has the effect of narrowing the 
profit margins of the non-U.S. carriers as well as the U.S. 
international carriers at a time when most governments are pushing 
their air carriers toward financial independence. The non-U.S. 
carriers are also experiencing the same scenario; i.e., a softening of 
traffic, incraasing fuel and labor costs, and pressure on yields as 
indicated earlier. In consequence, the earnings performance of the 
carriers outside the United States in almost all geographic areas will 
undergo a substantial deterioration in earnings this year. 
Looking ahead from the discouraging situation of the present, what 
do we foresee beyond 1980? Although SO'1le of the carriers are cutting 
back in order to more realistically match capacity with travel, others 
are not. Likewise, although some carriers are working toward using 
their new flexibility relative to fare increases to increase yield, 
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others are being more cautious. All carriers are working very hard to 
cut costs, but, unfortunately, a large percent gage of an airline's 
costs, particularly fUel, are really outside manage~ent's control. 
Some of the carriers, as they cut back, are selling or grounding some 
of their oLler aircraft. Fortunately, because of the inflationary 
environment, there is a !llarket for the more efficient models of the 
present generation of aircraft. However, some of the less 
fuel-efficient aircraft have a very small market and it is anticipated 
that many of these aircraft will be grounded. 
As we look at the present environment, those carriers with the 
most efficient cost and capital structure will do much better than the 
less efficient and more highly leveraged carriers. In fact, some of 
the stronger carriers are using their new route and flare flexibility 
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to improve their market position vis-a-vis the less efficient 
airlines. In consequence it can be anticipated that, as we look 
toward the future in the new deregulated environment, some of the 
weaker U.S. airlines will be acquired by the stronger carriers. Not 
only in terms of cost structure and capital structure, but also in 
terms of route structures, some of the small U.S. domestic trunks will 
be more vulnerable with respect to survival in the anticipated future 
environment. 
As we look at the future all indications are that the economy will 
improve early in 1981, which should lead to improved traffic growth by 
the second quarter of next year. Although this anticipated traffic 
growth will help pull the domestic industry out of the doldrums and 
improve operating performance, we have to recognize the fact that the 
15 percent annual rates of traffic growth we have enjoyed in the past 
will probably not be with us. In addition, the cost of fuel and labor 
will continue to escalate, while yields will continue to be under 
pressure both from the political aspect of consumer pressure and as a 
possible deterrent to traffic growth. 
In sum!llary, the outlook for the U. s. airline industry is not all 
that rosy. The outlook for the non-U.S. carriers is less severe. In 
the first place, they have a long history, through bilateral 
agreements, of attempting to match capacity to anticipated traffic 
growth through capacity control agreements or pooling arrangements. 
In addition, on scheduled routes the fares are related to cost, with 
lOW-cost vacation travel relegated to charter carriers on a plane-load 
basis. 
Although, as indicated, the profit margins of foreign airlines 
have been narrowed due to the U.S. policy of encouraging competition 
and lower fares on routes to the United States, most non-U.S. carriers 
operate on routes within their continent where competition is 
restricted and economic fares are maintained. In addition, traffic on 
these regional routes is more sustained over time than in the U.S., 
particularly now when the economies of many countries are not as 
depressed as that of the United States. In consequence, these 
carriers can often partially or wholly offset losses on routes to the 
U.S., whereas American international flag carriers do not have as much 
flexibility in this regard. In addition, when the chips are down the 
foreign flag carriers may well receive government support, whereas no 
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such support is available to the U.S. international carriers. 
In consequence, the deregulation policy of the United States could 
hurt U.S. international carriers .nore than the overseas carriers. In 
summary, although the foreign carriers will probably have a few lean 
years as the recession in the U.S. spreads abroad, the regulatory 
enviro~~ent in which they operate gives them greater ability to bridge 
the period to the return of traffic growth than is presently available 
to the U.S. airlines. 
The future environment for the industry as a whole of more 
moderate traffic growth, higher fuel and labor costs, and pressure on 
yields means that there will be continued pressure on airline 
earnings, which can only be alleviated by productivity gains resulting 
from further technological improvement in aircraft design and 
performance. 
During the past 20 years the carriers offset cost escalation by 
the tremendous productivity gains of jet aircraft and more recently 
the wide-body aircraft, as well as substantial traffic growth as air 
transportation reached more and more people at reasonable fares. 
However, in the future the cost picture will be worse. During the 
past 20 years, except for the last 5, fuel cost escalations were 
moderate, which is not the case at the present and unlikely in the 
future. Also, a leveling off of labor cost increases is not 
anticipated. As indicated, traffic growth will probably be more 
moderate, thereby limiting airline options in maintaining 
profitability through improvements in aircraft productivity or 
increasing of the price of their product. 
If the productivity gains are not there, then the only alternative 
is to increase fares, which at some point adversely affects traffic 
and will eventually halt the steady growth of the air transportation 
industry and may even lead to some contraction. 
The big concern of many of us involved in the air transport 
industry is due to the unfavorable outlook relative to operating 
costs, especially fuel, and the escalating cost of aircraft. The 
productivity gains of the new generation of aircraft--that is, the 
Boeing 757, the 767, and the A-3l0, and other contemplated advanced 
aircraft--could be eaten up before they are delivered in quantity in 
the mid-to-late 1980s. 
Clearly, the productivity gains in aircraft performance contempla-
ted for the 1980s and 1990s fall far short of those experienced in the 
1960s and 1970s. This outlook represents a challenge to the aerospace 
industry. In the economic environment we contemplate over the next 20 
years, further technological breakthroughs must be forthcoming in 
order to have a vibrant, wor11wide air transport industry that can 
serve the public .at a reasonable price. . 
As a nontechnical person looking in from the outside, the new 
generation of aircraft will be most helpful on top of the more 
up-to-date versions of the present generation of aircraft, 
particularly the wide bodies, such as the "Boeing 747, DC-10, L-1011, 
and A-300. But, as we look toward the year 2000 and the economic 
environment that we foresee, the presently contemplated new generation 
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of aircraft will not be enough to ensure that we will have a viable 
air transport industry capable of transportating an increasing number 
of passengers at a reasonable cost. This can only be accomplished by 
a substantial investment of money and talent by both government and 
industry in the 1980s and 1990s, leading to substantial technological 
breakthroughs that will result in substantial productivity gains in 
aircraft performance. 
Assuming that this will be accomplished, it is vital that the air 
transport industry have access to sufficient capital to modernize and 
expand its fleets with the most modern and efficient aircraft 
available in the 1980s and beyond. In order to access this capital it 
is essential that the carriers generate sufficient profits to earn an 
adequate return on their investments. As indicated, in an environment 
of continued increases in fuel and labor costs, political pressure on 
yields, and a lower rate of traffic growth, it is vital that the 
airlines operate the most cost-efficient aircraft to ensure profitable 
operations. Failure to achieve sufficient earnings to attract capital 
for fleet modernization will eventually lead to losses and financial 
instability as the high-cost environment accelerates the economic 
obsolescence of older aircraft--aircraft that the airlines cannot 
replace because of insufficient financial capacity. 
The end result of such a scenario is less service and higher fares 
for the traveling public, which would in turn impede traffic growth. 
The ability to generate earnings is particularly important to the 
domestic and international carriers in the United States that do not 
have access to government support. In addition, there is an 
increasing number of carriers throughout the world that must stand on 
their own feet and do not have support from their respective 
governments. EVen in the case of government-owned or -supported 
airlines there has been a distinct trend in recent years toward 
insisting that their flag carriers attain financial viability. 
Furthermore, many more government airlines must raise their funds 
to finance equipment purchases without government guarantees or other 
support, as was the case in the past. This will allow those 
governments to divert resources formally expended on their flag 
airlines to meet other pressing national needs. However, it should be 
noted that if the international regulatory environment does not create 
a climate that permits the flag carriers to realize financial 
independence, they will not be allowed to fail and will receive the 
support necessary to pursue their equipment programs from their 
respective governments. 
In summary, then, it is clearly in everyone's interest that the 
airline industry maintain a sufficient degree of financial strength 
and stability to access capital. It might be useful at this point to 
review briefly where this capital comes from. For the U.S. domestic 
and international carriers there are three primary sources of funds: 
commercial banks, the long-term institutional market--primarily 
insurance companies and the public markets for equity-type 
securities. These sources are supplemente:l by long-term leases of 
aircraft. 
Banks usually provide revolving credit facilities with full 
20 
availability for 2, 3, or 4 years during the perioi of aircraft 
delivery, then funding over periods ranging from 6 to 8 years with a 
normal door-to-door term of 10 years. The commercial banks have been 
the source of last resort of the U. S. airline industry during past 
periods of adversity and by ani large have stuck with the airlines 
through thick and thin. However, since bank money is usually limited 
to a 10-year term at most, it is vital for the industry to have access 
to the institutional market that could offer terms of 15 to 20 years. 
With the continuing escalation of the cost of aircraft, the 
payback period to the airline grows longer and it is most important 
that the financing more closely matches the useful economic life of 
the aircraft. In' addition, due to the cyclical nature of the 
industry, cash-flow considerations dictate that a significant portion 
of a carrier's financing must have a repayment term in excess of that 
available from commercial b~nks; hence, the importance of the 
institutional lenders. 
With the difficulties experienced by the U. S. industry in the 
early and mid-l970s, the institutional lenders largely closed their 
doors to the airlines. Fortunately, during the last several years 
this group of lenders has returned, but on a somewhat different basis 
than previously. Instead of lending on an unsecured basis for 20 or 
even 25 years in some cases, they have limited themselves to 15 to 18 
years on a basis whereby they are secured by specific aircraft. 
This takes the form of an· equipment trust financing with the 
airline or lessor taking a 20 to 30 percent equity position on the 
aircraft. It is very important to the industry that this class of 
lenders is not scared away again. 
The third source of funds is the public market for common stock, 
preferred stock, and subordinated debt issues. This is a vitally 
important ingredient because the leverage ratio--that is, the 
relationship of debt to equity--has an important impact on the ability 
of a carrier to access senior debt from institutional lendings and 
commercial banks. Again, during the early and mid-1970s this source 
was closed to the industry, but in recent years some carriers have 
been able to raise a modest amount of junior funds from the public 
market to supplement their retained earnings and reduce leverage. 
As indicated earlier, a supplemental source of capital is leasing 
that usually utilizes banks as well as other sources for equity and 
institutions for long-term debt on a basis similar to an equipment 
trust issue. These leases usually range from 15 to 19 years. A 
portion of the benefits of the 10 percent investment tax credit and 
accelerated depreciation . captured by the owner-lessor are passed onto 
the airline, resulting in a lower equivalent interest cost. However, 
since the owner-lessor is in a junior position relative to the senior 
lender he is particularly sensitive to the financial well being of the 
lessee. 
In recent years, primarily as the resuli: of competition among 
airframe and engine manufacturers both in the u.s. and abroad, a 
significant portion of both senior and junior funds have been secured 
by the airlines from aircraft and engine suppliers. For most of the 
airlines of the world other than u.s. carriers, the sources of funds 
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are somewhat iifferent. However, some of the techniques developed for 
the American carriers, particularly those extending the term of 
financing to meet the useful life of the equipment, are becoming 
available to non-U .S. carriers. Most aircraEt manufactured in the 
U.S. and sold abroad are financed on a basis involving a participation 
or guarantee on the part of the Export-Import Bank of the Uniterl 
States. Usually this financing involves .:l 10 to 20 percent -lown 
payment by the airline, which can be fi~anced, with the balance split 
equally between commercial banks and the Export-Import Bank over a 
10-year term with the commercial banks taking the early maturities and 
the Export-Import Bank the latter maturities. In the case of an 
Export-Import Bank guarantee, funds are raised through the Private 
Export Funding Corporation at market rates for U.S. government 
guaranteed paper, which is somewhat more expensive than the 
Export-Import Bank's direct lending rate. 
However, iue to an informal agreement between the various 
countries' export agencie~, the Export-Import Bank's financing has 
been limited to 10 years from -lelivery, which falls considerably short 
of the estimated economic life of the new aircraft and today puts a 
substantial squeeze on cash flow. In consequence, some carriers have 
utilized the leasing technique or the private placement of long-term 
debt in orjer to achieve a 12- to IS-year financing instead of 
utilizing the Export-Import Bank's financing. 
In recent ',rears, the Lnst itut ional market has opened up Eor a 
number of non-U.S. airlines, which gives them access to term funds 
ori~inal1y available only to U.S. carriers. 
In addition to the above sources of funds, some foreign carriers 
have secured their funds in the Eurolollar or other foreign currency 
markets ~o1ith and without the Export-Import Bank's participat ion. ~lost 
such Einancing has been limited to a term of 10 years. 
In connection with aircraft built outside the U.S., particularly 
the A-300, financing has been secured through the use of guarantees of 
the export agencies of France, Germany, and more recently the United 
Kingdom, to finance a very substantial portion of the aircraft. The 
balance has been raised unguaranteed from the commercial sources. It 
is hoped that the export agencies of the aircraft manufacturing 
countries will eventually extend their lending term to IS years, which 
is more in line with the useful life of the newer aircraft. 
In essence, in looking at airlines worldwide, all classes of len-
ders are interested in the ability of carriers to generate sufficient 
cash to pay back their loans over the useful life of the equipment. 
Also, profits ensure that a larger percentage of requirements can be 
met from internal cash sources, thereby limiting the amount of debt 
require-l. Lenders also want to see a sound capital structure with 
moderate leverage to gain confidence that the airline can ride through 
the normal economic cycles that historically have affected airline 
traffic and earnings. 
In conclusion, the same sources of capital utilized in the past 
will be available 'in the 1980s and beyond to assist the airlines in 
modernizing their fleets as long as they can demonstrate sufficient 
earnings and cash flow to meet their obligations. However, in our 
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vie\.r this will only be possi.ble if tha aviation in::lustry h'ls at its 
disposal cost-efficient aircraft that will pernit them to operate 
profitably in tha anticipatei econo~ic environnent where costs will be 
higher, fares tailored to the ability of the public to pay, and 
traffic ~rowth less robust than in the past. 
I hope that your deliberations this week will bri.ng us closer to 
that goal. Thank you very much. 
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I have been asked to discuss the outlook for petroleum, and I 
'Nould like to begin by addressing the question of how much more 
expensive petroleum is going to get. I refer to Figure 1. This is a 
figure that appears every year in an Exxon publication, and it is 
Exxon's estimate as to what the world's oil picture is going to look 
like in terms of oil reserves and production. It is interesting to 
watch this year by year because the picture is becoming progressively 
more pessimistic. A year ago the curve went up more steeply for 
production, indicating that people thought they were going to be using 
more oil than they are; but more importantly, the future discoveries 
estimate also was higher so that it actually was a little bit above 
proiuction. This year it is less than productive. 
These are five-year averages of future discoveries. If future 
discovery rates are less than production roles, reserves are going to 
be drawn iown. The reserve drawdown is the underlying factor that is 
going to determine price and supply. This changes every year, so any 
one set of such curves should not be taken too seriously. However, a 
very informed group of people feel that, despite reduced consumption 
of petroleu'U due to the price s i tuat ion in the world, the future 
discovery rate 1s not going to be able to keep up. So, the people who 
have oil are likely to charge more for it. If this is, indeed, the 
picture, then oil is going to become 'nore expensive. The kinds of 
numbers I have heard people quote--and they can't be taken too 
seriously--are a factor of two or three times the current price in 
1980 dollars for the end of this century. Th\lt would be based on a 
situation whereby an increasingly scarce but needed commodity is being 
soIl. Maybe we will be lucky and it will turn out differently. 
One way to look at the tightening petroleum situation is shown in 
Figure 2. I want to look a little farther into the future than the 
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ti~e frane 'we are talking about here because I fe=l that, since our 
effort is to guide the research activity in aeronautics, we ought to 
be consiierin3 the period of maybe 2020-2030 as a target 
time--certainly not just the next 10 years because unconventional oil 
sources are not going to have much impact then. 
This particular set of curves is conv-=nient to use. It appeared 
in Science magazine and was base:! on a large international study. 
These curves show more growth than is inrlicated in Figure 1. 'l11e 
slope of the total oil deman:! curve is higher, an:! the estimates in 
the two figures do not correspond very welL But, this figure does 
give an integrated view of where the oil is going to come fro'll. 
Although the ~1iddle East has large reserves, they are being drawn down 
quite rapi:ily. Conventional oil reserves are projected to be severely 
depleted ~y 2030. Unconventional oil, which includes enhanced 
recovery, heavy crudes and oil shale, will help to '1lake up the 
Jifference, with coal liquefaction not really coming in until around 
the turn of the century. 
If we are concerned about aircraft fuels in the period beyond 
about 1995, we are going to be looking at an increasing variety of 
sources. In the period beyond 2000, oil from the new reserves 
probably isn't going to be much cheaper than oil pro:!uced from the 
unconventional sources because it will be so Hfficult to fin1 and 
produce. 
One must state the framework of a discussion of this nature. 
Figure 3 shows that I am really looking way out in the future and am 
not trying to cope with the next 10 years. This view of the world's 
energy growth ini icates that it is not going to be very rapii ani 
probably not as rapid as the international study indicated. Worse 
than that, it is going to be erratic, in my opinion. We will probably 
have a series of crises. We will have times of real shortages and 
times like the present when the consumption has gone down a little bit 
below production and inventories are building up. So, it is going to 
be a very erratic situation; that is the pessimistic part. 
The encouraging part is that these problems are becoming 
increasingly obvious, and we are going to see a major effort in this 
country to convert solid resources into liquids. Our resources are 
solids, such as coal, shale, peat, and so on, and we will need new 
sources of liquids for the uses we anticipate. In addition, there is 
a major effort to conserve liquid fuels by improved technology and 
practices. This is the framework that I use in this discussion. 
A little bit of optimism on synthetic fuels is shown in Figure 4. 
~vhat has happened during this last year is almost like a religious 
conversion in some of the major energy companies. There has been a 
rather sudden recognition that synthetic fuels offer a major 
opportunity. A year or two ago it was not like that, although there 
were groups in the oil co~panies that were pushing synthetic fuels. 
We now have 'llajor energy companies proposing very large synthetic 
fuel :!evelopments as something that the nation shouli have. I think 
they are correct in this case. In addition to th'lt, companies that 
really haven't been in energy--chemical companies and the like--are 
developing the plans for synthet ic fuels. Th.e new synthet ic fue Is 
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corporation, just getting under way, makes it possible for the 
companies that haven't been in energy to consider really major 
projects, with financial backing available from the U.S. government. 
One position of the major energy companies is that, for the part 
they would play, they don't really need that backing. This varies 
from day to day, but generally this is the case. The federal goal is 
2 million barrels a day by 1992, with the hope of getting up to 6 or 8 
million barrels a day by 2000, or roughly up to the present liquid 
fuel import rate. 
Synthetic fuels, it must be remembered, are not all liquids. Some 
are gas. 
What I inclu.ie is the conversion of solids into either gas or 
liquids, although it could be broader. One might ask about tar 
sands. When they are dug up they are solids. ~undamentally, that is 
the problem. We have solid sources of energy, and we really want 
fluid sources. 
The reason for this sudden switch on the part of the energy 
companies and also nonenergy companies is that, at present world 
prices, it appears that some of the approaches would be good 
investments, assuming the current price structure projections. 
An Exxon proposal is shown in Figure 5 that indicates a production 
goal for synthetic fuels going up to as much as 15 million barrels a 
day by. 2010. They didn't choose the same time period as the federal 
government so there is a little ambiguity. While this estimate was 
based on supply and demand pro jec tions, it really boils down to a 
judgment on how fast the industry could be built up if we really tried. 
This proposal does stretch our national capabilities. It calls 
for an investment of about $800 billion, 1980 dollars, for mining and 
production. This would employ almost a million people, including some 
very special kinds of people. Almost 500,000 of these people would be 
in mining, which is about 60 percent over the total in mining now. 
The number of people needed to run the process plants would be up 
about S5 percent, and design engineers would be up 35 percent over 
present levels. It certainly offers a major employment opportunity 
and will require a major training program. 
This is a very interesting study because it is, again, integrated. 
If we want to really do something about energy, this is what one group 
thinks could be done in the next 30 years. 
Where would this energy come from? As shown in Figure 6, shale is 
the big source. We have two kinds of shale operations, all out in 
Colorado and Utah; about 6 million barrels a day from surface mines 
and 2 million from underground mines have been proposed. 
If there is an interest in doing something really significant in 
terms of shale oil production, surface mining emerges as the way to 
go. It has probably less environmental impact, and it gives much 
higher overall resource recovery--in the range of 70 to 80 percent 
versus on the order of 15 to 20 percent for mining. Surface mining 
employs fewer people for the amount of oil that is produced, which is 
looked on as an a:ivantage in Colorado because the impact of such a 
huge industry is of real concern. 
As for coal, much of it is in western regions, particularly the 
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Powder River Sasine Quite a bit o~ eastern coal, largely lignite, is 
in the Gulf and the Texas-Arkansas areas. In the time perioj we are 
talking about, mostly gas (.ould be produced from coal. Overall 
production would be about half liquids and half gas in the example 
shown. It should be recognized that pro-1uction of gas in effect 
displaces liquids and can therefore reduce petroleum. 
Figure 7 considers the cost of synthetic fuels. Absolute cost in 
these areas is a very slippery sort of thing, so I have taken the 
coward's way out and used cost ratios. Shale oil was used as the 
standard since it is believed to be the cheapest synthetic liquid. 
Its cost is considered to be about the same or less than the current 
price of imported petroleum. 
Intermediate BTU gas, which is a carbon monoxide-hydrogen mixture, 
will be extremely important industrially and costs about the same as 
making liquid from shale. It would be manufactured from coal, and 
pipelined or shipped by rail into industrial areas. 
For high BTU gas (methane) the cost goes up to 15 to 25 percent 
over liquids from shale. Methanol is slightly higher and is the 
lowest cost coal-base liquid. Methanol promises to be an important 
fuel, but not for aviation. 
The cost of refined coal liquids is high. There is some hope that 
with more research and improved technology the cost will go down. 
That is why the international study I referred to didn't show coal 
liquids becoming very important in the near and mid-term. 
Let us look at the situation in other countries. As shown in 
Figure 8, the U. S. is fortunate. We have some major resources of 
almost everything except tar sands. Canada has good resources. They 
don't have much in the way of good-quality shale, but their tar sands 
produce oil at about the same cost as shale, so they are in about the 
same shape as the U.S. North America, then, is in pretty good shape 
as far as liquid fuel sources. 
Europe has limited supplies of the fuel sources mentioned. They 
can help themselves quite a bit by working with those but must rely as 
well on imports. Japan also must rely on imports. 
One of the points to recognize is that the fuel situation is going 
to be very different in different parts of the world. The dynamics of 
supply and manufacturing are going to be different, and the 
composition of the fuel could well be different. Predicted trends are 
shown in Figure 9. I really want to emphasize the probable increasing 
frequency of shortages. When shortages occur the specialty fue1s--and 
jet fuels are classed as a specialty fuel because of their very 
restrictive specifications--immediately get very tight in supply. 
This has happened during the last two shortages. 
We are also going to have a shifting mix of projects in addition 
to the shifting raw material sources. 
Some projections trends are shown in Figure 10. In the industrial 
sector, the liquid fuel :leman:l will be going down, even though the 
projections this is based on showed continued industrial growth in 
this country. Liquid fuel use has in fact been growing in industry as 
imported fuels were used to displace gas; however, that trend will be 
reversed as gas supplies improve. 
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The nonenergy (petrochemicals, etc.) commercial and residential 
consumption will actually decrease somewhat due to increased use of 
gas and electricity. 
The total transportation demand will stay about the same; if the 
two transportation categories are combined t'ley total 9.9 million 
barrels per iay in the first case, and 10 in the second. The auto and 
light truck demand, of course, is the one that is going down in a 
spectacular manner as the public insists on smaller automobiles and 
better mileage. However, the use of aircraft for transportation will 
grow and the use of diesel fuel will also grow for truck transporta-
tion and the like. The transportation demand overall therefore 
becomes an increasing fraction of the total; however, the total has 
gone down slightly for the year 2000 and will continue to decrease as 
nonliquid energy sources are substituted. 
As an example of substitution, consider the electric power that is 
distributed in these consuming sectors. The liquid fuel demand is 
expected to go down from 1.4 to 0.3 million barrels per day as we back 
away from the use of imported fuel. 
These changes in demand for U. S. petroleum products will have a 
very large effect on the operation of an oil refinery. One way to 
characterize an oil refinery is by the gasolina-to-distillate ratio 
(Figure 11). Distillate includes mostly jet fuel, home heating oil, 
and diesel fuel. Historically, the ratio of gasoline to distillate 
has been about 1. 7. American retineries have worked hard to make more 
gasoline and less distillate and have ieveloped many processes for 
this purpose. 
We have considered two cases for the year 2000, one in which the 
use of the diesel automobile experiences only slight growth; the other 
case projects the higher rate of growth that is forecasted by the 
automobile industry. In the latter case, the ratio decreases to 0.7 
versus 1.7, which means, in effect, that the refineries would be 
working hard to make more distillates. 
This is an important change because when distillate quantity 
increases quality tends to decrease. 
There are some implications in this for aviation. It is clear 
that the competition for quality distillate fractions is going to 
increase because the automotive diesel system will work better on a 
fuel of higher quality than on the present diesel fuel. For example, 
a better quality fuel will improve starting in winter and facilitate 
handling of emissions problems. 
Since the distillates represent a larger fraction of the total, 
the lower-quality cracked stocks will have to be used in larger 
proportion. It has been the practice to try to minimize cracked 
products in better-quality fuels such as jet fuel. Poor-quality fuels 
can be upgraded by hydrogenation; however, with increased cost and 
increased manufacturing energy consumption, special facilities woul:! 
have to be justified and constructed and some flexibility in dealing 
with sudden changes in crude supply and composition would be lost. 
There are going to be supply disruptions and when that happens the 
product quality will tend to go down because it is very difficult to 
make high-quality, special products while maintaining supplies of the 
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major commodity fuels. As a nonaviation person, I am led to believe 
that the best position to be in would be to have aircraft that are 
capable of using a fairly wide range of fuels. One may not want to 
use the lower grades all the time or even as a staniard, but there 
will be times when maybe that is all one can get. 
The question, then, is what can be done to extend the capability 
of aircraft to use a variety of fuels. Let us consiier how jet fuel 
characteristics relate to performance and availability. . 
The flash point is the temperature at which the vapor-air mixture 
above the fuel becomes flammable. At the present time this is set at 
around 1000F. Figure 12 presents estimates that were developed for 
an ASTM committee grappling with the question of whether the flash 
point could be reduced a little more. Reducing the flash point does 
make available substantially increased quantities of components. It 
doesn't guarantee that they will be available for jet fuel, but it 
does allow a lot more flexibility. If the flash point is reduced to 
800 F, it allows a 22 to 30 percent increase in useable components. 
These are the fractions in the 800 to 1000F range that would 
otherwise be processed to go into gasoline. Use of these fractions 
would not interfere directly with diesel fuel production since diesel 
fuel has a higher flash point. Using more low boiling material allows 
use of more high boiling material while still meeting freezing point 
requirements. Flexibility is significantly increased. 
The question is one of safety. Certainly many areas experience 
termperatures greater than 800F. Fuel flash point is a question 
that I think needs to be addressed because it is the easiest way to 
increase jet fuel supply flexibility. 
Another important characteristic of jet fuel is freezing point 
(Figure 13). Increasing the freezing point makes a big difference in 
the stocks that are available for jet fuel. Jet A-I, a European 
specification, has been practical because Europe had the stocks to 
meet this specification fairly easily. With Jet A-I as a base with a 
-500 C freezing point, a comparison with Jet A, which has a -400C 
freezing point, shows a 45 percent increase in suitable components for 
Jet A. If the freezing point were set at -350 C, the increase in 
components would go up to 70 percent. Freezing point is a requirement 
that has a lot of leverage. Here, again, there are reasons for 
wanting it low. Freezing point requirements should be examined very 
carefully, and I believe it would be iesirable to have the capability 
to use jet fuels with higher freezing points. 
Aromatics or hydrogen content is another important factor to be 
considered in jet fuel specifications (Figure 14). As distillate 
demand increases and more low-hydrogen-content refinery feeds such as 
tars are used, more and more cracked stocks will go into the 
distillate pools. As an example, Jet A fuel in the past has had 20 
percent or less aromatic content. Some of the recent restrictions on 
crudes and refineries are leading to prediction of jet fuels with 25 
percent aromatics. The distillate fuels jerived frcm crackej stocks 
after treatment to improve stability and so on have an aromatics 
content in the 30 to 40 percent range. There will be continued 
pressure to use these crackei stocks. In the past, cracked solids 
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have been sold as domestic h~ating oil ani diesel fuel. 
Something can be done about it. Hydrogen can be added to reiuce 
aromatics, but this is expensive. Hydrogenation wastes energy and 
requires long-term planning and special equipment, particularly if the 
hydrogen must be '!lade from coal. This could be ll)ne, but it will 
increase the cost of air travel. 
As I noted earlier, the other '!lajor iistillate fuels will contain 
30 to 40 percent aromatics. The thing that is intriguing is that 
combustion systems can be built that will run satisfactorily on higher 
aromatic fuels. But there are some trade-offs, and there have to be 
plans to do it. So, here again is an opportunity to increase the 
flexibility of aircraft that should be considered. 
The last important jet fuel property is ther~al stability 
(Figure 15). In current aircraft, particularly high-performance 
aircraft, there is a tendency to use the fuel as a dumping ground for 
heat. This causes deposits and a variety of oth~r problems. Current 
stability requirements limit the refinery streams that can be used in 
jet fuel. Even ~il1ly hydrogenated cracked stocks tenj to go over the 
edge on jet fuel stability. In fact, about the only products that 
meet jet fuel stability requirements are the straight-run distillates 
that have been very carefully treated. 
As more cracked and high boiling stocks are put into jet fuel, 
even if they are partly hydrogenated, the stability problem arises. 
Therefore, one of the things that would really help on jet fuel supply 
flexibility would be for the new generations of aircraft to have less 
fuel stability requirements. 
What are the trade-offs and what are some of the things being done 
about the problem? Industry and governm~nt are working, through the 
American Society for Testing Materials, on jet fuel specifications and 
testing programs. I have mentioned the increases in aromatics that 
are being discussed. They are looking carefully at the flash point 
question, which I sensed is going to require more research. 
Of special importance to this meeting is the fact that NASA has 
initiated a 'llajor program to acquire the necessary data to reoptimize 
the aircraft fuel interface. It would be very difficult to make the 
case that a fuel composition based on past availability of relatively 
inexpensive petroleum is optimum for the future. What the future 
material should be isn't known. It could be higher quality for some 
uses, such as supersonic flight; it could be lower quality for other 
uses. The answer is not clear. 
NASA is not going to develop fuel specifications. The purpose of 
their work is to develop a data base to allow others to work the 
optimization problem and to match the requirements of the aircraft to 
fuel supply as time goes on. 
The Department of Defense has a substantial program largely 
related to assessing how well military aircraft can operate with the 
newer fuels and with the present equipment. 
AGARD and the NATO people are beginning to work on the problem on 
an international basis; they will participate with NASA in refinery 
simulations and will think the problem through themselves. As usual, 
there are quite a few viewpoints, but there is real interest in 
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working at the proble~. 
One thing ~ASA did was decide that, if there was going to be a 
broad look at this problem, there shouli be ~n experimental fuel that 
could be used by all participants as a stanrfar::l point of departure.· 
The characteristics of this experimental fuel are shown in Figure 16. 
The aro'llatics content has been increased to match more closely the 
components that would be available from cracked stocks ani synthetic 
fuels. There is no change in flash point. 
A substantial change was maie in the freezing point. This change 
could make quite a iifference in the supply picture. It was made on 
the basis that the higher freezing point would probably be 
satisfactory for about 98 percent of the flights. It was recognized 
that there would be some exceptions, such as very long, high-altitude 
flights or perhaps cold weather operations in Alaska. 
There is very little change in the stability temperature limits. 
The experimental temperature was set slightly lower, and it indicates 
what the experts thought might be done with very careful treatment of 
the higher aromatic fuel. This limit, however, falls short of 
providing for interchangeability with Hesel fuel, for example. This 
fuel has been acquired. It is being worked with and used as a 
baseline fuel. 
There are some general conclusions that can be drawn from all of 
this (Figure 17). First, refining technology is capable of producing 
high-quality jet fuels from future stocks, ani if we hae a steady, 
well-planned world there is no reason why we need to h'lve poorer 
'llaterials. But this doesn't mean that we should keep going just the 
way we are. I don't believe we can be assured of a well-planned, 
orderly future. 
To even maintain the present jet fuel specifications or to go to 
better ones will require a considerable amount of neTH, specialized 
equipment installed on a worldwide basis. The difficulty of meeting 
these specifications is going to vary considerably around the ~·lOrld. 
Some countries will be in relatively good shape and others will not. 
I believe that if the newer aircraft couli accept a wider range of 
fuel properties we would be better off in the future than if we 
continue to be restrictive or become more so as far as jet fuel is 
concerned. The question is what it costs in terms of performance 
operating problems and capital invest:nent balanced against the fuel 
costs. We don't have the answers now, and we need a substantial 
program to get the info~ation to solve the problem. 
We should have the philosophy of developing, what I would 
consider, rugged types of equipment that can tolerate conlitions that 
aren't quite ideal. The omnivorous airplane is probably too much to 
hope for, but I think we should be able to work out an optimum 
compromise. 
The message is that we really ought to look at fuel quality as a 
variable and build that into the advanced programs. 
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FRAMffivORK FOR THIS TALK 
Time Frame: 1990 - 2030 
World Energy Growth: Low and Erratic Due to a Series of Crises 
U.S. Response: A Major Effort to Convert Solid Resources 
to Liquids 
A Major Effort to Conserve Liquid Fuels 
FIGURR 3 
SYNTHETIC FUELS 
Supply Instability and Price Increases Have Resulted in a 
Clear Economic Driving Force. 
Hajor Energy Companies are Proposing Major 
Developments 
Former Non-Energy Companies Developing Plans 
Stimulated by the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation 
Federal Goal is 2MB/D (Oil Equivalent) by 1992 
FIGURR 4 
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ONE PROPOSAL FOR A MAJOR SYNTHETIC FUELS INDUSTRY 
Production Goal: 
Investment for Mining 
and Production: 
Employment: 
:FIGURE 5 
15 MB/D by 2010 
800 x 109 
(1980 Dollars) 
870,000 People 
PROPOSED SOURCES OF SYNTHETIC FUELS 
From Shale MB/D 
Surface Mines 6.0 
Underground Mines 2.0 
From Coal 
Powder River Basin 3.0 
Other Hestern 1.1 
Eastern 2.7 
Gulf 0.2 
Total 15.0 
FIGURE 6 
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COST OF SYNTHETIC FUELS 
% Increase in Cost 
Over Shale Oil 
Shale Oil 
Intermediate BTU Gas 
Methane 
o 
o 
15-25 
20-30 
40-60 
Methanol 
Refined Coal Liquids 
FIGURE 7 
GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSITY OF LIQUID FUEL SOURCES 
U.S. 
Canada 
w. Europe 
Japan 
Petroleum, Tar, Shale, Coal, 
Peat, Biomass 
Petroleum, Tar, Coal, Peat, 
Biomass 
Petroleum, Coal, Peat, Biomass 
Primary Reliance on Imports 
FIGURE 8 
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PREDICTED TRENDS 
- Increasing Frequency of Shortages 
- Recurring Tight Supply of Specialty Fuels 
- Shifting Product Mix 
- Shifting and Varied Raw Material Mix 
;FI.GURE. 9 
DYNAMICS OF LIQUID FUEL USE 
United States 
Consuming Sector 
Industrial 
Non Energy Plus 
Commercial/Residential 
Transportation 
Auto plus L. Truck 
Other Transportation 
Total 
Electric Power 
DEMAND MB/D 
1980 2000 
2.8 2.2 
5.1 4.2 
7.1 4.5 
2.8 5.5 
17.8 16.4 
1.4 0.3 
FIGURE 10 
3.1 
Major Trends 
Current Growth Reversed 
Decrease Due to Gas and 
Electricity Substitution 
Will Become an Increasing 
Fraction of the Total 
Continued Decrease 
Elimination of Heavy Fuel 
Oil Use 
u.s. PETROLEUM PRODUCTS DISTRIBUTION 
Year Gasoline/Distillate Ratio 
Min. Diesel Max. Diesel 
Growth Growth 
1975 1.7 1.7 
1980 1.5 
1990 1.2 
2000 1.0 0.7 
FIGURR 11 
FLASH POINT 
- Decreasing Flash Point is an Effective Means of Increasing 
the Range of Refinery Stocks Suitable for Jet Fuel 
Flash Point % Increase in 
0 C (oF) Suitable Components 
38 (loa) Base 
32 (90) 10-18 
27 (80) 22-30 
- Takes Advantage of Future Reduced Gasoline Consumption 
- Minimum Interference with Diesel Fuel Production 
- Makes Possible Addition of Higher Boiling Components 
FlGURR 12 
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FREEZING POINT 
- Increasing Freezing Point Greatly Increases Refinery 
Stocks Suitable for Jet Fuel 
Freezing Point % Increase in 
Fuel °c Suitable Components 
Jet A-I -50 Base 
Jet A -40 45 
-35 70 
- The Same Higher Boiling Fractions are Useful for Diesel 
and Heating Oil 
- The Higher Boiling Fractions Tend to Increase Liner Heating 
and Smoke 
FIGURE 13 
HYDROGEN CONTENT (AROMATICS) 
Increased Distillate Demand and Low Hydrogen Content 
Refinery Fuel Hill Result in Increased Use of Cracked 
Stocks in Distillate Products 
Jet A 
Revised Jet A 
Distillate Fuels from 
Cracked Stocks 
% Aromatics 
20 
22/25 
30-40 
Hydrogenation will Reduce Aromatics But is 
Expensive, Hasteful of Energy and Requires 
Special Equipment 
- Other Major Distillate Fuels 1Vill Contain 
30-40% Aromatics 
- Properly Designed Combustion Systems Can 
Satisfactorily Burn High Aromatic Fuels. 
FIGURE 14 
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STABILITY 
- Stability Requirements Limit Refinery Streams 
That Can Be Included in Jet Fuel 
- Other Distillate Products Do Not Meet Jet Fuel 
Stability Requirements 
- Cracked and High Boiling Stocks Increase The 
Stability Problem 
- Aircraft With Less Severe Stability Requirements 
Would Greatly Increase Future Fuel Options 
FIGURE 15 
EXPERIMENTAL BROAD SPECIFICATIONS FUEL 
Experimental 
Jet A Fuel 
Hydrogen Wt Percent ~14 ~13 
Aromatics Vol Percent ~ 25 '" 35 
Flash Point °c > 40 > 40 
Freezing Point °c -40 -29 
Break Point Temp °c >260 "> 240 
" 
FIGURE 16 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
- Refining Technology is Capable of Producing High 
Quality Jet Fuels from Future Fuel Stocks 
- This Will Require Increased Use of Specialized 
Equipment as Feed Stock Quality Decreases and 
Competition for Distillate Fuel Increases 
- The Difficulty of Meeting Specifications Will 
Vary Greatly with Location Especially in Times 
of Crisis Fuel Shortages 
- Aircraft Capable of Accepting a Substantially 
Wider Range of Fuel Properties Appear to Fit the 
Future Better than Aircraft with Restrictive 
Fuel Requirements 
- A Substantial Program is Needed to Acquire the 
Information Needed for Future Aircraft/Fuel 
Optimization. 
FIGURE 17 
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PERSPECTIVE ON ENGINEERING MANPOWER 
Patrick J. Sheridan 
Manager, ~anpower Activities 
American Association of Engineering Societies 
I wouli like to thank Dr. Stever and the Aeronautics ani Space 
En~ineering Board of the National ~esearch Council for the opportunity 
to speak at your tJorkshop this afternoon. Perhaps it might be well 
for ~e to take a moment to say a few words about the American 
Association of Engineering Societies, the parent organization of the 
Engineering Hanpower Commission. 
AAES, as it is now known in the alphabetical jargon of engineering 
societies, came into existence in December 1979. It has a membership 
of some 38 engineering societies with a membership of more than 
650,000 professional engineers. Its predecessor organization was the 
Engineers Joint Council. 
AAES is made up of four councils. They are known as the 
Educational Affairs Council, the International Affairs Council, the 
Public Affairs Council, and the Engineering Affairs Council. 
The Educational Affairs Council is concerned with such things as 
guidance for young people who are interested in studying engineering, 
continuing education for experienced engineers, engineering and 
technical education, and maintaining liaison between the engineering 
societies and the Accreditation Soard for Engineering and Technology 
(ABET). 
The International Affairs Council is concerne1 with the 
cooriination and communication of international activities and works 
with groups such as the Pan American Federation of Engineering 
Societies, the World Federation of Engineering Organizations, the 
World Energy Conference, and the u.s. Committee on Large Dams. 
The Public Affairs Council is concerned with establishing a 
Hashington presence on behalf of its member societies. It is also 
responsible for developing engineering information relevant to current 
public issues. The coordinating committee on energy is part of the 
Public Affairs Council. 
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The Engineering Affairs Council through the Engineering Manpow~r 
CO'lllUission is concerneJ \",ith the adequacy of engineering manpower to 
meet national gO:1ls. The Engineering ~1anpower Commission through 
survey programs furnishes infor~ation on education, placement, demand, 
and compensation of engineers and technologists. The Engin=crin.'s 
Affairs Council is also responsible for ~aintaining and publishing the 
guidelines to professional employment f:lr engineers and scientists. 
The Engineering Practices Information Center (EPIC) is part of the 
. Engineering Affairs Council. EPIC monitors legislation affecting 
engineering in every state of the United States and alerts subscribers 
with pertinent information concerning this legislati:ln. The 
Engineering Affairs Council is also responsible for publishing Who's 
Who in Engineering. This publication is revise1 every two years and 
consists of a listing of engineers who have 1istinguishei themselves 
by their contribution to engineering technology. 
I would now like to discuss with you some of the studies conducted 
by the Engineering ~anpower Commission and then review some of our 
most recent findings. 
Each year after the September enrollment, the Engineering Manpower 
Commission conducts a survey of the engineering and technology schools 
in the United States to determine the level of enrollment and the 
engineering and techn:llogy disciplines in which the new students have 
enrolled. These data are further broken down by women and minority 
students. The data are presented by schools on the basis of graduate 
and undergraduate programs. Accreditation iata by program are also 
presented. In June of each year we do a survey of the same schools to 
determine the number of graduates and the programs from which they 
graduated. The breakdown is similar to that of the enrollment survey 
and is presented on the basis of school, by women and minority, and by 
curriculum. Every two years the Engineering Manpower Commission 
conducts a salary survey of professional engineers. This includes all 
engineers in industry, education, and sovernment with a four-year 
degree in engineering. The data are presented on the basis of 
maturity--years since B.S. degree--and are further broken jo~n by 
supervisory status and degree level, such as bachelors, masters, or 
Ph. D. s. Groupings are also presented on the bas is of industry type; 
state, local, and federal government; an-l by :1cadem ically employed 
engineers on the basis of 9- or l2-month contracts. 
The Engineering Manpower Commission has, over the years, published 
manpower bulletins summ:1rizing the results of its various surveys and 
presenting other items of infor:nation to the engineering community. 
These are distributed on a subscription basis to engineers and 
engineering employers who are interested. 
I would now like to review with you some manpower history based on 
the studies taken over the years by the Engineering Manpower 
Commission. We will also look at the latest :nanpower information 
available, which in most cases is that from the 1979 studies. We are 
now in the process of collecting j~ta for 1980, but this information 
will not be available until sometime in October. The lata that you 
are about to see, for the most part, :ire general information covering 
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all engineering disciplines. Hhere possible we have isolate1 
~erospace engineering to give you a specific feel of how this relates 
to the overall engineering picture. 
Figure 1 shows total engineerin~ undergraduate enrollment. In 
1979 this a~ountej to some 340,488 un1ergraduate stuients enrolled in 
280 schools that award a bachelors or higher degree in engineering. 
This represents a 9 p~rcent increase over those enrolled in 1978 and 
an 82 percent increase over those enrolled in 1973. Both women and 
minorities increased 21 percent over 1978 enrollments. Comparing this 
\lith the overall increase in enroll'Uents of 9 percent indicates that 
{oTO.nen an:! minorities are now getting a greater share of engineering 
enrollments. Of the 340,488 enrollments, 9656 students were enrolled 
in aerospace engineering pro5rams. This represents a 21 percent 
increase over 1978, when the aerospace enrollment was 7949 students. 
So, we ~ight say that things are looking up in aarospace engineering 
enrollment. Of the 9656 students enrolled in aerospace engineering 
programs, 435 (4.5 percent) are foreign national stu.ients here on a 
temporary visa. 
Figure 2 shows a breakdown of engineering enrollment on the basis 
of freshmen, sophomores, juniors, and seniors. I have also shown 
graduate stu·ients in Figure 2, which were not included in the total in 
Figure 1. 
Freshmen enrollment in 1979 was 103,724. This represents an 8 
percent increase over 1978 and a lOO percent incr~ase over 1973. 
Sophomore enrolLnent of 78,594 represents a 9 percent increase over 
1978, and junior enrollment at 74,928 represents a 7 percent increase 
over 1978. Senior enrollment at 83,242 represents a 13 percent 
increase over 1978. Retention rates from 1978 and 1979 showed that 82 
percent of all freshmen became sophomores, 119 percent of the juniors 
became seniors, 'lnd 72 percent of the seniors graduated with a B.S. 
degree in engineering. Retention rates greater than 100 percent are 
due to transfers into en~inearing programs from other disciplines. As 
we all know, there is a great deal of transition in and out of 
engineering curricula. There is always a heavy loss from the freshman 
class to the sophomore class. This is made up, to some ex:tent, by 
students enrolled in other scientific fields who decide to transfer to 
engineering at the end of their sophomore and junior years. Not all 
of them make it, however, since only 72 percent of the seniors 
eventually wind up with a B.S. degree in engineering. 
Graduate students increased 8 percent over 1979 to 41,384 
enrollments. Thirty-four percent of the graduate enrollments in 
engineering curriculum' are made up of forei~n national students. 
Thirty-one percent of the masters degree candidates and 39 percent of 
the doctoral can:! i,iates are foreign national students. With respect 
to aerospace engineering, some 31 percent of the candidates are 
foreign natio~als anj 51 percent of the Ph.D. candidates are foreign 
national students. The number of women in graduate programs increased 
16 percent over 1978. 
Figure 3 shows that engineering degrees awarded in 1979 amounted 
to 52,598 at the bachelor level. This represented a 14 percent 
increase over 1978 and a 21 percent increase over the number of 
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degrees awarded in 1973. Of this total, 9 percent were awarded to 
women, as contrasted with 1.4 percent in 1973. Two percent were 
awarded to Blacks, as contrasted with 1.5 percent in 1973. One and 
one-half percent ~¥ent to Hispanics, as contrasted with 1. 3 percent in 
1973. Asian Pacifics were awarded 3 percent of the engineering 
degrees in 1979 and 1.6 percent in 1973. American Indians made up 
about 0.1 of 1 percent in each of those years. Comparing the makeup 
of the 52,598 degrees awarded in 1979 with the number of degrees 
awarded in 1978, women were up 44 percent, Blacks were up 20 percent, 
Hispanics were up 10.1 percent, Asian Pacifics were up 28.2 percent, 
and American Indians were up 59 percent. Compared with the overall 
increase of 14 percent, wo;nen and most minori ties maie headway over 
1978. 
Masters degrees in engineering were down 1 percent from those 
granted in 1978. The 16,036 ~aster degrees awarded in 1979 were also 
6.5 percent less than those awarded in 1973. Twenty-five percent of 
the masters degrees awardej went to foreign nationals in 1979. At the 
masters level, women increased their participation by 9.3 percent. 
~inorities were down. Blacks were off 21 percent, Hispanics were iown 
12 percent, and Asian Pacifics were down more than 14 percent. 
The number of doctoral degrees aWilrded in 1979 was 9 percent 
greater than in 1978. However, the 2815 doctoral degrees awarded in 
1979 was 22 per::ent below the number awarded in 1973. Thirty-three 
percent of the doctoral degrees were aWilrded to foreign nationals. 
Two percent of the Ph. D. degrees went to women, 0.7 percent went to 
Blacks, and 0.8 percent went to Hispanics. Six percent of the 
doctoral degrees went to Asian Pacifics. 
Taking a look at aerospace engineering degrees shown in Figure 4, 
we find that in 1979 there were 1145 degrees awarded. Although this 
represents a 17 percent increase over the number of aerospace 
engineering degrees awarded in 1978, it represents only 86 percent of 
the total number of degrees awarded in 1973. At the masters degree 
level, the 381 degrees awarded in aerospace engineering in 1979 is 93 
percent of the number of degrees awarded in 1978 and 62 percent of the 
number of master degrees in aerospace awarded in 1973. Ph.D. degrees 
also dipped in 1979 to 82 percent of those awarded in 1978 and about 
half of those awarded in 1073. Foreign nationals received 26 percent 
of the masters and 50 percent of the doctoral degrees awarded to 
aerospace graduates. 
Figure 5 translates the numbers in Figure 4 into percentages to 
reflect participation of aerospace in engineering curriculum. We find 
that bachelors degrees in aerospace engineering amount to 2.2 percent 
of the total awarded, masters degrees about 2.4 percent of the total 
awarded, and Ph.D. degrees about 3.3 percent of the doctoral degrees 
awarded. In each case, you can see there is a substantial decrease 
from the heyday of 1972. 
Figure 6 compares the degrees awarded to women to the freshman 
enrollment in all engineering curriculum. Women represented 14 
percent of the total freshman enrollment in 1979. This was 19 percent 
over that of 1978 and 480 percent over that of 1973. Nine percent of 
the total degrees awarded in 1979 went to women. This was a 44 
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percent increase over 1978 ani a 650 percent over 1973. Forty-seven 
percent of the degrees awaried to women were in three major fieUs: 
mechanical engineering--13 percent, electrical--13 percent, and 
chemical--2l percent. 
Figure 7 shows that Blacks made up 6 percent of the total freshman 
enrollment in engineering. Their total enrollment of 6339 represented 
a 15 percent increase over 1978 and a 197 percent increase over 1973, 
,.hich iniicates good progress but it does not quite come up to the 
progress made by women. With respect to degrees awarded, Blacks 
received 2 percent of the total. Sixty-three percent of the degrees 
awarded to Blacks were in the fields of mechanical--2l percent, 
electrical--32 percent, and chemical--10 percent. 
Figure 8 shows that Hispanics made up 3 percent of the total 
freshman enrollment in 1979. This represents an 18 percent increase 
over 1978 and a 29 percent over 1973. Degrees awarded to Hispanics 
amounted to 1. 5 percent of the total iegrees awaried. Forty-seven 
percent were in two fields: mechanical--19 percent and electrical--28 
percent. 
Figure 9 shows the participation of women and minorities in the 
degrees awarded for aerospace engineering. Although some slight gains 
have been made by ~lacks and Hispanics, women have penetrated the 
aerospace field considerably, increasing their participation in terms 
of degrees awarded by some 350 percent since 1974. 
Figure 10 shows some changes that have taken place in the 
participation of students in selected engineering curriculums over the 
past decade. In 1969 some 28.5 percent of the degrees awardei were in 
the electrical engineering field. This fell to 23.2 percent in 1979. 
Over the same period, mechanical engineering dropped from 21.1 percent 
to 19.2 percent. On the other hand, civil engineering went from 14.9 
percent in 1969 to 19.1 percent in 1979. Chemical engineering over 
the same period went from 8.6 percent to 11.1 percent, and aerospace 
dropped from 5.5 percent of the total degrees awarded in 1969 to 2.2 
percent of the total degrees awarded in 1979. 
Figure 11 shows the status of engineering graduates as of their 
date of graduation. Our 1979 survey showed that 76 percent were 
employed as of their date of graduation, 12 percent were entering 
graduate studies, and 3 percent had no offers or plans. In my 
opionion, the key items in this analysis are (1) entering graduate 
studies, (2) considering job offers, and (3) no offers or plans. When 
the job market is favorable we usually find fewer students going on to 
graduate school and more graduates still considering job offers. And, 
of course, when the job market is favorable we have fewer graduates 
with no offers or plans. When the job market is less than favorable 
we find an increased number applying for graiuate school, a higher 
percentage with no offers or plans, and very few still considering job 
offers, since they are quick to accept a fair offer when it is made. 
As you can see from these numbers, 1979 presented a favorable job 
market to the graduates. 
Figure 12 shows the statist ics for aerospace graiuates, with the 
number e!llploye:i as of the iate of graduatlon slightly lower, the 
number entering full-time graduate study slightly higher, and the 
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number of graiuates with no offers or plans about 1 percent higher 
·than the average. The statistics are slightly lower than for some 
other disciplines, but really not that far out of line. 
Figure 13 shows the progress in salaries for engineers by degree 
level from 1963 to the present. As the graph iniicates, engineers 
have made good progress. Figure 14 indicates that aerospace engineers 
have also made good progress salary wise. Figure 15 shows a 
comparison of the starting salaries paid to engineers in general and 
those paid to aerospace engineers. Although aerospace engineers were 
somewhat behind over the past decade, apparently they've now caught up 
with the average. I would now like to share with you some preliminary 
information that we have collected in our placement survey with 
respect to starting salaries for bachelors, masters, and Ph.D. 
engineering graduates in 1980. I should like to remind you that these 
are preliminary numbers and should not be considered official until 
our survey is published. As we all suspected, petroleum engineering 
graduates received the highest starting salaries of any engineering 
discipline at the bachelors level. At ~l983 a month, their salary is 
higher than most starting salaries at the' masters iegree level. 
Aerospace graduates received starting salaries of $1655 at the 
bachelors level, which is somewhat below electrical and chemical, but 
higher than computer and civil. The average starting salary for all 
disciplines as reporteJ in the Engineering ~anpower Commission 
Placement Survey is $1720 a month. At the masters degree level, the 
average starting salary is $1898 a month. The average starting salary 
for aerospace engineers at the masters level is $1867 a month. At the 
doctoral level, the average starting salary for all engineering 
disciplines is $2313 a month. Aerospace engineers at the Ph.D. level 
receive starting salaries of $2235 a month. 
Figure 16 shows engineering employment and unemployment in the 
United States. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that we have 
about 1,400,000 engineers currently employed, with an unemployment 
rate of about L 2 percent. It is estimated that aerospace engineers 
make up about 5 percent of the employed engineers. 
I hope that this information will be of some value to you in your 
deliberations over the next several days. If you have any questions 
in the time remaining, I shall try to answer them. 'Thank you again 
for your kind attention. 
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THE OUTLOOK FOR METALLIC MATERIALS 
Charles Law McCabe 
Vice President and General Manager 
High Technology Materials Division 
Cabot Corporation 
Perhaps I should retitle this talk "What Should We Do About 
Metallic Materials," rather than merely consider their outlook. 
That's because what we in the U. S. decide to do today and tomorrow 
will so profounily affect that outlook. Essentially, then, my remarks 
will ieal with what I think we should do to brighten the outlook for 
specialty metals, which are the ones I know the most about and the 
primary ones at issue. 
Coming from a private sector organization that has a long history 
in developing specialty metals, I might be expected to sketch either a 
flattering portrait of our industry's future or a dismal 
one--depending on the point I might wish to make. But it is because I 
am a part of an industry whose future depends on the eventual outcome 
of the issues we're discussing here that I conclude that the outlook 
for 'lletallic materials depends, to a large extent, on in1ustry and 
government working together. And as a former college professor, I'll 
~dd the academic community to that. 
To pick up the "outlook" threa1, I'll 1ivide it into three parts: 
--Today, it's not all that bad. 
--Tomorrow, it's 1ubious. 
--The day after, it could be disastrous; or, on the other hand, 
under control--which it will be is up to us. 
The current boom in the aerospace industry has seen :l period of 
metallic raw materials allocations and for wrought alloy producers 
lead times measured in months, even years (rather than weeks). In 
addition, it has been a period of rapid price increases all the way 
around. 
Although the acute shortage phase is over, we are still left with 
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some metallic raw material prices that are artificially high and 
cannot be sustained over time. 
I refer particularly to cobalt, which shot up in price during 1978 
and 1979, from $6 to $25 a pound. Unfortunately, most of the free 
world's cobalt comes from Zaire and Zambia, countries that are 
desperately in need of c3.sh. Political considerations, rather than 
marketplace pressures, therefore, dictate selling price. 
In time, the cobalt price will come down. Generally, though, we 
shouldn't expect metallic raw materials prices, which have escalated 
far faster than inflation, to come down. Therefore, pressures that 
have always existed to fin1 ways of reducing materials costs wi 11 be 
intensified, and good ideas will readily be funded. 
As for tomorrow, shortages such as we have experienced can be 
expected to occur again, given the fluctuations in demand by the 
aerospace industry coupled with a general increase in demand by other 
markets. The private sector has responded to this situation. Both 
primary metallic raw materials producers and wrought alloy producers 
have announced expansion plans. 
In my own division, our production today in pounds is twice the 
rate we enjoyed during the peak of the 1974 boom period. And just 
last week we signed a contract that, in 1982, -will more than double 
our capacity, as well as improve raw material utilization by 
increasing yields. 
Wi th this expansion, we hope that we'll be able to keep our 
delivery times down in the next boom period so that our customers 
won't have to order material so far in advance and wait so long for 
delivery. 
In most cases, the profit-making system will work in time to 
provide the necessary productive capacity. But this isn't the whole 
story and it certainly isn't for the day after tomorrow because there 
must be an adequate supply of minerals or metallic raw materials to 
feed the productive capacity and that supply is limited for some 
important metals. 
We in the U.S. are particularly vulnerable because 18 of the 
minerals considered essential to our economy and security are imported 
at levels of 50 percent or more. Close to 100 percent of two of the 
most strategic metals for the aerospace in:iustry--cobalt an~i 
chromium--are imported. 
Given that the demand for metallic materials fluctuates ani that 
we import so many of the vital alloWing elements, some way of bringing 
supply and demand into synchronization without worrying about possible 
cutoffs of foreign sources seems to be the way to go. 
How best to approach this admittedly idealized situation is the 
main point I wish to leave with you. Per-nit me to arrive at this 
point by summarizing the existing and near-term supply and demand 
situation and then iientifying some basic ideas concerning 
alternatives to our dependence on foreign existing supplies. 
The alternatives, each of which I will address, are as follows: 
--Substitution of those metals whose supplies are most vulnerable 
to political an·j other upheavals around the worU. 
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--Designing around--that is, eliminating or reducing--the amounts 
of those metals now being used. 
--Recycling, or salvaging, those metals ~uring proiuction of 
components and their eventual disposal. 
First, I will iiscuss the outlook for supply and demani over the 
next five years, focusing on some of our vital and vulnerable 
strategic metals. 
Chromium By any criterion, chromium is at the top of the list as 
a source of concern to anyone who supplies high-temperature alloys to 
the aerospace industry. The reasons, of course, are that virtually 
all our chromium is imported and all hi5h-temperature alloys contain 
about 20 percent chromium for oxidation resistance. The predominant 
world reserves are in the Union of South Africa and in what was 
Rhodesia, a region in which there is a great deal of political 
unrest. Because of its importance and because we don't know what else 
to do, my company is stockpiling chromium, just in case. 
Cobalt The high price of cobalt and the experiences of the recent 
cobalt shortage have spurred mining and extractive metallurgy programs 
in North America to lessen our dependence on southern Africa. 
Tantalum The demand for highly efficient, yet miniaturized, 
circuitry for electronic control devices in applications ranging from 
defense and automobiles to household smoke detectors and electronic 
games has placed unprecedented demand on the limited availability of 
tantalum. Tantalum powder prices have escalated by a factor of five. 
The best hope now is the discovery of new mineral deposits. 
Tungsten This is one of the metals that the U. s. possesses and 
can "accollmodate about 40 percent of its own demand. Demand is about 
20 million pounds, with 10 million pounds being imported (mainly from 
Canada af'd R"livi a). During this past boom, tungsten behavei 
itse1f--large1y because it was avoided in earlier R&D programs because 
of price and supply, because new productive capacity was installed in 
response to past shortages, and because the tungsten carbide industry 
learned to recycle using physical processes that are cheap and quick. 
Nickel Free world use of nickel is about 1. 2 billion pounds a 
year. Uost of the 400 million pounds of nickel used in the U.S. is of 
Canadian origin. Many new mines have been developed in recent years, 
and currently there is more potential capacity than demand. However, 
the cost of bringing on new mines has escalated so much that real 
prices will have to rise for them to be economical. 
110lybdenum The cost of molybdenum has risen 77 percent (from 
$9.10 to $16.20 a pound) since January 1, 1979. The U.S. is 
self-sufficient in this critical metallic element. Considerable new 
production is planned through 1987, which should support the 
forecasted growth rate. Beyond then, new sources will need to be 
developed, at significant cost, which could very well exceed the capa-
bility of any single corporation. 
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Columbium Large columbium reserves have been identified in 
Brazil, and production will be expanded to produce about 55 million 
pounds a year of this metal. 
So Jluch for the current situation--now, there are many ways to 
increase metals supplies: keep world reserves of strategic minerals 
in friendly hands, increase prices to spur exploration for new sources 
and exploitation of leaner ore bodies, and 10 more R&D on extracting 
metals from lean ore bodies. 
The big payoff in supply over the long term, however, will be 
found in other ways. One of these is materials substitution. 
Substitution in metals can take three avenues: use of other 
metals or alloys, use of metallic or nonmetallic coatings, and 
substituting nonmetals for metals. Obviously, substitution is not 
new, and all these avenues have paid handsome dividends in the past. 
In the past we have most often substituted to obtain better 
performance. Now, faced with uncertain mineral supplies, we are 
looking to substitution to help alleviate the situation or, as we 
hope, solve the problem. 
My division has had some recent R&D experiences in substituting 
nickel for coba1t--experiences that I would like to share with you. 
Our R&D program to develop a no-cobalt wrought alloy for the 
combustor can in gas turbines arose because of the $6 to $25 a pound 
increase for cobalt I mentioned at the start. Even at that price, we 
were on allocation and facing the sobering alternative of paying $40 a 
pound on the merchant market. The need for a nickel-base alloy with 
properties as good as the cobalt alloy was, thus, obvious and highly 
desirable, so we set to work right away. 
During the past year and a half we have made remarkable progress 
in this R&D program because of the large volume of scientific 
information already in the literature on phase diagrams, metal carbide 
compositions and morphology, diffusion coefficients of metals in 
alloys, and the elements of strengthening mechanisms. Without these 
data, we would not have been able to make nearly as intelligent 
guesses as to what systems were most promising and we would have been 
forced to do a great deal of Edisonian-type research. 
The basic lesson to be learned from this experience is that, in 
substituting metallic systems in aerospace applications, where the 
combination of properties required is very specific and very 
demanding, it is not practical to amass a storehouse of knowledge to 
deal with every substitution possibility that might be needed. 
What is needed is more basic scientific data that can be used by 
researchers to speed up the process of alloy development. Then, as 
the need arises for a substitute alloy or for a new alloy, it can be 
developed in a timely fashion. 
I am not advocating that we, as a nation, do less scientific 
investigation of the mechanisms of time-dependent processes, such as 
oxidation, creep, or low-cycle fatigue. Rather, I am saying that we 
in the U.S. should support more research work aimed at broadly 
gathering data on systems of potential interest for alloy substitution. 
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This is one of the areas that NASA can boost markedly, chiefly via 
increased support of research directed toward such jata gathering--in 
universities, government laboratories, and private industry. Certain-
ly, this is an area for cost shaving and one for cooperative R&D pro-
grams. 
We now come to design. 
History tells us that in the aerospace field the outlook for 
materials at any given time is intimately tied up with future design. 
In turn, future design often depends on 'ievelopments. in materials. 
Tolay, the need for reduced fuel consumption, reduced weight, 
increased reliability, and oiecreased manufacturing costs clearly calls 
for continued close cooperation between the design and the materials 
communities. 
My own experience convinces me that there is room for 
improvement. I know that in our own allocation of resources to 
various R&D areas we spend very little of our own funds or time on 
meeting future needs of design engineers because many of the 
uncertainties involved. We just do not, in the nor.ma1 course of 
business, meet with the key design engineers in industry or government. 
We would be pleased to spend more of our R&D effort in this area 
if mechanisms were set up to better define what needs to be done and 
if the tasks to accomplish this were split up according to the special 
expertise of the cooperative private or government organizations. I 
am sure that other metallic materials producers would be receptive to 
such a program. 
Conventional high-temperature metallic materials for gas turbine 
use have been approaching the limit of development for some 
time--except now it appears that dispersion-strengthened alloys have a 
great deal of promise. It is for this reason that there has been 
increasing emphasis on design to attain the objectives mentioned 
above. What can materials suppliers do to help? 
First, materials suppliers can provide product forms and physical 
characteristics that would be amenable to the new designs and, in some 
cases, to new manufacturing practices to make the newly designed 
components. Indeed, we as suppliers of high-performance alloy sheet, 
bar, plate, wire, and tubing can envision that we could add to that 
list certain fabricated forms that lend themselves to production in 
large-scale equipment that we would add to our conventional wrought 
alloy mill equipment. 
If required, we can respond to the need for wrought alloys with 
better welding and fabrication capabilities. As materials are used 
more efficiently (that is, thinner and in more complex parts), 
oxidation resistance may become a difficult problem to resolve, 
requiring responses from different segments of the materials community. 
Let us now discuss some other avenues we can take to help us 
adjust to the materials problem. 
First, alloy design. In designing alloys, the following should be 
considered (in addition to meeting design targets): 
--Future availability and cost of raw ~ateria1s. 
--Avoiding the loss of strategic elements in melting returned 
scrap. 
--Ability to process in e~isting large-scale equipment. 
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Seco~d, techniques that ~llow ~etter utilization--specifically, 
shaping instead of removing metal--are among the most rewariing 
actions that can be taken to make the b~st use of critical materials. 
Much a1rea:iy has been accomplished in this area, such as producing 
parts to near net shape using P/M techYliques, !Jut a great deal more 
needs to be done. Still, far too many cutting c~ips and too much 
griniing swarf are generate:!. The pity is that many of the alloys in 
them are not returned to their optimal economic use because they are 
irretrievably mixed with less expensive alloys. 
Finally, the above lea:!s to a subject that is of fUYl:iamental 
importance to ~oth the s~ort- and long-term solutions to materials 
shortages and high costs. 
It is clear, I'm sure, that the best way to conserve materials is 
to reuse them. For t'1is to ~appen, complete cooperation of three 
groups is maYl:iatory: 
--First, the alloy producer. He must segregate '1is internally 
generate:i scrap and :ievelop techniques and proce:lur~s for 
melting purchased scrap in grade and encourage his customer to 
return scrap in grade by paying good prices for segregate:! scrap. 
--Second, the fa~ricator of high alloy parts. 1~ should keep 
grindings and metal chips from diluting a graJe, or at least keep 
coba1t-, nickel-, and iron-base alloys separate. He ~ust also 
return these high-grade materials to the origi,al producdr, thus 
preveYlting them from finding their way into products 11here some 
of the strategic elements are not needed to meet specs. 
--Third, the engine designer. Where possible, assembly should be 
designed so that iifferent alloys (or fa~ili~s of alloys) can 
be easily separated when the assembly is finally scrapped, so 
that the alloys can be sent back to the ~lloy producer for 
melting-in grade. 
The materials outlook for the lQ80s is such that we simply cannot 
relax. We have a great many options open to us for short-term 
solutions to materials availability: we can explore for new jeposits, 
develop known deposits, stockpile in times of recession, ani ~eep the 
Soviets away from our sources of supply. 
For a long-term solution to our materials av'1 i 1abi 1 tty problem, 
however, ~le must look to substitution, jesign, an:! a ti~ht scrap 
return cycle. These solutions are not new; t'ley have a long 'lnd 
honorable history. But it is not too soon for us to accelerate 
deve10pmeYlts in these areas. 
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THE 1980S: 
A DECADE OF REVITALIZATON FOR AVIATION 
Dr. Bill Wilkins 
Associate Administrator for Policy and 
International Affairs 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Thank you for the opportunity to speak at this meeting. I bring 
you greetings from Administrator Langhorne Bond and his wishes that 
you have a productive session. :'oday I want to share with you some 
views about the future of air transportation from the viewpoint of the 
FAA's Policy and International Aviation Affairs organization, which I 
head. 
API, as it is called in the agency, has among its functions policy 
analysts, planning, ani international aviation affairs. As such, we 
may have many of the economists and systems planners of the agency 
within our organization. There are relatively fewer engineers among 
us than you would find elsewhere in the FAA. The engineering and 
regulatory parts of the agency are well represented by other people on 
your program who will be here all week. I bring to you today the 
perceptions of an economist regarding the future of aviation. 
Over the last several decades aviation has grown to maturity. Air 
travel, whether in a large jet transport or small private plane, is no 
longer the novelty or adventure that it once was. Aviation--and the 
opportunity it offers for safe, high-speed, long-distance travel--is a 
part of everyday life. The safety, comfort, and convenience it 
provides are taken for granted by most of the population. The air 
transportation industry has evolved to the point where it serves many 
markets encompassing a broad cross section of society. 
Along with this growth to maturity has come the establishment of a 
large infr~structure that we refer to ~s the 'lational Aviation 
System. A network of airports, navigation systems, and air traffic 
control facilities have been built to serve the hundre:ls of thousan:ls 
of aircraft that now operate in the United States. Aircraft 
technology has advan::.ed to levels of sOphlstication that few even 
dreamed of not so many years ago. What has evolved is a complex, 
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interrelated system of people, procedures, ~nd capital plant that 
demands a careful balance of ~ multitude of variables and, I believe, 
cooperation among all system elements i.e., government, industry, and 
users. 
Let me reinforce a point that was partially a:ldressej earlier 
today--which is one of the advantages or dtsadvantages of speaking 
later in the program. As aviation has grown to maturity in the United 
States it has also advanced substantially in the other industrialized 
nations of the world. Since at least the mid-1940s, the United 
States, has held a :lominant, if not unassailable, position in the 
international aviation community. Although the United States clearly 
remains the leajer in aviation, the era of our overwhelming dominance 
in the worli marketplace and international forums is disappearing. \~e 
must now negotiate and compromise to a degree unknown for generations. 
This has been much on our minds because the 23rd Assembly of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization will be held in September 
and October. Looking around this room I would guess that most of us 
grew up and did some of our most productive work during the time 
period that ~tarted as the great depression turned into World War II 
and ended with the close of the 1960s. That was a period of time when 
the leadership role of the United States was so clear it became easy 
to believe this was normal. Instead of being normal, it was, perhaps, 
a historical accident born of the prostration of our allies and former 
foes as well as our own strength. It was a dominance that we woul:l 
not reasonably expect to happen in other times and other places. 
Much has changed since that era--and not just in aviation. For 
example, the international monetary system created at Bretton \voods at 
the end of lvorld War II has been substantially changed in the last few 
years. The United States dollar no longer serves as the world's only 
reserve and trading currency. The military hegemony of the United 
States has been challenged in many parts of the globe. Similiar 
industrial examples could be drawn, many of them automobiles, steel, 
electronics, and oil. The U.S.-based system of pricing worlj oil, 
which worked for a generation, has changed dramatically with the 
emergence of OPEC. We could draw on many examples, not just in the 
field of aviation, that illustrate challenges of the leadership role 
of the United States. 
As a mature industry, aviation is now in much the same position as 
the other modes of transportation. In the federal government, as in 
the private markets, aviation must compete for a share of the limited 
resources available to the transportation sector. This beco'D.es more 
important when viewed from the perspective of the substantial capital 
investments needed in the near future for replacement of ground 
equipment in the federal portion of the National Aviation System. In 
the early development of the aviation system, 1l0st of our capital 
investment was focused upon addition of new equipment to the 
inventory. Now, however, we are entering a phase that wi 11 require 
large capital investments in replacement equipment--leading to either 
less net expansion of the system or substant ially increased funding 
levels. 
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In these times of increasing scrutiny 2nd fiscal conservatism it 
,.,rill, indeed, be a difficult task to ohtain substantial funding 
increases from general tnx revenues. Even the often heralde::'l trust 
fund "surplus" '-lill cover only a fraction of the expected needs. We 
must find 'ess costly, more efficient 'lays of ooing things. He must 
do more hy developing the technologies that help our people work more 
produc t j ve ly. . 
Cost ~nd resource problems are becoming increasingly critical 
throughout the aviation community. Huch of the capital plant of the 
airlines has reached the point where it will require replacement. 
Several years ago the capital needs of major airlines for the decade 
from 1976 to 1985 were estimated at $20 to $30 billion. Furthermore, 
it was estimated that they could more than double that amount for the 
period from 1976 through 1990. These estimates recognized that, in 
the mid-1980s, the airline industry would be entering its first major 
equipment replacement cycle since jet transports replaced piston 
engine ai rcraft. Although this was recognized as a major challenge, 
until recently most industry analysts believed that the airlines could 
"work out" any cash flow and balance sheet problems to provide the 
needed capt ial. 
The last feH years have added new dimensions to the problem. 
Inflation has reached higher-than-expected levels. Fuel costs have 
soared. Competition has intensified as newcomers challenge the 
established major airlines. In 1978 the average total cost per 
available passepger seat mile was less than 7 cents. Today, a 
conservative estimate is that this figure will be over 16 cents by 
1990. 
The cost of fuel is taking an increasing proportion of the 
operating cost dollar for the airlines. Based upon reported data, in 
1973 the cost of fuel was about 10 percent of total operating costs. 
Even with the efficiency and load factor improvements we have seen 
si nce then, this figure has risen to the poi nt that when jet fuel 
prices reach $1.00 per gallon--which is not hard to imagine--it will 
drive fuel costs up to more than 30 percent of total operating costs. 
General aviation faces a twofold problem with respect to aviation 
gasoline, part of which has heen discussed today--cost and 
availability. In June 1980 the national average selling price for 
aviation gasoline was around $1.65 per gallon. This is a large 
out-of-pocket expense for many general aviation operators, but the 
problem of high fuel costs is shared by the airlines, commuters, and 
general aviation alike. The special problem faced by general aviation 
is the availability of aviation gasoline. Spot shortages at airports 
can be expected, and, in fact, some spot shortages and troubles with 
deliveries have already been reported to us. I am interested in this 
problem and have personally visited with some managers of refineries 
who discussed the problem of small lot production mentioned earlier. 
7his is going to be an increasing problem for general aviation 
operators. 
As a mi litary enthusiast and pilot, I believe we have a problem of 
perception among the nonflying public and, indeed, with those who fly 
only on airliners. As long as there remains the 
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perception of general aviation as an instrument of pleasure--and 
perhaps even conspicuous consumption--it ~ill have problems in 
maintaining the political power to ensure its share of fuel supplies. 
Thus, there is no question in my mind that we need aircraft that 
are more efficient. In an environment of increase1 competition, this 
need has become even more acute for the airlines. With operating 
costs rising Easter than the airlines can cover them, earnings have 
suffered. You have already heard this problem iiscussed earlier 
today. These losses, which appear to have continued throughout the 
second qu~rter--a1though complete :iata are not yet avai1ab1e--impair 
the ability of the airlines to finance new equipment fro'll internal 
sources. Furthermore, they weaken the competitive position of the 
airlines for obtaining external financing through the capital markets. 
In the midst of this troublesome situation, it now appears that, 
based on a recent Air Transport Association study, upwards of 
$80 billion may be needed by the airlines over the next decade to 
finance new passenger aircraft. This increase in estimated capital 
needs is a result of several factors, including strong growth in 
passenger demand, higher than expected inflation, pressure to re:iuce 
noise levels; and, of course, rising operating costs. The question is 
whether sufficient capital will be available to meet these needs. 
Earlier in this meeting we heard Fred Bradley document the sources 
of financing from which these capital funds 'llust come. Viewing it 
somewhat different1y--in economic terms--for at least a generation we 
have looked to economic growth 'In:i rising proiuctivity to provide 
needed investment capital. In the future, rapid economic growth 
simply may not be available to produce major amounts of investment 
capital. If that is the case, rising proiucti vity becomes an even 
more important source. 
One of the functions of the API organization is to :ieve10p and 
publish the FAA's aviation activity forecasts. Our long-term 
forecasts support the need for new aircraft. Admittedly, the 
short-term outlook is for little or no increase in most activity 
levels until we begin to recover from the current recession. As a 
result, our most recent pre:iictions reflect somewhat less growth for 
the decade ahead than the forecasts we published last year. We are 
predicting an overall 5 percent annual growth rate in p'Issenger 
miles. ~at amounts to a 50 percent total increase ryy the end of the 
decade, with the 1980 activity remaining at about the 1979 level. We 
predict only a modest increase of about 20 percent in U.S. air carrier 
operations over that same period. This lower rate results from a 
continuing shift to larger passenger capacity for air carrier 
transport aircraft. On the other hand, we expect total air taxi and 
commuter operations to nearly double by 1990. This reflects the 
continued rapid growth in this area as air carriers restructure their 
1:'Olltes. Commuter airlines are expec tei to move into the opening 
market opportunities on less dense routes, usually with more frequent 
schedules in smaller aircraft. 
We expect general aviation itinerant operations to increase a 
total of about 44 percent over the next :iecade, '''hich is a sl i3ht1, 
higher rate than the 30-percent increase over the last :iecade. lIe :Ire 
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predicting an approKimately 63-percent increase to nearly 60 million 
hours for general aviation activity and an increase in the fleet of 
just over 100,000 aircraft. An interesting aspect of the forecast for 
general aviation is that we expect a larger share of the growth in the 
more sophisticated aircraft--the turboprops and jet aircraft. Their 
portion of the total flight hours is e~pected to grow from the current 
level of 9 percent to about 13 percent by 1990. Another interesting 
but not totally unexpected facet is that local and training flights 
appear to have been suppressed more than itinerant flights by the 
rapid fuel price increases. ~le also expect that high fuel prices will 
hold personal flying to a lower growth rate than business flying. In 
our forecasts military operations are expected to remain constant 
through 1990. 
One segment of aviation with significant growth potential is 
rotorcraft. Our most recent forecast is for the United States civil 
fleet to increase from 5800 to 11,100 rotorcraft by 1992. That is a 
growth of 91 percent. 
To summarize what our individual forecasts are saying, we expect 
aviation to continue to grow faster than the general economy, but at a 
slower rate than we predicted last year before the recession. In the 
commercial intercity passenger market, aviation has and will continue 
to be dominant. I see no fundamental change there. But commuter-type 
operations and, perhaps, business use of general aviation will show 
greater growth than the larger airlines and personal use of general 
aviation. 
When we pull together all of these individual projections we see 
some trends emerging that may be at od:ls with each other. We see a 
steady growth in traffic demand placed upon the system. This iemand 
will lead to more congestion in the system, particularly at the major 
hubs. On the other hand, we see rapidly rising operating costs--with 
soaring fuel costs as the major contributor--increasing the pressures 
for much more efficient aircraft and expeditious traffic movement. To 
deal effectively with this situation we will have to either make 
substantial capital investments in the national aviation system or 
face the possibility that constraints must be imposed. . 
It seems necessary to make one more comment on that idea. 130th 
Secretary of Transportation Neil Goldschmidt and FAA Administrator 
Langhorne Bond have made statements about that, some of which I think 
may have been misinterpreted. The point is that, if ~{e have growth 
and if we are not able to accommodate that growth through the capital 
investments needed to keep pace with it, then constraints might have 
to be imposed. No policy of constraining growth has been announced by 
either Secretary Goldschmidt or Administrator Rond. 
Looking at the investment needs of the aviation system and the 
airline industry, it appears that there may be a shortfall of 
available capital over the coming decade. Looking to the 
international arena, we see our former position of leaiership being 
challenged and eroded as competition becomes increasingly fierce. All 
in all, I believe you have to iraw the conclusion that the 1980s will 
be an interesting decade. 
What does all of this imply for the future direction of aeronauti-
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cal research and 
several areas of 
development? 
research and 
I believe this outlook lea.:is us to 
development that merit attention. 
Safety, of course, is our najor concern. The greatest single cause of 
accidents in the system is human error. Ue need to know more about 
the human element in the system. We need to know more about the 
interfaces between the pilot and his aircraft, other aircraft in the 
system, and the traffic controller. And we need to know more about 
how the pilot himself deals with various situations. We must better 
understand the human element to be able to cope with, and hopefully 
prevent, the human error. 
Fuel efficiency is another major area. We need more fuel 
efficient aircraft. We must develop more fuel efficient technologies 
in aircraft design, powerplants, and operating procedures. It seems 
likely that one of the major areas for research is that of 
operations. I think someone should be looking at alternative fuels 
for aviation. Since the fuel usage for all varieties of aviation is 
only about 4 percent of total domestic petroleum use, it is not a 
driving force in the marketplace. Therefore, I am tempted to ask: If 
NASA doesn't do this, who will? 
Another area for attention is the emerging short haul, low density 
markets. The commuter airlines are moving into the market 
opportunities made available as the air carriers and local airlines 
restructure their routes. Since the commuter airlines generally use 
smaller aircraft than the air carriers and locals, there is a large 
market emerging for small transport aircraft--sort of a middle market 
between the general aviation aircraft and the large, high technology 
aircraft of the airlines. Although there is some activity in the area 
of 20- to 40-seat aircraft. I believe there is a need for better 
designs and more technology aivances in both that range and the 60- to 
l20-seat range. 
Overlaying all of these areas is the fundamental concern that we 
develop cost-affordable technologies. Increasing attention must be 
given to the ability of the government, the airlines, and the users to 
pay for improvements. Future aviation technologies must be developed 
with greater consideration for their acquisition and operating costs. 
In light of the vast long-term investment needs of the system, rapidly 
escalating operating costs, and the general mood of fiscal 
conservatism--none of which is likely, in my view, to disappear--we 
must put much greater emphasis on developing technologies that are 
efficient and affordable. 
Thank you. 
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THE OUTLOOK FOR MILITARY AERONAUTICS 
William J. Perry 
Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering 
Department of Defense 
Guy, I want to thank you for inviting me here. You took quite a 
risk. You are going to get the perspective not from the point of view 
of an aeronautical engineer but from the viewpoint of somebody who is 
biased in electronics, which I am sure will be quite evident to you 
all before my talk is over. Aside from that bias I have resisted the 
temptation to give you a listing of programs that the Defense 
Department is doing or plans to do in aviation. Instead I will 
attempt to provide you with the perspective that underlies our 
planning, leading to the determination of our R&D programs as well as 
specific system developments. 
The first and the most fundamental point, I believe, has to do 
with the broad strategy with which we approach our acquisition of new 
weapons systems. It is that we should exploit the technological 
superiority that the United States enjoys today to get a qualitative 
superiority in our weapons. . 
This has not always been the case. I would like to take you back 
a little bit in history to recall that the principle impact that the 
United States had in World War II--and in fact in World War I as 
well--resulted from our enormous logistics a':lvantage. That is, we 
brought great fire power and logistics advantages to bear that had a 
decisive effect in both wars. 
To illustrate that point, I note that the United States alone 
produced over 50,000 ~ilitary aircraft in World War II. So, we 
mobilized our tremendous industrial base and brought it to bear on the 
problem. Whether or not our aircraft were superior to those of our 
opponents in World War II can still be jebated, but it wasn't terribly 
relevant when we were building 50, 000 of them. We overwhelmed them 
with numbers. 
Today--for better or worse--the shoe is on the other foot. Any 
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planning that we do must start with the recognition that it is on the 
other foot. To give you one figure to illustrate this point--in the 
last 10 years (during the decade of the 1970s) the Soviet Union 
invested about $240 billion more in military equipment than the United 
States. That figure may be 10 or 20 or 30 percent off, but despite 
this uncertainty, it is clear that we are facing an enormous problem 
and an enormous disparity in numbers. 
We see the problem manifested in the current and recent production 
rates in the Soviet Union. We see tanks that are being produced at 
three times the rate at which we produce tanks; missiles at about 
three or four times the rate. Even in tactical aircraft, where we 
have traditionally had a numerical as well as a qualitative advantage, 
Soviet production has been twice that of the United States. 
That is a fact, whether we like it or not. When we come up with 
our investment strategy we start off with that fact and decide what we 
should do about it. 
Many people argue that we cannot depend on quality, that we have 
to somehow deal with that quantitative advantage directly; we have to 
compete in kind. Whatever you may think about that argument, it is 
not possible for us to do it, at least it is not possible in our 
lifetime to do it. The momentum behind the Soviet production 
advantage and the deployment advantage is just too great. If we 
decided today, for example, to triple our tank production-~hich is a 
pretty big decision to make--and if the Soviets stopped their tank 
production--just turned off the valve altogether--it would be 1995 
before we would have as many tanks as they have. So, that is the kind 
of problem we are facing. 
I would further point out that, if I could snap my fingers and 
have Chrysler or General Motors deliver to our door next week 30,000 
tanks, so that we now had as many tanks as the Soviet Union, then the 
questions we would face are: What do we do with these tanks? How do 
we man them? That is 30,000 times four people in a tank, times the 
cooks and the bakers .and the rec.ruiting sergeants and all the other 
people. It would mean doubling the size of our peacetime army. 
So, unless you are willing to assume that we have three or four 
years to mobilize for a war--whichwe do not assume from a defense 
planning point of view--we have to figure out some way of dealing with 
this problem that does not involve :loubling the size of our army. 
That means having a real qualitative edge; an edge that isn't just 
something that appears in the specifications of the equipment, but an 
edge that makes a difference in combat performance. 
With that background, let me look at some of the specific 
objectives we have in the Defense Department and see how we will 
achieve them, how we might seek that kind of advantage, and the 
particular means we will employ to achieve it in combat performance. 
One of the most obvious and certainly the highest priority 
requirement that we face in the Defense Department is deterring 
nuclear war. I can translate that into saying that we want to be able 
to maintain the unquestionable ability to retaliate in the face of a 
surprise attack. 
We have sufficient forces to do that today. All of the strategic 
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forces programs that are conceived or planned for the next decade are 
designed to maintain that situation by improving the survivability of 
our forces. Very little of what we are doing is oriented toward 
improving their performance or improving their striking power. The 
entire thrust of our strategic forces' modernization program involves 
actions to improve survivability, that is, improve the ability of our 
retaliatory forces to survive a surprise attack. 
I don't plan to discuss strategic forces today, but let me just 
tick off very quickly the three major programs under way. 
The MX missile program is not so much a missile program as it is a 
program to provide a survivable basing for missiles. The cruise 
missile program is not so much orientej toward improving the striking 
power of our bombers as it is to allow. our bombers to perfor:n their 
mission without having to enter the air defense net of the Soviet 
Union. If our bombers were required to penetrate Soviet defenses, we 
think they would not be able to survive in the mid- to late 1980's. 
The new Trident program, both the submarine and the missiles, is also 
designed to improve survivability. The submarine is designed to be 
many decibels quieter than the existing Poseidon submarines, which 
makes it harder to find at sea. The missiles are designed to have 
twice the range of the Poseidon missiles, which allows the submarines 
to stan:! back farther from the shores of the Soviet Union, thereby 
increasing their available patrol area and their survivability. 
All of these programs are pointed toward increased survivability. 
In my view, the heydays of the aviation industry's role in the 
strategic forces--which was building planes that could fly faster and 
higher and so on--are really behind us. Even though we are confident 
we could do that, there is little motivation to improve our forces 
along those lines. 
Our second major objective is to deter the outbreak in Europe of 
what is called a conventional war; by a conventional war, we mean a 
recreation of the Second World War in modern times. We imagine that 
the Soviets' view of that is that if a war were to start they would 
mount a blitzkrieg heading for the Channel; you might imagine it to be 
the reverse of the blitzkrieg that Hitler launched against 
them--Operation Barbarossa--back in 1940. 
So, if we want to deter that action from a military point of view, 
we should improve our ability to stop a massive armored attack. There 
are two iifferent things that we are doing in our defense program that 
relate to that. One of them is making really major--I would say 
revolutionary--improvements in our antiarmor capability. I ordinarily 
would describe this in terms of what we call precision-guided 
munitions, and that is an interesting subject for a different day. It 
is also quite true that the carriers of these precision-guided 
munitions become quite important and, thinking of Gerry Tobias' talk a 
little bit earlier, helicopters are going to play a major role in our 
antiarmor capability. 
The second action in stopping the blitzkrieg is maintaining air 
superiority. We believe we have today the capability of controlling 
the skies over Europe if we were to be engaged in a war with the 
Soviets. We believe it is going to be difficult to maintain that in 
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the future but that we can do it. As ions as we can do that, ani as 
long as the Soviets realize we can do that, we do not. think they would 
be so foolish as to launch a blitzkrieg attack on Edrope. One would 
have to be the world's greatest optimist to believe that he could 
sustain a massive armored assault in the face of air inferiority, in 
the face of the other side having control of the skies. I will come 
back to the point of air superiority in a few minutes because I would 
like to make that a major theme. 
I do want to cite a third major objective of the Defense 
Department. I have described deterring nuclear war. I have described 
deterring conventional war in Europe. A third one is deterring a 
Soviet intervention in a conflict in the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean 
area. We believe that in order to do that we have to develop an 
ability to quickly introduce intervention forces in that area. By 
quickly, I mean in a matter of a few days, soon enough ·to arrive 
before the disaster has happened, not after. 
We believe that if we have the ability to do that, then it will 
provide a major deterrent to ever having to use that capability. 
In order. to be able to achieve that, we need to be able to 
maintain the sea power advantage w~ already have in the Indian Ocean. 
We need to pre-position heavy equipment in that area. That is already 
under way. We have equipment for an entire Marine amphibious brigade 
being loaded on ships on the way to Diego Garcia this summer. But we 
also need to make significant improvements in our airlift capability, 
particularly the ability to airlift what we call our equipment. That 
requirement is the genesis of what is called the ex program, and that 
will be one of our major aviation needs for the next few decades. 
Let me come back to the point of air superiority. It is going to 
be difficult to achieve. I have already mentioned that the Soviets 
are building about twice the number of tactical aircraft that we are. 
What is perhaps of even greater concern is they are building aircraft 
of greater and greater capability. The qualitative gap between u.S. 
tactical aircraft and Soviet aircraft is narrowing each year. 
They have, today, the MIG 23 and MIG 25, the so-called "Flogger" 
and "Foxbat" aircraft--very capable and very sophisticated aircraft. 
There is a widespread myth that the United States builds expensive 
airplanes and the Soviet Union builds simple, reliable, and cheap 
airplanes; that is no longer true. For better or worse, they have 
emulated us in this department and they are now building aircraft as 
complex and as expensive as ours. That is certainly true with the MIG 
23, and we believe it is true to a certain extent with the MIG 25, 
certainly with the modified MIG 25, "Foxbat." 
In addition to that, we know that they have a new technical combat 
aircraft in a very advanced state of development and expect them to be 
coming into operation by the mid 1980s. 
The question then is, in the face of this very deter~ined thrust 
both in quantity and in quality, how are we going to maintain the 
qualitative edge? I suggest to you that it is probably not going to 
come from the design of the airplane. That is not to say that we are 
not interested in the design of the airplane. T,.[e are interested in 
aerodynamics, but we don't believe that that is going to give us a 
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sufficient edge to deal with the problems that we would face in 
providing and achieving air superiority in Europe during the 1980s. 
We think it is going to depend on superior electronics, superior 
engines, and superior pilots. That is what the qualitative edge will 
depend on for the next decade or two. 
Let me be a little more specific about how those different 
features will be manifested in our systems. We conduct analyses of 
air-to-air combat situations, in particular, the very detailed 
simulated combat we conduct at Nellis Air Force Base in a program 
called "Red Flag." In this program, we bring in squadrons of U.S. 
tactical fighters and match them against an aggressor fighter squadron 
that we keep based there. The aggressor fighter squadron employs u.s. 
airplanes, F-5s, which we think are somewhat of an approximation to 
the capability of the Soviet airplanes that we might be up against. 
We have a set of pilots who live, breathe, and act as though they were 
Soviet pilots month after month. So, we bring our fighter pilots in 
and we conduct simulated air combat. It is about as close to the real 
thing as you can get. 
What we are learning in this simulated combat is that, while the 
quality of our airplanes, the F-l5 and F-l6, is noticeable and while 
they give us somewhat of an edge, it is not enough of an edge to 
offset a substantial advantage in numbers, even a two-to-one advantage 
in numbers. Therefore, if we are to prevail in a situation where we 
might have a two- or three-to-one disadvantage in numbers, we have to 
have something else going for us. That something else, we believe, 
will come from our superior electronics. 
First of all, if our pilots, if our fighter squadrons, have 
superior knowledge at all times of the location of enemy airplanes 
then that can be used in a fundamental way to offset the disadvantage 
in numbers. That is, even though they may have a macroscopic 
advantage in numbers, we can achieve a microscopic advantage. We can 
arrange to have our airplanes at locations where we outnumber them at 
that time and at that place. 
We can do this by having superior means of 10catt"ng enemy forces, 
superior means of locating our own forces, and superior means of 
rapidly communicating this information around to all of the people 
involved in that operation. That is done, by the way, with a system 
that is called AWACS, which is a large, flying radar; with a system 
called GPS (Global Positioning System), which locates our own units to 
within 10 meters at all ·times; and with a system called JTIDS (Joint 
Tactical Information Distribution System), which transmits digits from 
reconnaissance systems to AWACS airplanes to fighter airplanes, so 
that the fighter pilot has at all times displayed in front of him what 
in effect is a situation map. It tells him where enemy pilots and 
friendly pilots are relative to where he is. That information is 
continuously upgraded and displayed in front of him. That, we 
believe, will make an enormous 1ifference. 
The second aspect where electronics will make a big difference is 
in the kind of munitions that we use on the airplane. In the case of 
air-to-air combat, the air-to-air missile is the principal weapon that 
can make the difference. 
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We are now developing a missile called AMRAAM (A.Jvanced 
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile), which will have an enorcnous 
advantage over most existing missiles; it has a fire-anj-forget 
capability. That is, the pilot can fire it and then he can turn and 
break away from the combat. The missile then proceeds autonomously to 
perform its mission. Moreover, he can fire two or three or four of 
them simultaneously. That is, he can engage several targets at a time 
and still break away. This is going to be extremely important in his 
ability to deal with situations in which he is outnumbered. 
Those are the two principal factors in electronics that will make 
a difference. There will be very important improvements, I believe, 
that will be made in what we call RAM-D, what Gerry referred to as the 
reliability and maintainability areas. Most of these are going to 
occur through major improvements in jet engines in the next decade, 
through the introduction of super alloys into these engines which have 
the ability to withstand higher operating temperatures, with much 
greater durability. Therefore, we will be able to operate them at 
suitable performance levels well below the peak temperature of the 
materials. 
As it stands today, with the F-lOO engine, for example, which is 
the key engine we use in both the F-15 and the F-16 airplanes, we 
operate it so hot to get the performance out of it that we have a 
serious impact on its maintainability and durabUity. We would like 
to get that performance without being so close to the razor's edge. 
The way we do that is by employing super-alloy techniques for 
improving the temperature and durability of the turbine blades and 
other components in the hot section of the engine. 
Two final points. First, training. I have mentioned the 
superiority of the pilots. That superiority will be achieved only if 
we can maintain adequate training for them. It gets more and more 
difficult to achieve that training through flying airplanes many hours 
per month. Some of that has to be done. We would like, for a variety 
of reasons, to minimize it. Also, no matter how many hours you fly 
per month, it is not the same thing as training for combat. Both of 
those factors drive us into developing higher and higher fidelity 
simulations. 
Those of you who have followed this field know there have been 
very dramatic improvements in simulation in the last five or six 
years. We intend to push those technologies very hard. So, we are 
converging toward a situation in which a pilot can not only get 
training on how to land an airplane, but actually on how to simulate 
the conditions of air-to-air combat with the pilot sitting on the 
ground, including the visual, audio, and the motion sensations that go 
with it. We are much closer to that than you would think if you are 
not working in this field. 
My second point is with regard to improving the survivability of 
our airplanes. There will be two fairly unromantic and undramatic 
technical thrusts in that direction. We will be converging toward 
having a greater short takeoff and landing capability in our tactical 
airplanes. This will allow our airplanes to survive better in an 
environment where airfields are major targets. 
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Also, we are working ~lard and will continue to work hard to 
introduce the technology of low -iectectClbi 1 ity in our airplanes. Our 
airplanes today are very ~ood targets both for radars and for infrared 
sensors. ~e know how to make dramatic improve~ents in ~oth of these 
respects. We know how to greatly reduce radar cross section. We know 
how to greatly re,juce infrared emissions. Every ti.me we have come 
down to actually designing an airplane in the last few decades we have 
looked at that trade-off and decided that it just wasn't worth the 
performance loss to achieve the survivability gain. 
Two things have happened that will cause us to make different 
judgments in future designs. First, the air-to-air missiles are 
getting very, very good. An AMRAAM missile, the one I described to 
you, this radar-guided missile, is a very formidable threat to an 
airplane today, in no way to be compared with the threat of a Sparrow 
missile in the Vietnam War era. The A-9M, which is the current design 
of the Sidewinder missile, is vastly superior to the Sidewinder when 
it was originally developed. 
Therefore, in order for an airplane to survive, it will have to 
pay attention to ways of defeating those missiles. It will not be 
able to defeat them solely by maneuvering. The pilot will not be able 
to defeat them by being a "hot" pilot or having a "hot" airplane. 
There have to be ways, somehow, of directly defeating those missiles. 
We will exploit countermeasures and jamming to get as much mileage as 
we can. But, all of those tactics become much easier if you have 
reduced your size as a target to begin with. So, ~Ie will have a very 
great emphasis on that in the future. I think all future designs of 
tactical airplanes will manifest those technologies to' the extent that 
they can. 
The bottom line I would give you on air superiority is that we 
will be able to maintain it. But, we will not be able to maintain it 
with a silk scarf mentality. We will have to maintain it by using the 
technology that we have, by putting a heavy emphasis on weapons that 
go with the airplane, putting a heavy emphasis on helping the pilot 
know what the situation is at all times, and by training the pilot 
through simulation. That will be our major thrust in the 1980s, 
rather than, speaking in relative terms now, getting the last 10 
percent of performance out of the airplane itself. 
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Gentlemen, I have been asked to discuss the outlook for continued U.S. 
transport aircraft leadership during the next decade and the importance of 
maintaining our nation's preeminent position in the world's commercial jet 
transport market. Before doing this I intend to generalize a bit on the 
U.S. economy and certain government practices and policies. Then, I will 
narrow down on some specifics. 
The U.S. aerospace business is in relatively better shape than the rest 
of the nation's industry. That is a new role for aerospace and we shouldn't 
take too much comfort in it. One industry cannot keep succeeding while all 
·about it others are failing. Everything affects everything else. 
Aerospace is one of the few preeminent industries we have left. The 
other industrialized powers are placing greater emphasis on their aerospace 
development. I suppose being number one is more important in some fields 
than in others, but if various U.S. industries were to follow one another 
down an economic toboggan slide to become also-rans, the cumulative effect 
for the nation will be disastrous. We risk not only our standard of living, 
but our national security as well. 
I think the outlook for continued U.S. leadership in transport aircraft 
is promising if the industry is permitted to operate in a supportive 
economic an1 political environment. We need an environment that encourages 
growth, not misguided policies that strangle it. Unfortunately, in this 
regard, we have developed a bad habit of shooting ourselves in the foot. I 
will have more to say about that directly. 
Admittedly, as we enter the 1980s we see that it is a far different 
world than it was when the 1970s began. The energy situation, or at least 
our perception of it, has flip-flopped during the past 10 years. About half 
the oil currently consumed by the U. s. is imported and subject to sudden 
price increases or supply cutoffs. It is easy to blame the cost of oil 
imports for most of our economic problems, but it is not that simple. 
Gel~any and Japan import essentially all of their oil but their economies 
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remain strong and stable. The problems of the U.S. economy ::ire roote:! in 
several areas, inclu:!ing a tax policy that is biase:! against savings ani 
investment and a myriad of regulatory policies that have stifle:i trade, 
productivity, and job opportunities for millions of Americans. 
It is essent ial that we adopt a long-range program on a national scale 
to remove the basic causes of some of these problems rather than deal with 
their effects. Ive need some preventive medicine for our economic ills 
instead of haphazard emergency service that mayor may not save the system. 
Since the late 1960s the U.S. economy has steadily gone .lownhi11 in 
comparison with major industrial powers such as Japan and Germany. During 
the 1970s the U.S. lost about 23 percent of its share of world tra:ie, 
amounting to some $125 billion and at least two million jobs. 
Our military situation has deteriorated along with our economic 
decline. Even though the fiscal 1981 defense budget has increased 
considerably over that of recent years, it still represents a smaller 
portion of national expenditures than it did in pre-Vietnam days. In 1960, 
for example, the defense budget accounted for 9.3 percent of the gross 
national product (GNP). The current budget request will take 5.2 percent of 
the GNP, and the pl.an is to remain at about that level through the mid-1980s. 
Meanwhile, comparing our defense spending with that of the Soviet Union, 
you find that the Soviets exceeded our military spending by about 30 percent 
during the past decade. Military experts believe the Soviets are currently 
spending 40 percent more than we are on defense. From a position of 
military inferiority 10 years ago, they have now at least achieved equality 
and perhaps reached a position of superior military strength. They have 
more planes, more tanks, more guns, and more missiles than we do. And our 
once-flaunted technological advantage in military hardware has just about 
disappeared. 
This is not my charter for discussion today, but I feel this is an area 
of extreme importance for our nation. I think that we are in deep trouble 
and if we do not maintain a strong, credible military estab1i~hment equipped 
with the most advanced weapons systems we are capable of producing, there is 
no point in worrying about the future of transport aircraft or any other 
U.S. industry. We will all be losers. 
The energy outlook is equally bleak and won 't get better very soon. 
Although we have the capability and the resources to make big improvements, 
what we seem to lack is the will to do anything meaningful. For six years 
we have stumbled around trying to establish an energy policy, and we still 
do not know where we are going. 
The energy situation is a classic example of knee-jerk responses to a 
serious problem and government confusion at worst. 
As the cost of OPEC oil rose, the government continued to keep domestic 
oil prices far below world levels, allowed U.S. imports to double, and then 
unleashed its bureaucratic militia to guide the energy hunters on their 
way. The Energy Department pressured companies to switch from imported oil 
to coal, but the Environmental Protection Agency issued more stringent air 
pollution controls that knocked coal out of the picture. 
One agency encouraged offshore drilling to find new oil deposits, while 
another moved to block such efforts. 
Foreign trade is another area where we are in some trouble and could be 
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in more if we don't straighten up and fly right. Several critical issues 
underlie our foreign trade problems, including government action or 
inaction, taxing policies, inadequate research and development support, and 
regulatory activities. I wilt comment on each of these in a few minutes, 
but all of them have a common thread--adversaria1 relationships. 
In 1971 the u.s. experienced its first neg~tive balance of trade in this 
century. Since then we have suffered billions of dollars in deficits every 
year e'Ccept 1973 and 1975. ~uring this jeca:ie of deficits, most high-
technology industries in the U.S. 'llaintained a positive tra:ie balance and 
aerospace led the list among manufactured products. 
In 1979 the positive balance of trade for aerospace proiucts exceeded 
$10 bi.llion, with commercial jet transports account ing for most of that. 
These foreign commercial jet transport sales provided jobs for well over 
half a million knericans. The U.S. has established a dominant position in 
the world's commercial jet transport market, but foreign competition is 
growing. 
European aerospace industry increased its sales from $4 billion in 1970 
to $6.3 billion in 1977, while U.S. sales actually dropped from $22.3 to $19 
billion in constant 1970 dollars. European sales amountei to 19 percent of 
U.S. sales in 1970, but rose to 33 percent of U.S. sales in 1977. 
Last year, Airbus Industry, the European consortium, captured about 30 
percent of the new orders for commercial jet transports with its A-300 
family, more than tfcDonne11-Doug1as and Lockheed combined. We credit some 
of this success to favorable financing arrangements by the governments that 
own Airbus Industry, but we also recognize that Airbus is a formidable 
competitor reflecting a very solid base of technological development. 
Among the major traiing nations of the world, only the U.S. seems to 
regard foreign trade as a sideline activity, which is largely ignored as an 
economic base for domestic prosperity and jobs but frequently used to deny 
sales to some country in an attempt to infuence its actions. Sometimes we 
seem to invoke sanctions just because we don't like the particular country. 
Then, a few years later we change our mind. 
In addition, we insist that other nations observe our standards for 
human rights and environmental regulations if they wish to buy our products, 
as If the U. S. were the only source for such goods throughout the world. 
U.S. moraHty has become a major export. Although this sort of pressure 
seldom has any effect except to eliminate sales and therefore jobs for U.S. 
firms, it continues to be a popular exercise in futility. 
Except for the Export-Import Bank we have found that most U.S. 
government activity related to foreign trade has to do with restrictions and 
prohibitions. In recent months the Export-Import Bank has come under 
attack, apparently because it has jone an excellent job of providing 
financing to foreign buyers of U. S. products, including large numbers of 
transport aircraft. They had the failure of being successful, as Art 
Buchwald would say. 
Most other nations actively support their export trade, with the 
Japanese probably the ~ost proficient. The recent report by Japan's 
tfinistry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) outlined the steps 
necessary for continued industrial expansion during the balance of this 
decade. This report represented the cooperative efforts of ministry 
officials, industrialists, labor union leaders, and members of the Japanese 
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consumer groups. The Japan~se are strong believers in research and 
development. The MITI report stresses the crucial role of technological 
development and recommends that the ratio of technology speniing to gross 
national product be increased from the present 1. 7 percent to 3 percent by 
1990. 
Total R&D support by the U.S. government has averaged about 1.2 percent 
of the GNP over the past five years. Incidentally, the Japanese are placing 
a priority emphasis on their aerospace sector and, in particular, on the 
energy-efficient aspects of their aerospace technology. 
The Japanese government favors active support of corporations trying to 
achieve technological breakthroughs that contribute to these objectives. 
Obviously, the industrial policy of the Japanese is quite different from the 
government-business interface, but they do encourage expansion and have 
become highly competitive in the world's marketplace. 
Without advanced products that meet customers' needs it doesn't matter 
how benign the trading atmosphere is. Advanced products depend on a 
progressive and timely research and development program to pr01uce the 
technology. Here, too, the U.S. has been flunking the course in many 
respects. Last year about 50 percent of all research and ievelopment 
funding was provided by the government. That may sound impressive, but in 
the early 1960s it was about 65 percent. During the 1970s, fe-feral R&D 
funding declined about 9 percent over the previous deca1e. Contrary to what 
most people believe, defense ~&D has actually decre'lsed 17 percent durin.s 
the past 10 years, and the space effort R&D is about half what it was during 
the 1960s. 
Viewed as a percentage of the GNP, total government funding for R&D 
1uring the 1970s is iawn 34 percent from the previous 1ecade, while defense 
R&D has dropped about 38 percent. 
To a large extent we have been 11 ving off the aeronautical research 
dividends of the 1950s and 1960s. Much of that research was funded by the 
government for military and space programs. No one would deny that the U.S. 
commercial jet transports owe much of their success to the pioneering work 
done on ~ilitary programs such as the B-47 and the B-52. I also trust that 
no one would question the tremendous payoffs in commercial and social 
progress as a result of the jet airliners. At one time the benefits of 
military R&D flowed into the commerci'll sector. That flow has been reversed 
in recent years. In addition, the U.S. Air Force now has jet tankers, 
airborne command posts, flying n'lvigator trainers, and airborne warning and 
control systems in inventory. All were based on commercial platforms that 
have been modified for military requirements. 
We seem to have a big problem with subsidies these days. We don't know 
how to define them or whether they are good or bad. In fact, we can't walk 
across the street, have :linner, or take an airplane trip anywhere without 
running into a number of subsidies, most considered good. There are 
subs idies for highways, agricultural products, airports, FAA controllers, 
ani the weather bureau, to mention a few. 
It bothers me, however, when an important part of the NASA budget for 
aeronautical research is called a subsidy thClt we 1on't nee1, or a bad 
subsidy that is unnecessary because it contributes to commercial technology 
::levelopment. I would call it stimulation--sti'1lulation to preserve American 
jobs. 
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For many years the research efforts of NASA have benefitted the 
aerospace industry and society in general. Boeing has accumulated many 
years of experience working with NASA and with the Federal Aviation 
Administration on various aerospace problems. Our relationship with both 
thase federal agencies has always been one of mutual respect. We may at 
times have disagreed on methods, but seldom on objectives. NASA's 
pioneering worlt has been valuable to Boeing even when we :Hdn' t use its 
specific development. For example, we developed our own proprietary airfoil 
for the new 757 and 767 aircraft, but ~ASA's technical data on the 
supercritical wing supported the validity of our work. 
More recently, the industry has needed to respond in a very serious way 
to the fuel crisis and the consequent need for ~ore fuel-efficient 
aircraft. \le have had to investigate all the system elements: 
aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, and flight management--to name a few. 
NASA's work has been of great value to all three of the major U.S. 
commercial manufacturers. The most important element was that such work had 
been a continuous effort an-:i as such was available to industry when the need 
arose unexpectedly, as it did in the mid-l970s. 
Two of the many programs that provided the most benefit were the 
composite structures programs for more efficient aircraft structures and the 
advanced flight ,nanagement program for more efficient aircraft operations. 
Both began in the early 1970s, and both represented cooperative 
government-industry efforts. Both were programs requiring such long lead 
times that evolution by industry alone would have been delayed or even 
unlikely. In our own case the results of these two programs have made our 
recent new programs, the 757 gnd 767, more competitive in the world market 
and, we hope, retained some American jobs that might otherwise have been 
lost to foreign manufacturers. 
These two R&D programs are examples, I wanted to underscore, of the 
synergistic effects of industry and government working together to achieve a 
greater result than either could achieve alone. However, there are many 
other examples, such as winglets currently flying on test aircraft, the 
levelopment of sophisticated area rule techniques to optimize drag, and 
active control systems that will eventually redu~e weight and drag both by 
modifying structural loads and by reducing empennage size. 
In some of these cases our proud Boeing engineers think they did a 
number of these things by themselves, but the NASA work helped show us the 
way. The agency prods the industry into doing things better and I 
appreciate that. 
When government agencies or private firms in the aerospace family run 
into technical problems they go to NASA for h~lp with the solutions. They 
usually find them because the agency has a significant technological 
capability. The relationship works, and when a government-industry 
relationship works you shouldn't try to change it. It is a rarity in my 
experience. 
Let me talk about the future. Improved fuel efficiency will continue to 
be an imperative, and international competition will get progressively more 
severe. We can see potential efficiency improvement of some 25 to 40 
percent, but we know the time and effort required to get it will tax the 
resources of government and industry working together. We know that in some 
cases our foreign competitors have more complete research and development 
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programs in place. Examples of advanced technology not matched in the 
United States inclu:!e the work in composites for primary wing structure by 
Dassault of France and the shaiow mask cathode ray tube development by 
Hitsubishi of Japan. 
U.S. technology is dropping behind that of both the French and the 
Japanese in these critical areas and will nevar catch up at its current rate 
of progress. 
It :loesn't take much imagination to evaluate the situation as a serious 
one. The real knerican requirement is that we run faster, and that takes 
all the resources we can collectively assemble. 
In summary, we need to address several key issues if we are to maintain 
our position of leadership in aerospace. We need a long-range policy on 
foreign trade, one that recognizes the overall benefit of exports for our 
national economy and American jobs. Sometimes the question of affordability 
clouds the issue. We need a strong, viable Export-Import Bank if we intend 
to compete in world markets. We need to increase, not reduce, our 
government investment in research and development from the theoretical 
beginnings through technology credibility attainment. We shoul::l develop a 
different approach to what is necessary to protect our industries. We need 
to shuck our national guilt complex about helping industry before it gets 
into trouble. We seem to have no difficulty in helping the losers, but the 
approach for sustained preeminence would create the conditions that make it 
possible for industry to grow. We need to exchange our savior policy for a 
winner policy. Stimulation is a lot more fun than rescue and a damn sight 
cheaper as well. 
What seems obvious to me is that we must get our act together in the 
areas of foreign trade, research an:! development, and government-industry 
cooperation. At present, the United States is the leader in commercial jet 
transport :!evelopment, but there ~re plenty of warning signs showing up. 
The situation is a world situation, ani it has military as well as commer-
cial overtones. Unlike the cooperative industrial programs developej by 
Japan and the European nations, the U.S. has adopted policies of confronta-
tion in many areas. Such policies exhaust our energies and splinter our 
resources into nonproductive avenues. 
In the government contracts area, far too much industry and government 
money is spent in monitoring and validating research work. The administra-
tive expenses of some government contracting have reduced the productive 
value of the contract dollar by about half. 
Our nation must begin to see the big picture, realize the benefits for 
all Americans of saner government-industry relationships and the absolute 
necessity for maximum research and ievelopment if we are to compete in 
today's world. The penalty of failure in terms of the economy, the balance 
of trade, and, most of all, American jobs is so serious that success is not 
just an objective, it is mandatory. 
Thank you. 
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THE OUTLOOK FOR GENERAL AVIATION 
Malcolm S. Harned 
Senior Vice President, Technology 
Cessna Aircraft Company 
I will start by defining general aviation, because there seems to 
be a perception problem as far as this part of the business is 
concerne:l. It is defined as all aviation except military an:i air 
carrier. Consequently, it inclu1es personal, sport, training, 
agricultural, air taxi, and business flying. 
For many years business· flying has been the 10minant portion of 
the field. Currently, the domest ic fleet consists of 184,000 
aircraft, of which 2600 are jets, 3300 turboprops, 23,000 piston 
twins, and 155,000 piston singles. The international fleet is just 
about half again as large. 
In the U.S., general aviation is currently providing about 15 to 
20 billion passenger miles of pre'llium transportation per year. That 
is about an or:ier of magnitude less than the revenue passenger miles 
of the commercial airlines. HowelTer, general aviation is probably 
providing more essential passenger ~iles per year than the commercial 
airlines. Furthermore, this business transportation is vital to our 
economy and can only be supplied by general aviation. This condition 
has been brought about principally by the decentralization of industry 
and the move to get out of the overcrowded, unmanageable major 
cities. This trend of moving industry into large numbers of small 
communities will continue to expan:i the need for business aviation 
well into the future. 
The airline deregulation law and high fuel costs have combined to 
force the airlines to become extremely efficient transporters of 
masses of people over long tiistances. The reductions in air fares 
have generally caused 10lrge increases in traffic, crowded airplanes, 
and congeste:l ter~inals. These factors make flying very unpleasant 
for the businessman and eliminate the possibility of working while 
traveli ng. 
In a1dition, as a result of the quadrupling of the costs of avia-
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tion fuel, the airlines can no longer afford to service their low load 
factor routes, which generally are to decentralized, industrial 
communities. For a few statistics--of the country's 15,000 airports, 
less than 350 are served by the airlines. About 70 percent of all 
passengers emp1ane at the 25 major hub airports,. with one-third 
emplaning at the top 5. Also, in the last' 20 years airline service 
has been discontinued to over one-third of the cities once served by 
the airlines. 
Another condition that has built business aviation is the high 
load factor necessary to conserve fuel and achieve low airline fares. 
High load factors frequently mean leaving people at the gate. Since 
the businessman tries to minimize his time expenditure, he is most 
likely to be the last at the gate and the one to be left. After 
missing a couple of important business commitments, a corporate 
aircraft becomes a real necessity. 
Without the business aircraft we have had, our rapid industrial 
expansion of the past 30 years would have been completely impossible. 
In the future, they will be even more essential. 
Another service 'offered by general aviat ion is the air ta"Ci or 
commuter aircraft. Reductions in service to smaller communities on 
the part of the airlines has created a large demand for this commuter 
service from the many business people and others who need it but 
either cannot afford or cannot justify aircraft ownership. 
Airline transportation on the long routes is one of the best 
bargains available today and will be even better in the future. In 
small communities there are large numbers of people who want to take 
advantage of the low cost, high speed air travel available at the 
major hubs, and this has created a very large demand for commuter 
operations. 
Agricultural aircraft have become a necessary tool in the supply 
of food for the world. There are roughly 10,000 such airplanes 
treating one-quarter billion acres per year. For example, the u.s. 
produces the world's lowest cost rice by using aircraft to prepare the 
soil, seed, fertilize, weed, and protect from pests--a11 from the 
air. The only time farmers set foot in the rice fields is for the 
harvest. 
Another essential service is that of training new pilots for all 
flying purposes. Over 50,000 new pilots enter aviation each year from 
the general aviation training services. Also of importance are public 
,services such as air ambulance and law enforcement. 
In addition to these essential transportation roles, general 
aviation has become a very significant factor in our economy. Figure 
1 shows the growth in general aviation both in total airplane sales 
and in exports over the last 10 years. It has grown to 2.1 billion in 
gross airplane sales, with a $600 million export sales picture in 
1979. That "D.eans that it has become a very significant business and 
plays an important role in our balance of trade. This is a business 
that if properly supported could grow even faster in the future. 
To give a more complete perspective of what general aviation has 
been doing the past 10 years, I have three figures that show the 
relative position as compared to the other categories of aviation. 
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Figure 2 is a comparison of sales of general ~viation (GA) aircraft to 
military sales. The abscissa is the percentage of GA to military. 
You will note that in the past 10 years the gross sales have grown 
from 5 to 15 percent of the military sales. Most significantly, the 
export sales have grown from about 15 to over SO percent of the sales 
level of military aircraft. Also important is the fact that these are 
true export sales. They are not government giveaways. 
The relationship to helicopter sales is shown in Figure 3. There 
has not been a very big change over the years; however, the fact that 
total sales are some 500 percent greater ani export sales are about 
300 percent greater gives a good idea of their relat i ve economic 
importance. 
Figure 4 considers transport sales. We all recognize that 
commercial transports are one of this country's greatest assets in our 
balance of trarle battle. Therefore, it is significant that general 
aviation sales relative to commercial transport sales have grown from 
about 12 to better than 25 percent. (One year we hit close to 50 
percent.) On the export sales en1 of the business, we have gone from 
5 to over 10 percent as much and a couple of years were better than 16 
percent of the export sales of commercial transport. 
In summary, general aviation not only perfor'lls a number of very 
essential transportation roles, but has also become a vital and 
growing factor in our economy. I would like to recall one of 
T. Wilson's comments about the fact that our government should be 
supporting the winners. General aviation is not only a winner today, 
but it has the potential of becoming a much bigger winner in the 
future, if the technology is provided. 
Now, I would like to turn to what is needed in the general 
aviation field for this growth to continue. Safety is an area that 
needs some serious attention. It has received considerable public 
attention in the last year. 
Table 1 shows safety statistics on the basis of fatalities per 100 
million passenger miles and is representative of the experience of the 
1970s. The airlines have set an amazing record of 0.04 fatalities per 
100 million passenger miles. It is outstanding for all forms of 
transportation. In contrast, the overall general aviation average is 
about 16 per 100 million, or 400 times worse than the commercial 
airlines. Even the much maligned passenger car fatality rate, which 
has dropped considerably in recent years with the advent of lower 
speeds and the use of safety belts, only runs 1.4 and our general 
aviation rate is 10 times that. 
Also included in Table 1 are three specific small aircraft models 
on which we have good statistics. The Cessna Skyhawks have run at a 
level of 7 fatalities per 100 million passenger miles, and they are 
clearly the most forgiving and easiest to fly of the small single-
engine aircraft. They still have a rate of 7, mostly because they are 
used a lot in training. In the 42ls, there is considerable 
professional pilot operation and the rate is down to 2. In the case 
of the Citations, where virtually ~ll the piloting is professional, we 
are down to a rate of 0.4, which is the same as the airline rate of 10 
years ago. I cannot put too much emphasis on this question of pilot 
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proficiency. 
Figure 5 also iniicates the importance of that proficiency. Here, 
we consider Cessna fleet experience over a 10-year period. The reason 
I show this is because it tells the impact of the biennial review 
instituted by the FAA. You will notice that fatalities increased as 
the fleet increased in size. 7he moment that the biennial review ~Jas 
instituted the fatalities dropped essentially in half. 
We must reduce the requirements for piloting expertise. Our 
airplanes, in the future, must be more forgiving, easier to fly, and 
better capable of coping with the environment so that proficiency is 
easier to achieve and maintain. 
It is important to recognize the safety areas in most T'leed of 
attention. Accident statistics show that approximately one-half of 
all fatalities occur during approach and landing; another 20 percent 
are associated with takeoff. So, essentially 70 perc~nt occur during 
takeoff or landing ~nd are related to stall speed. Consequently, we 
need to do everything possible to reduce stall speed. We also need to 
eliminate the stall-spin accidents by making the airplane stallproof. 
It is also important to offer better a,Uity for coping with the 
weather at a much lower cost, since about 20 percent of our accidents 
are weather related. Pressurization, anti-icing systems, weather 
r.adar, and radar altimeters that caT'l be afforded in all airplanes are 
essential. 
In aHition to the safety picture, there is also a big need for 
increased equipment reliability and a 13.rge re:iuction in maintenance 
requirements. Future customers will also insist on significantly 
improved comfort, primarily related to re:iuced noise and vibration 
levels. In addition, the requirement for good air-conditioning is 
going to exist in just about every airplane. 
The overriding need for the future, however, will be improved fuel 
efficiency. With the anticipated higher prices, fuel costs will 
certainly dominate the cost of operation of all our aircraft. 
Current fuel consumption status is illustrated in Table 2, in 
which statute miles per gallon (mpg) for an airplane and seat miles 
per gallon are presented. The numbers are good compared to the 
current American ~ar and the current American airliner, which 
typically is a 50-seat-mile-per gallon airplane. However, they do not 
fare too well against the future 767s or 7 57s. We need to improve 
these numbers dramatically, and I think that with the technology 
promised it can be done. 
There is a very great promise in this potential technology, most 
of which has already been i:ientified by NASA. With this technology I 
think we have the makings for dramatically improving performance, fuel 
efficiency, and safety. Realizing that potential will depend on a 
greatly expanded NASA effort in general aviation. 
Going back to the economic numb::!r I commented on ~arlier, we in 
the general 'lviation tnlustry feel ~Ne ,ave a stature today that says 
we have been seriously neglected in the share of NASA research. 
The biggest single potential improvement that is offered by the 
new technology is in the field of composite materials (see 7able 3). 
Most of you are familiar with the numbers, but here they are for 
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Kevlar and graphite. Both of these fibers, as you know, offer 
strength-weight ratios that are superior to aluminum. NASA's ACEE 
program has done an outstanding job of proving the suitability of 
graphite for use in airliners. However, before the potential is 
realized for general aviation a lot of developments are needed, 
including better approaches to lightning protection, new inspection 
and testing techniques, interfacing with metals, new approaches to 
structural analysis and design, new matrix materials (which is a 
particularly important area), new manufacturing techniques, and new 
methods for field repair. In addition, the material cost must be 
drastically reauced. However, if it is pursued properly, by the 1990s 
the problems can all be solved and the materials could be standard 
production items. 
The fact that Kevlar, the aramid fiber, is replacing steel in 
premium tires today on a economically practical basis--it is 
essentially dollar for dollar right now--means that the potential for 
high volume, low-cost production of that material is promising. 
Consequently, we would expect it to become the general aviation 
structural material of the future. 
These fibers, principally Kevlar with some graphite used, offer a 
real potential for reducing the weight of newly ,iesigned general 
aviation aircraft by 35 percent. 
There should also be significant improvement in aerodynamic effi-
ciency as a result of the universal application of refined versions of 
the NASA supercritical airfoil and the natural laminar flow airfoils. 
Dramatic advances in electronic technology will continue in the 
future, thereby decreasing the size, weight, and cost of all avionics, 
as well as increasing capability and reliability. We fully expect 
this to come from the avionics industry. It is moving well today and 
we expect to see it continue. 
Aircraft piston engines could be significantly better both in 
power-weight ratios and specific fuel consumption. Composite 
materials should be used extensively for weight reduction. Lean 
burning techniques with fuel injection and other improvements should 
also offer 10 to 15 percent reductions in specific fuel consumption. 
Even diesels could become usable with a 25 percent improvement in 
specific fuel consumption (SFC). Much more efficient turbochargers 
could contribute to improved SFC and power-weight ratios and will 
probably be used universally. 
These are areas where NASA has started programs, all of which are 
very promising. The biggest question is whether these programs will 
continue to be implemented properly. 
Turbo machinery should also be improved. Pressure ratios and 
compressor efficiencies have been limited in the small engines in the 
past because the sizes were too small to make use of highly efficient, 
axial flow compressors. However, today we see the way for development 
of centrifugal compressors that can be just about as efficient as the 
axials. This will permit the use of much higher pressure ratios and 
give greatly improved thermodynamic efficiencies. At the same time 
higher turbine inlet temperatures will be realized through such devel-
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opments as monocrystallin~ metals and ceramics for turbine ~l~des and 
stators. Here ag~in, composite materials will be used to re1uce 
weights. 
Power-to-weight ratios could 'Je increased by ~ factor of two. 
Specific fuel consumption should be improved by 25 percent in 
high-altituje operation. Here 3gain NASA has ~ade the start in these 
fiel:is. The question is whether It ~\7i11 be followed up to achieve the 
potential result. 
The use of pusher propellers shoul:i be ~ade practical for the 
future as a result of using composites for lightweight blajes plus 
helicopter technology providing the lightweight, reliable drive shafts 
and gear bOKes. This approach offers significant jrag reduction, 
b~cause there is no propeller slipstream impinging either on the 
fuselage or on the cells. In fact, there is no need for nacelles to 
produce drag at all. This 'lrrangement also provides reduced cabin 
noise and better visibility. 
If developed on a timely basis these new technologies will 
generate many new airplanes that we expect will have the following 
common features and characteristics. All would 'Je pressurized to 
provide the ability to fly over the weather and· out of turbulence, 
with much greater efficiency and safety. All wings '"ould have high 
aspect ratios of 9 or more. This would result in better climb, lower 
stall speeds, and better LID ratios at high altitude. All would have 
full-span flaps with slot-lipped roll spoilers and flight path 
spoilers. The latter would be controlled by the throttle to provide 
negative thrust. All r;rould have angle of attack sensors, limiting 
elevator power to keep the aircraft from stalling. 7his feature, 
combined with flight path spo ilers, shoul:! completely el i'Uinate the 
stall-spin accident. All woul:! have advanced automatic flight control 
systems, the heart of which would be a central computer receiving 
information on all aircraft functions, including an air lata system 
made possible by low-cost sensors. 
All the navigation functions t\7ould be integrated ~\7ith this, 
including DME (Hstance measuring equipment) and RNAV (radio 
navigation). The system would automatically calculate and fly optimum 
flight profiles. It would also eliminate the possibilities of 
disorientation and spiral :lives. In many of the aircraft the system 
would be sufficiently re:!undant to offer automatic blind-l~nding 
capability at airports equipped \\7ith the necessary microwave systems. 
Most would have engine monitoring systems sensing vibratio~s, 
torsional loading, and metal in the oil to anticipate engine failures 
well in advance. This would increase safety, r~juce engine 
maintenance costs, and make the fuel-efficient single-engine aircraft 
. very safe. 
The six-place and larger airplanes would have strain gauge systems 
mounted on the landing gear that would provi:le an autom3tic weight and 
balance readout from the computer. All the airplanes would have radar 
altimeters, and most would have oth:r radar. aost would have 
all-weather systems, including an anti-icing capability. Inspection 
periods would increase from 100 to 300 hours or once a year. 
Now, I would like to examine a few examples of the aircraft that 
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these new technologies should ~ake possible for the 1990s. The 
minimum four-place aircraft is iepicted in Figure 6. It is 
essentially a very streaml1ne:i Skyhawk; however, it is supercharged 
and is pressurized to a 2.5 psi Hffare"tlal for cruising at 16,000 
feet, which Is above the worst weather problems, but still low enough 
to e llminate any concern over catastropl-tic iecompresslons. It also 
minimizes the weight penalty. 
l\le wouli expect this new aircraft to be 25 percent lighter in 
empty weight than today's Skyhawk. The supercritical airfoil and the 
full-span flaps wouH combine to make reduction of the wing area 1)y 
over one-third possible. However, the wing span has been retained in 
order to give good climb characteristics ani a ~igh LID. :he 
high-aspect ratio wing has a composite support strut tdth less than 
half the drag of today's struts. 
This future Skyhawk would cruise at 185 miles per hour and offer a 
range of 900 miles under visual flight rules. At the same time it 
woul:! cost less to buy, operate, ani maintain (in constant :lollars) 
than the Skyl-tawk of toiay. 
Figure 7 exemplifies ~Y'hat ~ould ~e a turbocharged Uesel-powered 
four-place '1i rplane. Because the engine is re lat lvely he'lVY it is 
located in the nose witl-t the propeller .uounted on the tail. 7his 
provides an efficient aeroiyna~ic configuration ~s well as a very low 
cabin sound level. The cabin TlOuld 1:>e pressurizei to 4 psi, giving a 
25,000-foot cruise altit1l1e. The Hesel wouU run at 3500 rpm with a 
light-weight drive shaft transmitting the power to a gear box at the 
rear, where the rpm of the prop would be cut to 2000. The irive shaft 
would pass through a center-tunnel armrest, as in a sports car. Wide 
chord composite propellar blales would proviie good efficiencies at a 
high-altitude cruise. 
Because of these capabilities, this airplane should cruise at 250 
mph, have a l600-mile range, ani offer 26 mpg--a really high level of 
fuel efficiency, better than 100 seat miles to the gallon. 
A mInimum-cost twIn-engine airc.raft is shown in Fi3ure 8. To 
provide a minimum cost, we have used two supercharged automotive 
Wankel engines. Their compact size and light weight make possible the 
convenient arrangemant for the safety of center-line thrust. Since 
these engines are liquid coole:!, the raHators T.Y'ould be the aluminum 
leaUng edges on the wing and on the tail surfaces. This ~l1ould 
provide an automatic anti-icing capability. This would also be a 
250-mph airplane cruising at 25,000 feet, but would only get about 18 
mpg. 
Although the Wankel engine will always lJe inferior to the piston 
engine in SF8, its lightweight, compact size, '1nd lack of vibration 
will perpetuate its ievelopment as an automotive engine with the 
result that its low cost could make it very attractive for personal 
aircraft. The lack of a valve train and its basic simplicity should 
also make it very reliable. 
Another "ew type of aircraft that we expect to be very popular In 
the 1990s is a single-engine turbopropellar type in a pusher 
configuration. This would lJe 'l six-place airplane, pressurized to 8 
psi with a 400-mph cruise speed, anl the alJillty to fly at altitudes 
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up to 40,000 feet. We would be looking at a turbo-shaft engine with 
6000-rpm output reduced to 1800 for the propeller. The rear-mount 
engine and propeller will proviie a very quite, smooth, cabin 
environment. It would have an l800-mile range capability. 
Because of the engine monitoring system it should be possible to 
virtually eliminate any concern over engine failure. This would offer 
a l6-mpg capability, again approximately 100 seat miles per gallon. 
This type of airplane will replace many of today's piston twins. 
Another new category of aircraft for the future woull be the 
twin-turbine single-propeller airplane shown in Figure 9. The two 
turbine engines, which have their inlets in the wing roots, would be 
geared together to drive the single propeller. In this way, you not 
only have two engines but also the safety of center-line thrust. Some 
people may object 'to the single propeller; however, people flying 
today in twin-engine helicopters depend on a single rotor to stay in 
the sky. This propeller would have a very high activity factor to 
drive the airplane at 450 mph at 45,000 feet, making it very 
comfortable and providing a cross-country nonstop range. It would 
have 8 to 10 seats and offer a fuel efficiency of better than 10 mpg; 
again, approximately 100 seat miles to the gallon. 
Continuing on up the scale in speed in the 1990s, we should see a 
Mach 0.95 business jet, which is illustrated in Figure 10. This would 
offer a 20 percent increase in speed over today's business jets and, 
at the same time, provide high fuel efficiency. It would be necessary 
to bury the engines, "area rule" the fuselage, and go to highly swept 
wings with supercritical airfoils. We would also be looking at 
canards. The winglets in this case would serve the dual purpose of 
increasing aspect ratio and directional stabilizaion. You can see in 
this many NASA outputs, and we would expect to use even more. 
This airplane would offer stand-up aisle height, 16 places, plus a 
600-mph cruising speed at altitudes up to 60,000 feet, with 
ocean-crossing range. Even with this speed it should offer a fuel 
efficiency of better than 4 mpg. 
It also offers the safety advantage of essentially having 
center-line thrust and would have a cabin that is free of engine noise. 
Another important future category for general aviation will be 
short-haul commuter transport. This market will grow in size by many 
times in the next 15 to 20 years. Consequently, new designs will be 
developed in which the principal emphasis will be on the minimum 
amount of aircraft weight per passenger lifted into the air. One 
approach to such a SO-passenger machine is illustrated in Figure 11. 
'By using a tandem wing configuration, minimum drag is achieved with 
good control power. This also makes possible an aft location of the 
turboprops to provide minimum cabin noise. It would be pressurized to 
cruise at 25,000 feet, where it would achieve speeds up to 300 miles 
an hour. Even for 100- to 200-mile routes it woul:! offer over 100 
seat miles per gallon. 
In summary, in the 1990s the potential exists for general aviation 
aircraft to generally provide 25 percent more speed with SO to 100 
percent better fuel efficiency plus greatly improved safety, 
reliability, convenience, and comfort. The accident rate would be 
98 
reduced by well over an order of magnitude and it would be safer than 
cars. This shouli all come about if the new technology is developed 
on a timely basis, which will require substantial effort by NASA. In 
this way we would stay ahead of our foreign competitors and 
substantially increase the growth rate of general aviation. 
A major concern today is the fact that there are 10 other 
countries already engaged in general aviation production and several 
others in the process of developing a general aviation industry. All 
of these governments are strongly supporting their industry by 
subsidizing R&D and tooling from 80 to 100 percent and, in many cases, 
subsidizing the manufacturing costs. On top of that they heavily 
subsidize marketing with low-interest, no-down-payment financing. Put 
together, this is a very serious threat, which in a five-year period 
could easily take the general aviation market away from the United 
States. 
A very important aspect of the export market is the fact that in 
developing nations, where there are no railway or highway networks, 
general aviation aircraft can provide instant transportation systems 
with a very small capital investment. This creates a particularly 
good potential for rapid growth in this export market. 
In closing, I would just like to make one comment on the 
importance of U.S. preeminence in aviation. Many, if not most, people 
throughout the world regard flying as man's most magnificent achieve-
ment. I think that is really true. It is not just this group here; I 
think it is true of people in general. This is borne out by the fact 
that most developing nations' first objectives after they develop any 
kind of economic stature is to have a nat tonal airline and then to 
have an air force. Not far beyond that comes having an aircraft 
industry. 
In addition to the great economic importance that general aviation 
leadership offers, the cont inued posit ion of preeminence in aviat ion 
manufacturing, we think, is the most important means for the U.S. to 
maintain its role of world leadership. Without preeminence in avia-
tion, I thtnk we can all be assured that we are going to be regarded 
as a second-rate nation throughout the world. 
Thank you. 
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TABLE 1 Fatality Rates per Hundred Million Passenger Miles 
Airliner 
Overall general aviation 
Passenger cars 
Passenger cars on turnpikes 
Sky hawks 
42ls 
Citations 
0.04 
16.0 
1.4 
0.7 
7.0 
1.5 
0.4 
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TABLE 2 General Aviation Fuel Efficiency 
Sky hawk 
Pressurized 210 
421 
Conquest 
Citation II 
MPG 
(St'ltute) 
17 
12 
7 
5.5 
3.5 
COMPOSITE CHARACTERISTICS 
TENSILE COMPRESSIVE 
MATERIAL STRENGTH MODULUS STRENGTH MODULUS 
3 
10 PSI 10
6 
PSI 10
3 
PSI 106 PSI 
KEVLAR 49 200 11 40 10.5 
GRAPHITE 110 28 100 28.0 
ALUMINUM 60 10.5 36 10.5 
2024 T3 (YIELD) 
DENSITY 
#/CU. IN. 
.05 
.06 
.10 
(UNIDIRECTIONAL FIBERS IN EPOXY LOADED IN DIRECTION OF FIBERS) 
TABLE. 3 
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Seat Miles 
Per Gallon 
68 
72 
49 
55 
30 
FIGURE 6 An Example of a Minimum 4-Place Aircraft of the Future 
FIGURE 7 An Example of a Turbo-Charged Diesel-Powered 4-Place Aircraft 
____ ~--------~ij~W~~------~------
FIGURE 8 An Example of a Minimum-Cost Twin Engine Aircraft 
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FIGURE 9 An Example of a Twin-Turbine Single-Propeller Aircraft 
FIGURE 10 A Mach 0.95 Business Jet of the 1990s 
FIGURE 11 An Example of a Future 50-Passenger 
Short-Haul Commuter Aircraft 
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THE HELICOPTER'S FUTURE: FRUITION OR FRUSTRATION? 
Gerald J. Tobias 
President 
Sikorsky Aircraft Division 
United Technologies Corporation 
Thank you. It gives me a great deal of pleasure to participate 
toda:..r in this -1 iscussion on the role of NASA in aeronautics and to 
present to you one viewpoint from the helicopter industry. 
My presentation this afternoon will consist of three parts. 
First, the helicopter market as I see it evolving in the next decade, 
including the key underlying trends and shifts that are occurring. 
Second, the role of the helicopter in our society. And, finally, the 
role that I believe NASA should play, not only in bringing this market 
to fruition, but also in ensuring that the U.S. helicopter industry 
receives its appropriate market share. 
Over the last decade as illustrated in Table 1, the free world 
helicopter industry, which is primarily the U.S. and European 
manufacturers, produced 21,000 civil and military helicopters, with 
revenue at ~lS billion. (All financial data are in 1980 dollars.) 
In comparison, over the next decade we project that free world 
output of helicopters will rise to 29,000 units, with revenue 
estimated at $29 billion. These data provide an average annual growth 
rate in units of 3.2 percent, while, on a revenue basis, the rate is 7 
percent. The inversion in these growth rates indicates another 
interesting statistic, which is that the average unit value will 
increase significantly. 
Summarizing then from a business point of view, we believe that 
there is an attractive rate of financial growth, coupled with a clear 
shift toward larger vehicles, which is a fairly typical aerospace 
trend. 
I will return to the question of vehicle size in a few moments, 
but first of all let me go over the question of the military/civil 
mix. Continuing with the statistics used earlier, Table 2 shows that 
the 21,000 helicopters produced between 1971 and 1980 were made up of 
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some 11,600 milit~ry and 9400 civil machines. 
Our projections for the next decade indicate production of 8000 
military units and 21,000 civil helicopters. The app~rent decline in 
the military market is the result of the Vietnam War. It appears that 
the military market in units will change little over the ne'Ct two 
decades, suggesting a replacement, rather than a growth, mode. 
\Hth respect to the civil sector, unit growth is a strong 8.5 
percent, while the revenue growth is an even stronger 11 percent 
(Table 3). This strong growth of the civil sector in the helicopter 
market is of significance to NASA. What, perhaps, is even more 
important is the fact that the civil market is growing in a different 
technical direction--the military and civil markets are 
technologically diverging. 
I believe this is a factor of great significance in the context of 
this workshop, since traditionally the technical community has become 
accustomed to strong relationships between civil and military 
designs. As an example, compare the Lockheed C-5 and the Boeing 747. 
Although their specific designs'lnd utilizations Hf fer, the 
requirements they meet ani the environments in which they operate are 
sufficiently si~ilar to permit a high degree of technical cross 
fertilization. t-lhile this is COlThllon in the fixed-wing industry, it is 
rapidly diminishing in the rotary-wing sector. 
For example, our new helicopter, the Sikorsky SPIRIT, was 
conceived from the wheels up as a civil design (Figure 1). 
The marketplace had reached a point where it was mature 
make economically viable a privately funded venture. 
importance, that market could only be captured by an 
specifically designed for its needs. The potential market 
longer be won by a modified and repainted military aircraft. 
enough to 
Of equal 
aircraft 
coul:i no 
The reasons behind this divergence can be seen by considering our 
new military design, the UH-60A Black Hawk (Figure 2). In simple 
terms, six factors dominated its design: threat survivability, rapi.d 
maneuverability, ability to operate at altitude and ambient 
temperature extremes, ease of air transportation, improved reliability 
and maintainability, and crashworthiness. 
Unfortunately, as illustrated in Table 4, four out of six of these 
military attributes economically and/or operationally penalize the 
application of this aircraft in the civil market. Threat survivabi-
lity features are irrelevant to operation of a civil helicopter and 
appear as added weight and cost in many vital components, such as 
rotor blades, drive systems, and controls. Rapid maneuverability 
requires excess installed power and design optimization for low-speed, 
rather than cruise, flight. 
The capability for operation at virtually any altitude and 
temperature around the world again lea-is to excess installe:i power ani 
a general lack of "balance" between the dynamic and structural 
components. The requirement for ease of air transportation physically 
limits the external dimensions of the Black Hawk in order to meet the 
internal dimensions of Air Force tr~nsport aircraft. The result is a 
passenger cabin envelope unsuited to civilian passenger standarJs. 
It is only in the areas of reliabilitY/llaintainability and crash-
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worthiness that the ~ilitary attributes have a direct applicability to 
the civil design. 
Now, let me return to the civil market projection I discussed 
earlier. You will recall from Table 3 we projected 21,000 units worth 
$13.6 billion for the next decade. In Figure 3, we divide this market 
into three gross weight categories--l ight, define:! as a ircraft below 
6000 Ibs.; intermediate/medium; an1 heavy, which are aircraft above 
35,000 lbs. Just over three-quarters of the units are projected to be 
below 6000 Ibs., and less than 1 percent are above 35,000 Ibs. 
However, above 35,000 Ibs. the civil market potential revenue is a 
miniscule 1.5 percent of total iollar volume and the lightweight class 
has shrunk from its 75 percent of units pro:!uced to only one-third of 
the total llarket revenue. I believe, therefore, that ~ASA should 
pursue areas involving the central core of the helicopter market--the 
intermediate/medium class. 
Based on this premise, let us reexamine the civil/military 
technical divergence I ~entioned earlier. Figure 4 shows some of the 
salient designs in this migration toward heavier gross \ole ights in 
relation to the first flight of each aircraft. This trend in1icates, 
I believe, that NASA should not only throw its technical authority 
generally into the intermediate/medium weight class but specifically 
into the 25,000- to 35, OOO-lbs. sector, which we anticipate will be 
emerging in the late 1980s. 
It is through the development of vehicles such as this that the 
U.S. helicopter industry will aid in the continuation of its role in 
keeping our air transportation system the envy of the world and an 
efficient servant to the expansion of the United States economy. 
Before proceeding, let me take a few moments to define the role of 
the civil helicopter in society as I perceive it. As you know, this 
aircraft has two very unique capabilities whose significance is 
frequently not fully appreciated, namely, the fact that it takes off 
and lands vertically an1 that it can sustain flight in a hover. This 
means that the helicopter serves both remote and congested areas with 
minimum investment in facilities and equipment. At the same time, in 
1980 the helicopter is much more economical than circa 1960-1970 
predecessors and is, therefore, becoming more competitive with fixed-
wing aircraft in a wide variety of applications. 
Helicopters are also more attractive to potential users because of 
substantive increases in creature comforts and convenience. For 
example, the new-generation helicopters can provide faster 
point-to-point transportation. than current fixed-wing aircraft within 
a radius of 300 nautical miles or so. 
The h~licopter can now fill a number of roles in society as a 
complement to our existing transportation systems. It provides 
economic point-to-point transportation for key business and government 
people, not only in developed areas, but also in regions inaccessible 
by other means. In our population centers, the helicopter is ready to 
provide a flexible and economically viable solution to the problem of 
our consested fiKed-wing airports. When flying point to point, 
helicopters can use "unused" airspace via helicopter air routes, thus 
contributing to the re1uction in fixed-wing route congestion. 
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Adiitionally, as a service of inestinable value to society, the 
helicopter can provide emergency service to vast areas of the 
population at high speei and without the need for fixed-wing 
facilities. In the 40 years of the helicopter's existence, it is 
estimated that helicopters have been instrumental in saving over 
100,000 civilian lives, not to mention the million plus military 
comb~t rescues and medical evacuations. 
Now let me be more specific about the threat that the U.S. 
helicopter industry is facing, the help that is needed to defeat that 
threat, and the way in which NASA can provide the help. Figure 5 
shml1s what is happening in the world helicopter market. lolhile the 
U.S. helicopter industry has been holding its own, our European 
competitors, all heavily supported by their respective governments, 
have doubled their output. 
My concern increases l-lhen I consider NASA's list of potential 
markets: 
--Tactical fighter 
--Long-range subsonic transports 
--Supersonic transports 
--General aviation 
--Short-range/commuter transports 
--Military V/STOL 
--Improved military and civil rotorcraft 
I fully appreciate the point that this is not a list of priorities, 
but the fact remains that of the seven items listed, six are 
fixed-wing oriented. Furthermore, while four of the six fixed-wing 
items are quite specific, the rotary-wing item is almost a meaningless 
generality. 
An analysis of NASA spending does nothing to alleviate my 
worries. The data in Table 5 show that NASA expenditures in the last 
decade for fixed-wing transport research equates to one-fifteenth of 
the next deca:le's market revenue. The comparative figure for 
helicopters is I in 54. 
NASA would have to spend $600 million on helicopters to catch up, 
or 2.5 times as much as in the last decade. And the payoff, in 
technical terms, will be rapid. I believe it is generally agreed that 
the helicopter has reached only about 50 percent of its technical 
potential, whereas the fixed-wing subsonic transport is very close to 
maturity. Helicopter rese'lrch will provide rapid and visible 
advances, whereas fixed-wing research will require increasingly 
heavier funding for relatively marginal gains. 
How can NASA help the U.S. helicopter industry? The greatest 
service I believe NASA can provide is to help us find out where we are 
now technologically, or to put it another way, to help us turn our 
remaining "black art" into a more form'll science. 
Those of us who have been around the industry for a little while 
will not forget the enormous contribution 'TIaje by NI\SA in the 1930s, 
1940s, and 1950s to the total understanding of the aerodynamics of the 
subsonic aircraft. I don't mean to belittle their contribution to the 
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understanding of the supersonic regime, but rather to give special 
recognition of the totality of their work in subsonic aerodynamics. 
The value of this work to the U. S. aerospace industry and the world 
was immeasurable, and it played a large part in placing the American 
commercial aircraft industry in the position of preeminence it holds 
today. 
I urge the NASA of today to parallel the efforts of their NASA 
pioneers and help the helicopter industry get a total understanding of 
the very complex aerodynamic. field in which our product must work. 
Obviously, we have made great strides but there is, I believe, much 
more to learn. A truly great effort on the part of NASA in 
fundamental helicopter research could contribute much to the American 
helicopter industry and most importantly to society at large. And the 
industry must participate so that the most effective use can be 
derived from all resources. 
Beyond this, I have my own particular priority candidates for 
helicopter research. They come under the general heading of improved 
operational capability and are as follows: 
--Development of helicopter instrument approaches 
--Noise abatement 
--Dedicated helicopter airways 
--Cockpit integration and human factors 
--Crashworthiness 
In my view, success in these areas of research is essential if we 
are to enable the helicopter to play its appropriate role in relieving 
the traffic constriction in this country's air transport system. 
While the FAA also has a vital role to play in this arena, there is 
much that NASA can do to help. Important areas in which there is much 
to be done include the development of helicopter instrument 
approaches, the reduction of noise, the establishment of dedicated 
helicopter airways, cockpit integration and human factors, and 
crashworthiness. The payoff for this work would be almost immediate. 
Airport congestion is now widespread, and saturation is becoming a 
serious problem in many major metropolitan areas. The airports that 
have already reached saturation are Washington National, Philadelphia 
International, Chicago's O'Hare, Los Angeles International, San 
Francisco International, New York's La Guardia, and New York's Kennedy 
International. 
Considerable relief can be obtained by establishing independent 
helicopter airways and public-use heliports close to the centers of 
population. These can be made to work if the research is properly 
funded. 
In summary, then, I see the role of NASA assistance to the 
helicopter industry to be, first, recognition of the separate needs 
and uses of the helicopter as an essential air transportation 
vehicle. I have expressed my views relating to the problems the 
helicopter industry faces in many professional forums. The most 
serious is being packaged in the same technical and operational box 
with our fixed-wing brothers. NASA must view the future by recogniz-
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Lng the signi.fi:::ant iistin:::tLon b2tw~en fixed-wins ani rotary-wLn~ ;:tir 
vehicles and their r~spective contributions to societv. 
Secon1, 'lAS:\. shoull provUe assistance, 'llong with the 2fforts of 
the FAA and lniustrv, to ievelop a soe=ific heli:::opt~r operating 
environment. 
Third, ~ASA shouli proviie a fir~ foundation of basic resear:::h by 
funHng to a level that is appropriate to the pot~ntLal :::o'ltri1:>ution 
of th~ helicopter. 
Th2se actions will assist the U.S. industry in its effort to main-
tain a cO'llpetitive posture ',-lith th2 raplily expanding ani nati'mally 
supportei helicopter iniustries of Europe. 
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FREE WORLD HELICOPTER MARKET 
Units 
Value of new 
Helicopter Production 
1971-1980 
21,000 
(1980 Dollars) $15 Billion 
Average Unit Value $0.7 Million 
TABLE 1 
1981-1990 
29,000 
$29 Billion 
$1. 0 Hillion 
FREE HORLD HELICOPTER MARKET DISTRIBUTION 
OF CIVIL & MILITARY MARKETS 
1971-1980 1981-1990 
Military 11,600 8,000 
Civil 9,400 21,000 
Total Units 21,000 29,000 
TABLE .., ... 
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Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
3.2% 
7.0% 
Units 
Value 
CIVIL MARKET GROHTH 
1971-1980 1981-1990 
9,400 21,000 
$4.7 Billion $13.6 Billion 
TABLE 3 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate 
8.5% 
11.0% 
FIGURE 1 Sikorsky SPIRIT™ 
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FIGURE 2 Sikorsky UH-60A Black Hawk 
BLACK HAiiK 
Military Attributes Civil Market Penalty 
o Threat Survivability o Weight 
Irrelevant Features 
0 Rapid Maneuverability 0 Excessive Installed Power 
Optimized for Low Speed 
0 World Wide Capability 0 Excessive Installed Power 
Dynamics-Heavy Design 
0 Ease of Air Transportation 0 Design Constrained 
Cabin Size Unacceptable 
0 R & M 0 None 
0 Crashworthiness 0 None 
TABLE 4 
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Heavy 1 
<1% , 
Light 
76% 
21,000 Units 
Heavy -""""1 
<2% , 
I ntermediatel 
Medium 
68% 
/ 
$13.6 Billion 
.I 
FIGURE 3 CIVIL MARKET FORECAST BY WEIGHT CATEGORY· 1981-1990 
30,000 / 
V> / .Q 20,000 
- / l- I I / (!) / w / 
:5: / 
(f) / (f) 
10,000 0 Sikorsky Spirit 
a: 
(!) 
Bell 47 
1945 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
FIRST FLIGHT 
FIGURE 4 EVOLUTION OF CIVIL DESIGNS 
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1970·1974 1975·1979 
$5.68 
$7.58 
FIGURE 5 GROWTH OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION (1980 Dollars) 
NASA RESEARCH SPENDING VS. HARKETS 
Fixed Wing Transport 
Research (1971-1980) = $7.0 Billion 
Market (1981-1990) = $103.0 Billion 
Rotary Wing 
Research (1971-1980) = $0.25 Billion 
Market (1981-1990) = $13.6 Billion 
TABLE 5 
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Ratio 1:15 
Ratio 1:54 
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HOW NASA CAN ASSIST THE FAA 
Charles R. Foster 
~irector, Northwest Region 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Neal Slake and I wi 11 both address the issue of assistance from 
NASA as far as the FAA is concerned. 
me to discuss the b~ck~round for this 
starting with the mission of the FAA, 
how we are going. 
I thought it might be wise for 
presentation, both mine and his, 
what we are about, and where and 
As you know, one of the major areas where NASA can participate 
with the FAA deals with our charter for the development and growth of 
civil aviation, as well as for providing and ~aintaining the highest 
level of safety in air transportation. We can break that 
responsibility into a couple of different areas, one dealing with the 
management of the navigable air space, or the air traffic side--and 
Neal will be jiscussing more of that than I--and the other side of the 
issue having to do with the aircraft and the aircraft operations. I 
would like to spend my time iealing primarily with some of the issues 
relative to those two elements. 
First, in the aircraft, we start with the actual design of the 
vehicle, how it is manufactured, and how it is maintained. We group 
these three together, and we identify all of them with the 
airworthiness of the vehicle. So, we have a major role in the 
airworthiness of the vehicle, both initially as well as on a 
continuing basis. In the operat ional area we are dealing with the 
flying of the vehicle. ~hat includes the procedures that we use, the 
training of the creW members, the types of people we have aboard the 
airplane, the numbers we have, the human factors, how they 
interrelate, the in-iividual. and the machine itself. This we lump 
into our operational side of the house. So, airworthiness and 
operations ~re two major areas where NASA has been able to contribute 
to the FAA's overall mission in the past as well as today. 
It is interesting to note that NA<::A, which came into being in 
1915, had a budget of $5000. In NASA. today, the budget is about 
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$5 billion. That is quite a jump from 5000 to 5 billion in this time 
span. I am sure that in 1915 if anyone had proje(:ted the 'llost you 
would ever see in any budget for any government agency the wori 
"billions" '"ou11 nat even h'lve b~en usei. A person' s jud~'llent 'Moul·:l 
have been questioned if he had pre1icte:l as 'lluch as a million ;loHars 
for an agency enga~ed in aeronautical research. 
One of the issues is how and where the aeronautical part of this 
budget should be spent. I have heard s~veral people here discuss the 
issue of funlamental, or pure, research. There are some who question 
whether NASA should go beyond that into the development of technology, 
even into operational feasibility; in other wor:is, what part of the 
spectrum of aeronautical research should be done by NASA? 
In addressing this issue for the 1980s, we should not focus 
strictly on NASA and NASA alone as if there, and there alone, is where 
the research is going to be done. In my dealings with the Office of 
Management and Budget many times in the past, when we would ask for 
funds for research, the general question we would get would be whether 
this is not something that NASA should be joing. So, we would have to 
justify why it was something that the FAA or some other .part of the 
Department of Transportation should be doing, even though the generic 
term may apply across the board to NASA, the Department of Defense, 
and others. 
So, if we are not careful we can wind up having the research 
identified with one organization such that there may be, because of 
administrative procedures and processes, an inability to get the funds 
or resources equitably distributed according to the priorities that we 
see as far as the value of the research prolucts. 
I will address, first of all, transport aircraft. You have heard 
some excellent speeches dealing with our role in the transport 
aircraft business, where we stand today, the challenges we have, the 
leadership we have had in the past, what we need to do, and where we 
should go to maintain the leadership for the future. I think that the 
area of rotorcraft is one that has not received the attention it 
should have in the past. In the FAA I think that we have all too 
often dealt with the field of aircraft, and 99 percent of the time we 
think of airplanes. We have put out regulations that, once they were 
in the field, people have questioned whether ~e really meant for them 
to apply to helicopters. The answer was, goo:iness no, we were not 
thinking about helicopters, we were thinking about airplanes. We have 
not addressed the require'llents for rotorcraft with the sane priority 
and resources that have been given to airplanes. For example, in the 
area of icing, I think it is unfortunate or t-lOrse than unfortunate 
that we have foreign governments that have certification criteria for 
icing of rotorcraft and we do not have them in the United States. 
This is a case, I think, where we have not done the kind of research 
that we should have done in the past or we would have had the 
information necessary for us to develop these kinds of certificaton 
criteria. 
Commuter aircraft. As you may know, the FAA certificate aircraft 
according to type. Ue have the cate-sories broken 10wn in which we 
have specific Federal Aviation Regulations. They are divided into 
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different parts for itfferent categories 'If aircraft. For example, 
P;Hts nand 29 bal with rotl)rcraft. PHt 23 ie~ls with utillty, 
acr,)batic. :tnd light aircraft. Part 25ieals with transport category 
aircraft. ~le have been working for 3bout 4 ·:>r 5 'Iears to :leter'lline 
whether or not \ole need to put out a new part, a Part 24, for ~ircraft 
that are between the sm'lller ~eneral aviation category ani the heavy 
transport category. '..-1hy have we been spenjing this time on Part 24? 
Bec~use we feel there is a requirement to levelo? an aircraft that is 
really :les igned to sat isfy the commuter J1arket. Unfortunately, most 
of the aircraft that are designed fl)r the co~muter market and sold in 
the Unite.f States are not manufactured here nor ~re they designed 
here. The aircraft that fit into this market ~re those that have been 
developed for business executive aviation or general aviation and have 
been expanded or 'lloiified to fill the g~p. Here is an are3 where, I 
think, we coul:l get some input from NASA into the basic fundamentals 
necessary to put togeth~r a truly effective commuter aircraft. 
The general ~viation side of the picture. I think Mal Harned made 
some good points dealing with that. We are kUling too ~any people 
stalling and spinning aircraft. Aircraft do not have to have those 
kinds of characteristics. ~le can buil:! airplanes that wi 11 not spin, 
that will not stall, and that will still perfor~ the mission for which 
most people buy a private airplane. 
Lastly, I have to touch on my previous ~ssignment ielving into 
government dealings with the environment. Slnce I spent manj ye~rs in 
that area, I would like to touch on a couple of things that I think 
NASA can asslst us with In our dealing with environment3l lssu~s, 
particularly as far as noise is concerned. 
Across the spectrum of types of aircraft, one of the areas that 
has been discussed here and will continue to be :liscussed at SOille 
length has to do with composlte materlals. We are :leveloping 
information about composite materials and are employing composite 
materi~ Is in some of our aircraft today. It was interest i ng to hear 
Gerry Tobias' comment regarding the percentage of the Spirit heli-
copter that actually is composite, even the primary structures. ~-le 
need to know ~ore about how we are going to certificate composite 
materials. We need to know more about the damage tolerability of 
composite materials. What are the effects on the environment in which 
these materials will operate? What happens after 5 years, 10 years, 
or 15 years? What kind of non:lestructive testing can we have? How 
can we be sure, both in the initial development testing and in the 
proving of the product, that it is safe and meets the criteria as well 
as the continue:! airworthiness of vehicles uslng composite materlals? 
I think that we have not properly addressed all of these areas, and I 
thlnk many tl~es we spend too much effort, as far as the FAA is 
concerne:i, on identifying unique characteristics on too small a scale. 
Obvlously, we WOtlli llke to see the work Ln aerodynamics and 
control of aircraft contlnued. One of the concerns we have today has 
to do wlth transsonic flutter analysls, particularly shock-induced 
flutter that can be developed on some of our supercritical wing 
airfolls. 
Active controls. We are making some progress in active controls. 
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H'e feel that further research needs to be done in this area. 
One of the largest areas is the hu~an factors work. H'e are moving 
in the area where we are having more and more things done in a 
cockpit, either through mechanical means and/or electronics. As the 
airplane cockpit becomes more complex we are able to handle more 
things automatically. The big question is how to resolve the work 
load problem to make sure that we do not put so much in the cockpit, 
so many different kinds of instruments, ra1ios, what have you, that 
the crew work load is not increased. 
It is interesting to note that we have gone from crews with as 
many as 4 and 5 members, 10 to 16 years ago, down to 2 and 3 today. 
The important thing is being able to quantify how we can reduce this 
work load by the development and interface of various electronic and 
mechanical pieces of equipment. 
Another area that we need to improve is the propulsion system, 
particularly for transport aircraft. We have had quite a few 
discussions dealing with various types of modification and improvement 
of existing turbo machiners, development of new types, new and 
different kinds of fuels, and new means of propulsion. 
I would like to throw out one subject that has not been covered--
that is the reliability of our new propulsion systems. In the early 
days of the DC-4s, DC-6s, Constellations, ant! Stratocrusiers, we had 
airplanes that had four reciprocating engines. In those days, the 
engine failure rate was running around 400 and 500 flight hours per 
engine shutdown. Along comes the turbojet and we hardly ever have an 
engine failure. 
Actually, most of the turbojets are removed because of time 
limits. In the days of predominantly four-engine airplanes, we had 
aircraft land with one engine shut down--sometimes two engines shut 
down. I think the 747 will be the last large four-engine aircraft 
built. H'e are moving more and more toward two- and three-engine 
aircraft. Our newest, latest aircraft are coming out with two large 
high-bypass-ratio engines. 
So, as we delve into the means· of improving the specifics, 
reducing the weight and many other factors that deal with the 
propulsion system, we must also make sure that we provide adequ;>.te 
attention and time to the reliability of these machines. Two-engine 
failure of a twin-engine airplane is entirely different from 
two-engine failure on a three- or four-engine airplane. 
Lastly, I would like to comment on the environmental concern. H'e 
have moved from the arena in noise where we were, I guess 15 years ago 
or so, really trying to find the fundamentals of how noise was 
generated; what were the mechanisms involved particularly in the jet 
exhaust? We were developing means of suppressing the noise or 
modifying the design so that the noise was not generated. And we have 
made tremendous progress. Unfortunately, we still have a lot of 
aircraft with old engines that will be flying over the next 5 or 10 
years that will not incorporate a lot of the technology that we have 
developed and applied to the newly produced airplanes. 
As we have moved from concentrating on the source of the noise in 
our propulsion systems, we are now in the area of major legal issues, 
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and people are going to court because of the noise exposure they are 
receiving. In California, the airports are now paying compensation 
for noise nuisance, and in::iications are that the recipients can go 
back and back if the nuisance is not removel. As this spreads across 
the country the impact could be ievastating on our whole transporta-
tion system. 
One of the problems that I see in this is the method for 1eter-
mining what the noise exposure is. tole have SOll~ very sophisticated 
noise map or noise contour modeling proce::iures both within the Depart-
ment, the Air Force, NASA, and other places. NASA has a large facility 
at Langley that is working on this particular problem. The computer 
program will 10 an excellent job of taking the input ani drawing out 
all these contours. The courts take the contours anj -letermine what 
t~e noise may be or should be. ~ut, if you go out ani st~rt measuring 
around these contours to validate the contours through measurements, 
you find one of the fundamental problems we have and that is our 
ability to truly predict what the sound pressure level is going to do, 
the content of the soun::!, as it propagates over long jistances. This 
is a long time, I think, for an expensive type of research that needs 
to be completed. We still have limited results from research dealing 
wth this long-range propagation of sound. Over the last 15 years, I 
think we have made tremendous progress in aircraft noise reduction. 
So, dealing with the aircraft and its operations, I have indicated 
the types of aircraft (transport, helicopters, commuter, and general 
aviation) for which I feel we need input from NASA to assist us in 
modifying our regulations and developing new criteria. Composite 
materials, aerodynamics, human factors, propulsion, and the environ-
ment are the five areas that I felt would be worthwhile mentioning and 
highlighting at this time. I would like to say, in conclUSion, that 
these things are not all that we are interested in. 
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HOW NASA CAN ASSIST THE FAA 
Neal 13lake 
Deputy Associate Ad~inistrator for 
Engineering ani Development 
Feleral Aviation Administration 
Although predicting the future is an inexact science at best, I 
think certain trends have been identified that have helped us to 
assemble a scenario for the shape of the air traffic control system of 
the future. This scenario, in turn, has been used to identify 
development activities that we need to complete to provide a higher 
capacity, more automated, more fuel-efficient system for 1990 and 
beyond. 
Today, I will give you a very brief overview of some of the 
impacts of traffic growth, our development program goals, our future 
air traffic control system scenario, and present and planned 
activities in the devalopment area to support that scenario and I will 
try to identify some of the key areas for NASA support in this program. 
In his paper, Bill Wilkins indicated that we still expect 
continued significant growth in the number of aircraft requesting FAA 
separation services over the neJet deca.fe. The forecast of growth in 
aircraft operations under instrument flight rules handled by our air 
traffic control centers is expected to be approximately 60 percent by 
1990. The greatest percentage of growth is expected in general 
aviation, air taxi, and commuter operations. Air carrier growth, as 
noted yesterday, will be slower, and military operations are expected 
to stay about the same. 
The forecast growth in air traffic handled by the individual air 
traffic control centers will range from about 35 to 67 percent during 
this time period. Operations at tower-equipped airports are expected 
to increase about 44 percent during this same'time period--again, the 
big growth will be in general aviation, air taxi, and commuter 
operations. 
This forecast growth and achievement of significant gains in each 
of the five major FAA goal areas provide most of the basis for our 
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engineering anj development program. 
The first goal is safety. Our highest priority has always been 
siven to improvlng system safety and reJucing flight risk. This goal 
area encompasses the development activities needed to prevent aircraft 
collisions with terraln and other aircraft, to reJuce fatalitles from 
inflight and postcrash fires, to detect and reduce the consequences of 
human error, and to detect and avoid severe weather pheno~ena. 
The second goal is system performance. Improving system 
performance by increasing capac ity, reducing -:lelays, and improving 
weather 3.nd pilot briefing services has been a goal of many of the 
recent development programs that are just now providing field 
implementable systems. This area includes programs to increase 
airport capacity, provide more direct aircraft routings with 
fuel-efficient profiles, and provide improved flow management 
particularly during adverse weather conditions. 
The third goal, increasing system productivity by providing 
improved service while reducing the cost of providing these sevices, 
is becoming an ever increasingly more important goal area. The 
activity to improve both the weather and pilot briefing services while 
simultaneously reducing the cost of providing those services is 
already well under way. 
Additional ievelopment programs are aimed at reducing the 
operation, rna intenance, and cert ificat ion costs of the air traffic 
control system. 
As Bill Wilkins mentioned, fuel conservation has become an 
increasingly important goal area and a number of procedural and 
facility improvements designed to conserve fuel are already entering 
the system. AHitional automation activities are under way, which we 
expect will further reduce the excess fuel burned due to air traffic 
control and weather delays. 
The last goal, protection of the environment, is an area related 
to the reduction of aircraft noise and control of engine emission both 
through procedural changes to the air traffic control system and 
improvements to aircraft and aircraft engines. This goal is heavily 
supported by a number of FAA and NASA programs. 
Now, in looking ahead to the air traffic control system of the 
1990s and beyond, we see continued growth in the demand for services; 
a need to provide the higher level of automated coordination required 
to permit controllers to issue direct-route, fuel-efficient, 
conflict-free clearances in more of our air space; a continuing need 
to achieve the most efficient use of the nation's existing airports; 
and a pressing need to control the growth in the cost of providing the 
service. 
So, within this general context we see the future trends for the 
various elements of our system as follows. In the airport area we do 
not believe that there will be a significant number of new airports or 
even new runways at existing airports, particularly in the major 
terminal areas. Our current program to equip satellite airports with 
approach and landing aids and control services ~ay provide some added 
commercial capacity at these airports if such improvements in fact 
cause a migration of general aviation activities to the satellite 
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facilities. 
Hence, our programs in the airport area will continue to focus on 
increasing the life of runways, reiucing pavement test time, proviiing 
improvei airport surveillance systems, and, later in time, automated 
surface traffic control systems and improved hazardous weather and 
wind shear ietection forecasting and avoidance systems. These new 
systems, operating in conjunction with a more automated air traffic 
control system, will permit us to make the most efficient use of our 
airport resources, particularly in the high-density traffic areas. 
Airport capacity. Congressman Harkin brought that one up 
yesterday. The airport capacity program includes studies of each of 
the nation's high-density airports, that are coniucted to determine 
the improvements that are feasible at each airport and to assess the 
benefit of implementation of each of the possible improvements. ~his 
program covers a wide spectrum of improvements, incluiing aiditional 
runways, short runways, runway exits, taxiways, proce:iural changes, 
and systems that will permit reduced longitudinal spacing between 
aircraft on the final approach. The latter includes vortex wake 
detect ion, prediction, and avoidance and vortex alleviation on 
aircraft, automated ter~inal metering, and spacing systems. 
Improved automation and navigation systems on the aircraft will 
interface directly with the groun:i metering and spacing computer to 
offer still greater precision in the delivery of aircraft to the 
runway. 
Navigation. The navigation system today is based primarily on 
Vortac for short-range navigation and Omega and Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) for long-range navigation. Other aids are used, but 
these 'Ire the primary ones. INS, with external updating from other 
aids, is used in the continental U.S. as well as in oceanic areas an:i 
currently permits Air Traffic Control (ATC) to issue direct clearances 
to equipped aircraft, particularly in the area west of the Mississippi 
lliver. 'iHth the implementation of automated assistance to the 
controller in coordinating direct-route clearance between controllers, 
we expect that most high-altitude flights over the U.s. could be 
conducted via direct routing with the proper equipment in the aircraft. 
The demand for ATC service for low-altitude IFR helicopter 
operations is increasing rapidly, 'lnd development and test efforts 
have been increased with a view toward early certification of Loran-C 
as a supplementary aid to Vortac and Omega to meet these special user 
requirements in areas where the Loran-C coverage is adequate. 
Now, looking to the somewhat longer term, the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) may provide the basis for navigational services in some 
air space. ~-lhile many questions concerning this system are yet to be 
answered, such as its accuracy for civil use, the number of satellites 
to be used, the redundancy needed for satellite failure backup, and 
its vulnerability to hostile action, we believe that GPS may offer, in 
the 1990 time period, a global navigation service supporting the needs 
of aviation, particularly in the oceanic and lOW-density traffic areas 
throughout the world. Although use in :iomestic areas will depend to a 
large extent on dec isions yet to be taken, a development program is 
under way to explore the use of this system in all air space. 
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We believe that airborne navigation systems will contain area 
navigation computers that can accept n~vigation signals from a variety 
of sources, including INS, Omega, Loran, Vortac, GPS, and the 
~icrowave Landing System (XLS) and autom~tically adjust to the 
characteristics of the selected system and provide outputs to a 
variety of systems and displays, incluiins graphic displays. These 
new systems can ;:>rovide the pilot with guidance in reaching 
checkpoints at times and altitudes either generated internally by 
aircraft fuel performance computers or by the ground air traffic 
control system. 
The FAA is nearing the end of the development cycle on a number of 
the systems needed to provide the base on which the more efficient 
automated systems of the future will be built. These systems include 
the discreet address beacon system, the MLS, automated flight service 
stations, and aircraft separation assurance systems. The last 
includes conflict alert and conflict resolution to warn the controller 
of impending loss of separation, the automatic traffic advisory and 
resolution service, and the beacon collision avoidance system to warn 
the pilot of impending disaster. These systems are all scheduled for 
implementation during the 1980s. 
}1ajor development activities have already been started to produce 
the improvements needed to support the system of the 1990s. Some of 
the major efforts include: 
o Replacement of the present air traffic control computers, 
starting with those installed in our air route traffic 
control centers, with computers providing the greatly 
increased capacity and reliability needed for the future. 
This is planned for the late 1980s. 
o Upgrading of the communication system to provide for more 
efficient, more reliable, an1 lower cost services. 
o Development and implementation of a real-time severe weather 
detection, processing and display system to provide accurate 
identification of the hazardous are~s of storms to pilots and 
controllers. 
o Continued high emphasis on improving aircraft airworthiness 
and post-crash fire safety. 
o Airport and airspace capacity and delay programs will be 
expanded to provide a more efficient traffic flow management 
system. 
o Increased emphasis is being placed on the human factors 
programs to reduce the number of accidents attributable to 
human error. 
FAA engineering and development has looked to NASA for some of the 
basic research and technology develop~ent neeied in areas where the 
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current technology base is not adequate to support our program goals, 
as well as for some direct program support in critical program areas. 
The output from the NASA program provides the data base needed to 
formulate advisory circulars, regulations, and new air traffic control 
system improvements. I believe that the relationship between NASA and 
the FAA has been an extremely productive one, and steps are being 
taken continually to further strengthen it. 
The coordinated programs already cover a number of important 
areas, a few of which incluie aircraft safety, covering fire safety 
technology, the effects of using antimisting kerosene on jet engine 
performance and life, general aviation and transport aircraft crash-
worthiness, vortex alleviation, and landing dynamics. 
The second area, aircraft avionics systems covers advanced inte-
grated flight controls, the terminal configured vehicle programs, the 
MLS, heads-up displays, cockpit display of traffic information, 
automated terminal service, automated pilot advisory service, 
lightning effects on avionics, the low-cost GPS receiver, and general 
aviation technology programs. 
The materials and structures area, which was covered by Mr. 
Foster, includes the advanced composite materials and structures and 
lightning effects on composite materials. 
There are a lot of other areas, such as search and rescue equip-
ment, helicopter air traffic control operations, pilot training, and 
measurement techniques. 
Now, from this quick overview of the areas of the coordinated 
programs, you can see that much of the basic research and technology 
needed to support our future air traffic control system development 
are already well under way. We believe, however, that augmentation of 
several of these areas is needed because of the high payoff in terms 
of system improvement that would result from successful technology 
development. I have listed four. 
Certainly, vortex alleviation is near the top of the list. The 
introduction of the wide-bodied aircraft into the fleet highlighted 
the problem of weight vortices and resulted in increased aircraft 
separation minima. This, in turn, reduced the capacity of our major 
terminal facilities by 15 to 20 percent. Now, some capacity gains can 
be and have been achieved from procedural changes and implementation 
of our future automated systems, both air and ground. The technical 
problems associated with vortex alleviation, I realize, are very 
difficult but some encouraging results have come out of past tests. 
The payoff for successs is very high in terms of airport capacity. We 
would urge a continuing high level of effort in this area to identify 
techniques that would alleviate the strength of vortices. 
Human factors. In the human factors area, basic research is 
needed on the causes of human error and the effects of pilot boredom 
on performance, particularly in emergency conditions. Closely related 
to these factors is the need to ievelop improve1 warning systems that 
can prioritize and present the key actions a pilot must take when an 
emergency exists and every second is precious. 
The fire safety area. Much progress has been made in the 
development of an antimisting kerosene additive, and some encouraging 
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large-scale test results have been achieved~ Progress in the 
development of improved cabin materials has been somewhat less 
dramatic, and sustained high emphasis on new materi.a1s development 
continues to be needed. 
The use of simulators for pilot, aircraft, and rotorcraft 
certification is another area. While much progress has been made in 
the use of simulators for pilot certification and training, continued 
activity is needed to determine the extent to which simulators can be 
used in the certification process for aircraft and rotorcraft. NASA 
assistance is needed in the development of methods of verification and 
validation of computer models used by the manufacturers in the 
certification process. 
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HOW NASA CAN ASSIST THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN AERONAUTICS 
Gershom R. Makepeace 
Director, Engineering Technology 
Office of the Under Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering 
Department of Defense 
During the next few minutes I will try to give you a brief 
overview of how NASA can and does assist the Department of Defense 
(DOD) in aeronautics and particularly in aeronautics technology. I am 
sure that I do not need to describe to this group why aeronautics 
technology is of critical importance to the DOD. You may be 
interested, however, in a quantitative measure--dollars--of just how 
important it is. Table 1 shows data from our FY 1981 budget. More 
than $2 billion are allocated to Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) on aircraft and related equipment. Nearly $300 
million will go to system-oriented aeronautics technology, including 
aircraft engine technology as well as airframe technology. 
The operational uses for the DOD aircraft now in service, and for 
the technology of interest to this group, are listed in Table 2. Some 
of the new technology required to provide these capabilities is 
closely related to that needed by commercial aircraft--fuel economy, 
for instance--even though the reasons for needing it may not be 
entirely the same. We need increased range for logistic aircraft, 
with reluced fuel cost a secondary benefit. Commercial aircraft need 
lower operating costs, with greater range a secondary benefit. But 
the technology in this case is the same. In quite a few other areas, 
of course, DOD needs are not parallel to any commercial demand. In 
many of those cases, too, NASA provides direct support to us. 
As indicated in Table 3, DOD does not do all of its own aeronau-
tical technology work, or even the principal fraction of it. We have 
always relied upon a strong, complementary technology base in NASA, 
industry, and academia. DOD cannot and should not support a complete 
technology base activity covering all aspects of the application of 
air power to the DOD mission. 
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Table 4 itemizes the principal aspects of our relationship with 
NASA. Both agencies have statutory authority to conduct aeronautical 
research under the Space Act of 1958. NASA has extensive experimental 
facilities and concentrates on the scientific disciplines that form 
the aeronautics technology base for all development whether civil or 
military. DOD, on the other hand, is more systems oriented; however, 
the Department conducts sufficient basic research to maintain 
competency, does exploratory development pertinent to its operational 
needs, and carries out technology demonstration as needed to reduce 
system risk. 
NASA technical personnel currently assist DOD in all phases· of 
aircraft development, including preliminary design in which NASA helps 
with performance prediction assessment. For example, manufacturers 
may be required to submit wind tunnel models to NASA for independent 
evaluation, solving problems occurring in the flight test phase of 
development. NASA expertise is of immeasurable value when significant 
operational problems occur with military aircraft in service. For 
example, we rely on NASA's help in deriving aerodynamic modifications 
needed when external carriage of ordnance is required on operational 
aircraft that was not anticipated in the original aircraft design 
(Figure 1) or when changes in flight regime are require:! by changed 
operational needs--such as low-a1t itude penetrator flight patterns for 
the B-52. 
DOD and its contractors make extensive use of NASA experimental 
facilities. NASA has over 30 major aeronautical research facilities, 
some of which are unique in the Western world. Noteworthy examples 
are the 40- x 80-foot wind tunnel at the Ames Research Center in 
California and the transonic aerodynamics tunnel at the Research 
Center in Langley, Virginia. The DOD accounted for over 15,000 hours 
of NASA wind tunnel time during FY 1979. The cost of military 
aircraft development' would increase significantly if NASA facilities 
were not available, and some critical work could not be done at all. 
A very important joint DOD-NASA activity, now well along in 
implementation, is the cooperative development of major new 
aeronautical research facilities. Examples of these are the National 
Transonic Facility located at NASA's Langley Center, the 
Aeropropulsion Test Facility located at the USAF Arnold Engineering 
Development Center at Tullahoma, Tennessee, and the 80- x 120-foot 
tunnel at the NASA Ames Center in California. 
NASA has unique flight simulation capabilities that have been and 
are of great help to the DOD. The Differential Maneuvering Simulator 
at Langley is used for evaluation and development of new 
fighter/interceptor concepts. Similarly, the Flight Simulator for 
Advanced Aircraft at Ames in invaluable in the -ievelopment of short 
takeoff and landing (STOL) and large aircraft. The new Vertical 
Motion Simulator at Ames will be immensely important In development of 
V/STOL aircraft and advanced helicopter concepts. 
NASA/DOD joint programs in aeronautical technologies are in full 
and productive flower. Currently, there are more than 46 forna1 ani 
informal joint program agreements to develop and demonstrate 
aeronautical technologies of mutual interest. Recent examples of such 
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programs include the KC-135 winglets development, which reduces 
aircraft draft by 5 percent and increases range by reducing range 
consumption proportionately; shipboard STOL demonstration conducted by 
the Navy, utilizing the NASA-developed STOL demonstrator, the Quiet 
Short Haul Research Aircraft; and joint NASA/Army development of XV-IS 
Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft. 
NASA is the sole developer of technology for utility and transport 
type aircraft. DOD relies on NASA for this technology in the 
development of cargo transport and, to some extent, bomber aircraft. 
It should be noted that recent actions by the Office of ManageIDent and 
Budget curtailing NASA activity in the development of primary 
composite aircraft structures for large aircraft will have an adverse 
impact on the development of the next aircraft--the CX. There are 
insufficient resources in the military aircraft DOD program to take up 
the slack in this important effort. 
Table 5 lists several ways in which it is important that NASA 
assist DOD in the future. In particular, we would urge the following: 
1. NASA should maintain high interest in advanced aeronautics 
technology and continue to be the leading edge of technology oriented 
toward military aircraft development. The capability to explore and 
develop advanced technology when no formal "requirement" exists is 
vital to maintaining superior military aircraft. Examples of the kind 
of work we have in mind are the HIMAT Research Vehicle to demonstrate 
highly maneuverable fighter aircraft configurations and the F-16XL, 
the joint NASA/General Dynamics effort to develop a wing with 50 
percent increase in supersonic lift/drag ratio, increasing it from 4 
to 6 at mach 1. 6, while maintaining good transonic maneuver 
performance. 
2. NASA should carry technology development through the 
validation phase. This is necessary to ensure adequate technology 
readiness for new developments and to provide feedback to the 
technologist; technology cannot be developed open-loop. 
3. NASA should expand flight simulation activities and 
capabilities, particularly those related to defense needs. 
o Increased sophistication of aircraft and weaponry is causing 
paper analysis techniques to be of reduced value. The need 
for good simulation testing has increased to the point of 
indispensability. 
o NASA currently leads the United States and Western world in 
simulation capability and should maintain that lead. NASA 
simulation facilities and erpertise should be considered a 
national asset and supported accordingly. 
4. The present DOD-NASA relationships in aeronautics should be 
continued as a basic ingredient for a successful military capability. 
In summary, as noted in Table 6, it is concluded that NASA 
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aeronautics technology :levelopments are vital to DOD. This is the 
case in development and use of· RryT&E facilities as well as in 
technical expertise in all aspects of aeronautics. There are several 
reasons for this: 
o Advanced technology work must begin before requirements are 
clearly identified. To wait keeps us behind the "power 
curve" in terms of time and money and may ultimately affect 
the security of our country. 
o Flight validation of new technology gives us the information 
we need before we risk taking it. Furthermore, it provides 
the feedback needed by the technologist to refine and improve 
his technology. 
o Joint programs provide the stimulus needed to "force" 
technology to move forward. Specifically, they enable NASA 
technical personnel to become aware of DOD needs and at the 
same time provide necessary technical expertise to DOD. 
o Civil aircraft technology is and will remain very important 
to DOry, especially in the logistics aircraft fiel':!. We are 
totally dependent upon NASA for this technology. 
o Finally, we would encourage support for NASA to expand its 
flight simulator capability. It is already excellent and 
indispensa ble to our neeis, and as aeronaut lcal technology 
continues to develop it will become even more critical to us. 
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AERONAUTICAL TECHNOLOGY 
CRITICAL TO DOD 
IN FY 1981: 
.$2232. MILLIONS WILL BE SPENT ON RDT&E FOR 
AIRCRAFT AND RELATED EQUIPMENT 
THIS IS 13.5% OF THE RDT&E BUDGET FOR DOD 
;. $283. MILLIONS WILL BE SPENT ON AERONAUTICS 
TECHNOLOGY 
THIS IS 12.6% OF THE RDT&E BUDGET FOR 
AIRCRAFT 
IT IS 1.7% OF THE TOTAL RDT&E BUDGET 
TABLE 1 
MILITARY AIRCRAFT USED IN 
WIDE RANGE OF MISSIONS 
• GAIN AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE BATTLE AREA 
• INTERDICT MOVEMENTS OF ENEMY TROOPS AND 
MATERIEL 
• AUGMENT AND DIRECT GROUND AND SEA BASED 
FIRE POWER 
• FORWARD AREA SUPPLY 
• QUICK REACTION, LONG RANGE TROOP 
REINFORCEMENT AND SUPPLY 
• MAINTAIN SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION AND 
SUPPLY 
• STRATEGIC DETERRENCE 
TABLE ! 
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DOD RELIES UPON A 
COMPLEMENTARY TECHNOLOGY BASE 
ACTIVITIES INVOLVED ARE: 
• DOD LABORATORIES AND CONTRACTORS 
• NASA LABORATORIES AND CONTRACTORS 
• PRIVATE INDUSTRY THROUGH !R&D 
• UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 
NASA HAS A VERY LARGE ROLE IN MEETING 
DOD NEEDS 
TABLE 3 
PRESENT RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN DOD AND NASA 
A. BOTH AGENCIES CONDUCT AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH 
B. NASA PERSONNEL ASSIST DOD IN ALL PHASES OF 
AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT 
C. DOD MAKES EXTENSIVE USE OF NASA EXPERIMENTAL 
FACILITIES 
D. COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF MAJOR 
NEW AERO RESEARCH FACILITIES 
E. DOD RELIES UPON UNIQUE NASA FLIGHT SIMULATION 
CAPABILITIES 
F. MANY NASA/DOD JOINT PROGRAMS IN AERONAUTICAL 
TECHNOLOGIES 
G. DOD USES NASA CIVIL AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGY FOR 
UTILITY AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 
TABLE 4 
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FIGURE 1 F-16 with Ordnance 
WAYS FOR NASA TO CONTINUE AND 
INCREASE ASSISTANCE TO DOD 
A. SUSTAIN HIGH INTEREST AT THE LEADING 
EDGE OF MILITARY AERONAUTICS 
B. CARRY TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
THROUGH THE VALIDATION PHASE 
C. EXPAND FLIGHT SIMULATION ACTIVITIES 
AND CAPABILITIES 
D. CONTINUE PRESENT NASA - DOD 
RELATIONSHIPS 
TABLE 5 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. NASA AERONAUTICS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IS 
VITAL TO DOD 
B. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE 
TO MILITARY AIRCRAFT, MUST BE UNDERTAKEN BEFORE 
OBVIOUS REQUIREMENTS APPEAR 
C. FLIGHT VALIDATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IS NECESSARY 
D. JOINT PROGRAMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST MUST BE 
PURSUED 
E. CIVIL AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGY IS IMPORTANT TO DOD 
F. EXPANSION OF NASA FLIGHT SIMULATOR CAPABILITY 
WOULD HELP DOD 
TABLE 6 
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TqE EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF NACA AND NASA IN AERONAUTICS 
AND NASA'S AERONAUTICS CAPABILITIES 
Dr. Walter B. Olstad 
Acting Associate Administrator for 
Aeronautics and Space Technology 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
There are two sets of information that I am going to try and leave 
with you. The first has to do with the evolution of the role of NACA 
and NASA in aeronautics from the beginning of NACA up to the present 
time. The second has to do with NASA's aeronautics capability. I am 
going to try and give you an appreciation for that capability. I 
think I was helped to a great extent by the previous speaker, who made 
some flattering remarks and talked about some of our capabilities. 
I am going to spend a bit of time with Figure .1, which is a kind 
of timeline. 
Prior to 1915, the focus of aviation progress shifted from the 
U.S. to Europe after the early successes of the Wright brothers, 
Curtis, and others. The U.s. actually lost its lead in that time and, 
in fact, some research centers were established in England, Germany, 
and France, for example. Fortunately, the U.s. government became 
aware of this situation and decided that something ought to be done. 
So, in 1915, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics was 
formed, with its membership composed of leaders from government and 
universities. There were no industry representatives on the committee. 
Figure 2 shows the charter for NACA. The emphasis is on the 
scientific study of the problems of flight and also on their practical 
solution. The committee was also asked to determine which problems 
should be experimentally attacked and how to arrive at solutions and 
practical application. Those were the primary aspects of that NACA 
charter. 
When llorld War I came along and the NACA was just a committee in 
Washington, their first budget was something like $5000, and they were 
unable to use all of it. We have learned better since. 
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The committee, from what I have rea:i, really did not m3ke any 
major contributions to the war effort, with one exception. They 
convened a meeting of all the engine manufacturers and the procurement 
officers of the services to :iiscuss the problems of aircraft power 
plants. The meeting brought into sharp focus the problems involved in 
obtaining more powerful and more reliable engines for military air-
craft and ieve10ped an arrangement whereby the Society of Automotive 
Engineers became involved in providing assistance in solving aircraft 
powerp1ant problems. A year later, the NACA recommended the estab-
lishment of the Aircraft Production Board. A major U.S. contribution 
to aviation during World lvar I 'Nas the development of the Liberty 
engine. 
Huch of the effort of the committee at that time was directed 
towar:i the establishment of the first research cent2r. Originally it 
was to be colocated with the Army and with the Navy, all to do R&D at 
the same place. They chose Tj ang1ey Field as the location an:i then the 
Army deci:le:i no, we really want to :io our R&D at McCook FieH, which 
later became Wright-Patterson. The Navy deci:lej no, they would stay 
across Hampton Roads in Norfolk. There was an Army airfield at 
Langley, of course. 
On June 11, 1920, the Lan~ley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory was 
formally delicated. There were three bUildings at that time--one 
housing a tunnel, one an engine 'iynamometer, and another a research 
lab. 
Immediately after World War I, there was considered to be two 
major problems in aeronautics. The first was aerodynamics, and the 
second was power plants. NACA chose to work in aerodynamics, and the 
National Bureau of Standaris took on the role in power plants. 
Actually, they a1rea:iy had that role prior to the establishment of 
NACA. Also, the committee felt that the industry had excellent 
facilities and so it really wasn't necessary for the com'.1littee to 
concentrate on aircraft power plants at that time. 
In 1921, Max Munk joined Langley and brought to it his scientific 
expertise and his aggressiveness. He was a very prolific researcher, 
authoring or coauthoring some 57 reports in a period of 5 years. 
Perhaps more importantly, he was the driving force behind the develop-
ment of the Variable-Density ~ind Tunnel, which was a major advance in 
wind tunnel capability at that time. It gave the Langley researchers 
a capability for controlling Reynolds Number and led to the :ievelop-
ment of the NACA series of airfoils, which was one of the major 
contributions. 
In 1926, the Air Commerce Act was passed. This was a result of a 
great deal of debate starting in 1919. The Air Commerce Act estab-
lished the national aviation policy an,j also forned the Bureau of 
Aeronautics within the Commerce Department. It kept NACA separate 
from and independent of any other department and kept it as primarily 
a research organization. There was quite a bit of pressure to bring 
NACA under the Commerce Department at that time. It was really a lack 
of agreement on how to do that that kept it from happening and retaine:i 
NACA's independent status. 
In 1927, Lindbergh crossed the Atlantic in the Spirit of St. 
Louis. This event really brought aviation to the fore in the D.S. and 
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made people aware of it and prou-i of it and willing to spend money on 
it. The Propeller Research Tunnel was also developed at Langley that 
same year, which 'lllowed the ievelopment of the NACA cowling. This 
cowling work had been requested first by the military and then by the 
industry. It turned out to be a very interesting example of 
~overnment-in:lustry cooperation in which NACA iid the research" and 
developed cowling designs. However, they sent the blueprints out to 
industry for their comments and recommendations and then worked rather 
closely with the industry. 
That activity led to a flight demonstration. It was certainly not 
prototyping, but it was a flight demonstration of cowling technology 
and allowed it to be rather easily and qqickly incorporated into actual 
aircraft. 
The cowling was a major success and the committee capitalized on 
that success. As a result they were able to advocate successfully the 
Full-Scale Wind Tunnel and the Seaplane Towing Tank, which were built 
at Langley in 1930. 
In the late 1920s, iniustry representatives began to serve on NACA 
technical subcomllittees ani annual industry conferences were held at 
Langley. They used to get on the boat in Tlashington, come down the 
Chesapeake, stop at old Point Comfort, spend the night, go into Langley 
for the day, ani then get back on the boat to return to Uashington. 
~hose conferences later came to be calle:! inspections and became quite 
a regular thing. 
However, NACA generally refused to test industry models in their 
facilities. Iniustry would come with a request and NACA would 
respon:l, "No, we just don't wish to show favoritism to anyone 
company. Almost all of their work was done at the request of the 
military. There was a very strong military relationship then~ 
However, in 1931, after the Full-Scale Tunnel was built ani 
operating, a policy was established so that industry models could be 
tested on a fee basis and without any guarantee regariing proprietary 
rights. All the data were available to the government and to 
everybody else. 
This tended to favor the large, established companies, because it 
could cost quite a bit to get to the point where a model could be 
built for testing. In fact, a lot of the way that NACA and, in fact, 
NASA works with the industry ioes tend to favor the large, established 
companies. It is difficult not to. It is certainly difficult to find 
the innovative iniiviiual. NASA certainly can't locate him. He has 
to find NASA, and sometimes it is rather expensive for him to take 
advantage of our capability. 
In 1938, there was another act, the r.ivil Aeronautics Act, which 
split the Bureau of Aeronautics in the Comllerce Department into the 
CAB and the Civil Aeronautics Administration, which later became the 
FAA. A~ain, NACA remained iniepenient and again there was pressure to 
bring NACA in with these other organizations and put them under some 
other jepartment, but that W'lS resisted. At that time the voice of 
commercial aviation as opposed to military aviation was strengthened 
on the committee because the heais of these two newly formed organiza-
tions became members. 
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In the late 1930s, there was a growth of German aviation activity, 
also some Soviet activity. The Germans were rapidly building facili-
ties. They employed more scientists and engineers in their labora-
tories than did NACA, and in general they were better educated than 
those employed by NACA. This lei to a great deal of concern, and the 
Special Committee on Future Research Facilities was established to 
look into the situation. The special committee came up with what they 
called a ~obilization plan in 1939, in which it recommended the estab-
lishment of a seconi ~ACA laboratory. The reasons were, first, to 
relieve the workload at Langley; seconi, to iisperse the facilities in 
the event of attack; third, to locate close to a major segment of in-
justry that was now on the T.~est Coast; an:! fourth, to loc'lte ~lose to 
available power. The Ames Aeronautical Laboratory 'Nas "lpproved and 
began research in October 1940. 
Also in 1939, NACA eKpanded its subcommittee structure a::lding a 
great ~any industry representatives. So, as time went on the influence 
of in:!ustry on the committee was strengthening, although there were 
still no in::lustry representatives on the main committee. 
In 1940, the Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory was approved, 
which was to become Lewis. It was something of an afterthought. NACA, 
as I mentioned, had not been in the engine game. They had, back in the 
beginning, opted out of it. The recognition came that NACA really 
needed to do something and that it needed a laboratory. It was decided 
that it would be in Cleveland in order to be close to the engine indus-
try. Research began there in June 1942. 
During \\I'orld ~>1ar II, the great bulk of the NACA effort was devoted 
to cleanup and testing of prototype military aircraft. Every aircraft 
and engine used in H'orld War II was tested and/or approved in NACA 
facilities. There was little fundamental research going on ::lue to the 
press of the work of the day. NACA worked directly with industry. 
There were many industry representatives on-site. The idea of working 
through the mlllt'lry first to get to the iniustry just 1idn't matter. 
There was a war going on; there was a war effort. So, the 
relationship among the industry, the mil it'lry, and the ~ACA really 
grew close. 
The NACA manpower qua::lrupled during this period, and the industry 
and the military grew even faster. 
At the end of the war, the Administration put together a National 
Aeronautics Research Policy in which it was stated that NA~A was 
responsible for fundamental research, industry for development, and 
military for evaluation. There was general agreement on those points 
although there was no general agreement on what those things meant and 
where the boundaries were. Also, three industry representatives were 
named to the main committee for the first time. 
In the late 1940s and 1950s, the challenge of supersonic flight 
was a real impetus to the u.s. aeronautics program. It was partially 
based on a u.s. response to German progress made during the war, also, 
I think, partially based on perceived prestige and security issues 
associated with aviation leadership. It led to the research aircraft 
program, or the X-series of aircraft, which was a joint NACA-military-
industry effort. It worked very much like the wartime effort--very 
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close cooperation among the three partners on that activity. Again, 
industry people at the centers--it really iiin't matter who the 
sponsor of the activity was--everybody was working on the same team. 
In 1949, the NACA Hi'~h-Speed Flight Research Center was openeL 
Of course, that has since become Dryden. Also in 1949, the Unitary 
Wind Tunnel Plan Act was enacted with two titles. Title I was for the 
building of three wind tunnels for ~ACA--supersonic tunnels at Langley, 
Ames, and Lewis. That sot changed somewhat because A~es ended up with 
more than one. According to the intent of the Act, those wind tunnels 
were primarily for industry use. The industry had a lIery powerful 
influence in that Act and the wording of it. Title II led to the es-
tablishment of the Air Engineering Development Center, later to beco~e 
the Arnold Engineering nevelopment Center, in :ullahoma, Tennessee. 
In the early 1950s, the first transonic tunnels were ievelope-l. 
Rockets were used for transonic research. The first V/STOL demonstra-
tion aircraft was developel. There was quite a bit of activity going 
on at that time, with all kinds of facilities. 
In 1958, of course, the Space Age iawned and NASA was formed. 
This eliminated the committee structure and led to a very different 
kind of organization than ~hat was the NACA organization. The 
administrator now ,l1as an individual who was really preoccupied with 
space, because that beca~e the key thing in the program. However, the 
organization was still independent. It still played no regulatory 
role. 
The NASA charter is shown in Figure 3. Al Lovelace spoke about 
this the other day. There is still an emphasis on the fundamentals of 
the scientific aspect of the problem of flight, as well as an emphasis 
on the practical application. There is 'llso, now, an emphasis on 
preserving U.S. leadership in aviation and also a link 'l1ith the 
military. 
As a result of entering the Space Age and the concentration on 
that activity, both the manpower devoted to aeronautics and the 
aeronautics budget within NASA were cut to half their previous 
levels. Also about this time, the divergence between civil and 
military requirements for aircraft began to show up, which is an 
interesting factor in the role that NASA now plays. 
In the ~id-1960s and early 1970s, the NASA aeronautics capability 
was built back to about two-thirds of the previous peak manpmler. 
In 1968, ~ASA ~agan some long-range studies of commercial air 
transportation. These were taken on in cooperation with the FAA and 
with in::iustry and led to an emphasis on technology for commercial 
transport. 
In 1975, the Aircraft Energy Efficiency, or ACEE, program 'l1as 
approv~d, and in so~e respect this represented a different role. 
Formally, the Senate requested :~ASA to provide a ?lan for improving 
the efficiency of commercial transport aircraft. Of course they were 
interested in fuel economy, but they were also interested in the 
economic and conpetitive w'~'llth of the c::lm,nercial transport in1ustry. 
NASA and industry testified that NASA should go beyon::i the tradi-
tional R&T bounls in this activity and extend to the point 'l1here 
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results can be readily appliei by industry with relatively 51113.11 risk 
in terms of development cost ani schedule. Some elements of ACEE, but 
clearly not all of them, represent proluct improvement activities, such 
as the Engine CO'llponents Improvement program. ~ost elements of ACEE 
remain well within the traiitional areas. 
We are about halfway through the ACEE program now, and I feel that 
it is already proving to be hi,shly successful. ~le can alrealy point 
to quite a few accomplishments. The payback from ACEE will be many 
times the investment. However, I would note that the Alministra-
tion--you can read OMB there--considers ACEE a one-of-a-kind solution 
to a p~rticu13r problem that cropped up and not necessarily a prece-
dent. 
Figure 4 shows some slow, early growth in manpower and then, just 
prior to the 1940s, or right 3.round 19~O, Ames got going, and in 1942 
Lewis got going. There was, of course, the tremendous increase in 
manpower luring l-lorld 'lar II. Then, there was further growth after 
the war as NACA got into the supersonic program. With the beginning 
of the S?ace Age, in the late 1950s, the manpower dropped roughly to 
half its previous level. Then, there was a recovery over an 8- to 
10-year period to the current level, which is about two-thirds of the 
peak. 
I might point out that NASA now has more facilities. There is a 
greater diversity in the kinds of things we io, the number of 
disciplines we deal with. As a result, NASA manpower is thin. We are 
certainly spread more thinly than we were at the peak, obviously. 
The funding history shown in Figure 5 looks like a spectrum of 
some kini. Those !ire 1980 io11ars; so, this has b~en aijusted for 
inflation. There were major increases iuring ~lorld ~-lar II and -luring 
the commitment to the supersonic flight progra'll. The spike at about 
1950 represents the Unity Plan Wind ~unne1 Act. During the late 1950s 
and e3.rly 1960s, the budget iropped to about one-half the previous 
level. ~uring the late 1960s, it began growing again to where it has 
even passed the previous peak. 
There are a number of things going on, of course. Our manpower is 
less. ~le are depenHng more on industry, more on contract ing our 
activities. As I mentioned, there is a greater diversity of disci-
pline areas. ~here is more er.J.phasis on syste'lls kinds of activities 
and the use of 'llore sophisticated tools. Those tools cost more and 
also cost more to operate and maintain. There is a need to bring 
technology closer to application for reasons that have been discussed 
by other speakers. And program costs have increased faster than the 
inflation rate. 
The foregoing provides a background on how we got to today. Now, 
I would like to talk some about the NASA capability in aeronautics. 
Unfortunately, we have some numbers on Figure 6 that aren't as 
meaningful as they should be. \-lhat these numbers represent in terms 
of the staff are the total numbers at those centers. !-le had meant to 
give you the numbers devoted to the aeronautics programs only. I am 
going to read the proper numbers to you and also provide them to you 
in a separate handout. 
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The Civil Service staff ievoted to aeronautics at Am~s is 655 out 
of a total of 1645. At Langley, it is 1482. So, rou'Sh1y half of the 
Langley Civil Service staff is lire=tly ievoted to aeronauti=s. At 
Lewis it is 2111, and at Dryden it is 301. 
There is so~e additional ~anpower in the aeronautics progr~m not 
locatei at those four centers. There are, of course, people at head-
quarters and a number over at ~fallops. The total ~.rorking iirectly on 
the aeronautics program is 3772 in FY 1980. 
The nUlllbers in the right c:)1umn are correct. Those are what we 
call the R&D 10llars. They do not include construction of facilities, 
and they do not include salaries and overhead. 
NASA. working relationships are shown in Figure 7. ~le work with 
other government organizations as shown. There are many interfaces, a 
lot of interaction, informally. There is a lot of formal interaction. 
There are cooriinating com'llittees of many different kinds. There are 
several ways that we work with industry: the a:!visory committees, 
technical symposia, workshop conferences, contra=ts, obviously a very 
important way we work with industry. We also work with the universi-
ties. I sho~Jlri have said more about that earlier. There always has 
been a tie with the universities. :he first chairman of the NACA was 
"Brig. Gen. George Scriven, U.S. Army. Since then all chairlllen wer~ 
ci vilians. The second chairman was Professor Durand of Stanford and 
it is interesting that he also receive:! the first contract. No one 
worried about a conflict of interest ~ecause he was obviously the most 
qualifie1 iniividua1. 
Now, I want to talk about the individual centers. lfe will start 
wi,:h Ames. Somewhat arbitrarily we have grouped their capabilities in 
the four areas shown in Figure 8. The same four areas are shown on 
the left of t~e matrix in Fi~ure 9. The column heaUngs represent 
application areas--generic, general aviation, etc. Where there is a 
solid symbol, obviously, t~ere is a major emphasis. Where there is an 
open symbol the activity is applicable but is not the major role or 
major emphasis at that center. 
Figure 10 illustrates work in the theoretical ani computational 
analysis area. :bis part icular i llustrat ion sho~.rs both wind tunnel 
and calculate:! flow fie11s. These are calculations perfor'lled on the 
Illiac IV. Computational flow simulation is a real strength at Ames. 
In the ~dni tunnel experimental investigations area, Figure 11 
shows an example of V/STOL configuration work with a moiel tested in 
the ll-Foot, 40- by 80-Foot, and 12-Foot Wind Tunnels. Additional 
activities in the ll-Foot tunnel are shown in the lower half of the 
figure. One of the really nice features about the major Ames 
facilities is that the same model can be through the speei range from 
low subsonic to supersonic. Also the power costs are less at Ames 
than at other centers. 
Figure 12 illustrates the simulation an1 human factors area with a 
picture of the Fli.ght Simulator for Advanced Aircraft. It represents 
only a portion of the simulation capability of Ames. 
In the flight systems research and o?erations area 
number of efforts, some of which are shown in Figure 13. 
is the tilt rotor research aircraft pro~ram. There are 
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there are a 
f)ne of these 
two of these 
aircraft. One of them is being refurbished aft=r being testei in the 
40- by 80-Foot Wind i.'unnel. The other is to be delivered shortly to 
Uryien, \{here it will undergo adiitional envelope expansion flights. 
There are other flight facilities, like the quiet, short-haul, research 
aircraft (QSRA) and the rotor-systems research aircraft (RSRA), associ-
ated with Ames as well. 
At Dryden there are a number of areas of activity, as shown in 
Figure 14. The activities/applications matrix for Dryden is shown in 
Figure 15. 
Flight test techniques are illustratei in Figure 16. This shows 
one of the calibrated cones mounted on the nose of an air~raft, used 
to obtain flight data to compare with the wind tunnel 1ata in terms of 
transition Reynolds number; just one of many examples of flight test 
techniques activities that go on at Dryden. 
The flight test instrumentation area is illustrated in Fisure 17. 
This is an example of the HIMAT (Highly Haneuverable Aircraft 
i.'echnology) vehi~le in the flight structural loads rig test equipment. 
The HIMAT is a particularly interesting vehicle because aeroelastic 
tailoring was used in its design in an attempt to arrive at the optimum 
configuration under deflection due to flight loads. It is a remotely 
piloted vehicle and is one of a couple of remotely piloted vehicles at 
Dryden; the HIMAT ani the DAST, (Drone for Aeroelastic and Structural 
Tests) (Figure 18). ~Je work with these so that we ::an do higher-risk 
flight testing. 
Langley Research Center capabilities are shown in Figure 19 and 
the matrix is shown in Fi~ure 20. 
Aerodynamics and flight mechanics are illustrated in Figure 2l. 
This shows some activities to further improve wind tunnel facilities, 
:nagnetic balance ,,,ork, and crygenic wind tunnel technology. Under 
this category are the many major wind tunnel facilities at Lan~ley. 
The area of aeroelasticity is shown in Figure 22. We use tunnels 
like the Transonic ryynamics Tunnel, ~hich was mentioned as the 19-Foot 
Transonic Freon Tunnel. It provides a very unique capability for 
doing flutter research. Flutter suppression work as a military model 
is illustrated here. 
Figure 23 illustrates the materials, structures, an:i -lynamics 
area. These are examples of the kinds of things that go on--control, 
environmental effects, which all feed into safety, re lability, and 
economy. 
The electronics, avionics, and controls area is shown in Figure 
2~. Shown here is the neW airlab facility. ather examples of the 
activities in this area are simulators and the TCV (Terminal Config-
ured Ve~icle) air~raft. 
Figure 25 provides an example of efforts in airframe propulsion 
integration. The 8-Foot i.'ransonic Pressure Tunnel is shown. The 
l6-Foot and V/STOL Tunnels are also used. 
Acoustics and noise reduction activities are shown in Fi 5ure 26. 
The Aircraft Noise Reduction Laboratory and several 3cenes within that 
facility are illustrated. 
The final capability area at Langley is in vehicle systems techno-
logy. Shown in Figure 27 is the :)ifferential Maneuvering Simulator. 
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It is a unique f~~ility that has certainly gotten a lot of use in sup-
port of the military. I should also mention 'in important capability 
'it Langley that is not llste1 in Figure 19, and that is Lansley's capa-
bility in computer-aided design. 
The four primary capabi li ty areas for the Lewis Research Genter 
are sh~wn .in ~igure 28. They also appear again in the matrix presen-
ted in Figure 29. 
The first capability area illustrated is theoretical and computa-
tional analysis (see Figure 30). This is an area of great pronise and 
recent growth. Co~puters are now getting powerful enough and we are 
getting smart enough in our use of the computer to work on the very 
difficult internal flow problems. Shown is an experimental setup and 
a comparison of analysis against experiment. 
Fundamental research is illustrated in Figure 31. This is an 
example of advanced diagnostics using a laser velocimeter. Again, and 
this applies to all the centers, there has been a breakthrough in 
measurement techniques in the last few years with improvements in 
electronics and lasers, which allow nonintrusive iiagnostics and 
~easurements in the flow field rather than just on the surface of a 
model. This is very important in propulsion research. 
Advanced turbine work is sh3wn as an example of component R&T in 
Figure 32. There are compressor rigs, combuster rigs, power 
transmission facilities, high-pressure hot section facilities, and the 
like for doing component technology R&T at Lewis. 
The engine and propulsion system R&T example shown in Figure 33 is 
of the development and test of an advanced control theory for the 
F-lOO engine. The static engine test stan-:ls, altitude facility, 
propulsion tunnels, and icing research facility, among others, are 
used in this kin1 of activity. 
So, there is quite an overall capability available in NASA. A 
rough estimate is that there is a $3-$4 billion replacement value for 
the NASA aeronautical facilities. There is in-house expertise in all 
of the1isciplines mentionei from funiamental research up to systems 
technology. 
Figure 34 displays the capability in an overall matrix that shows 
a rather complete covera~e in critical areas. 
Thank you. 
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